--- a/handouts/ho01.tex	Sat Jan 03 23:14:47 2015 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho01.tex	Sun Mar 01 00:11:13 2015 +0000
@@ -639,8 +639,12 @@
 
 
 \end{document}
-%%% 
 
+%%% fingerprints  vs. passwords (what is better)
+https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVxL9ymiyAU&feature=youtu.be
+
+%%% cookies
+http://randomwalker.info/publications/cookie-surveillance-v2.pdf
 
 
 %%% Local Variables: 

Binary file handouts/ho06.pdf has changed

--- a/handouts/ho06.tex	Sat Jan 03 23:14:47 2015 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho06.tex	Sun Mar 01 00:11:13 2015 +0000
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
 \end{quote}
 
 \noindent 
-You could go on to look up the definition of the third
+You could go on looking up the definition of the third
 non-article in this definition and so on. But let us assume
 you agreed with Bob to stop after three iterations with the
 third non-article word in the last definition, that is
@@ -80,21 +80,21 @@
 were barred from publishing their results used also a hash to
 prove they did the work and (presumably) managed to get into
 cars without a key; see Figure~\ref{paper}. This is very
-similar to the method about crosswords: They like to prove
-that they did the work, but not giving out the ``solution''.
-But this also shows what the problem with such a method is:
-yes, we can hide the secret temporarily, but if somebody else
-wants to verify it, then the secret has to be made public. Bob
-needs to know that \textit{folio} is the solution before he
-can verify the claim that somebody else had the solution
-first. Similarly with the paper: we need to wait until the
-authors are finally allowed to publish their findings in order
-to verify the hash. This might happen at some point, but
-equally it might never happen (what for example happens if the
-authors lose their copy of the paper because of a disk
-failure?). Zero-knowledge proofs, in contrast, can be
-immediately checked, even if the secret is not public yet
-and perhaps never will be.
+similar to the method above about crosswords: They like to
+prove that they did the work, but not giving out the
+``solution''. But this also shows what the problem with such a
+method is: yes, we can hide the secret temporarily, but if
+somebody else wants to verify it, then the secret has to be
+made public. Bob needs to know that \textit{folio} is the
+solution before he can verify the claim of Alice that she had
+the solution first. Similarly with the car-crypto paper: we
+need to wait until the authors are finally allowed to publish
+their findings in order to verify the hash. This might happen
+at some point, but equally it might never happen (what for
+example happens if the authors lose their copy of the paper
+because of a disk failure?). Zero-knowledge proofs, in
+contrast, can be immediately checked, even if the secret is
+not public yet and perhaps never will be.
 
 \begin{figure}
 \begin{center}
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@
 If somehow Alice can find out before she committed to $H_i$,
 she can cheat. For this assume Alice does \emph{not} know an
 isomorphism between $G_1$ and $G_2$. If she knows which
-isomorphism Bob will ask for she can craft $H$ ins such a way
+isomorphism Bob will ask for she can craft $H$ in such a way
 that it is isomorphism with either $G_1$ or $G_2$ (but it
 cannot with both). Then in each case she would send Bob
 a correct answer and he would come to the conclusion that
@@ -407,6 +407,8 @@
 
 \end{document}
 
+http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/11/zero-knowledge-proofs-illustrated-primer.html
+
 http://btravers.weebly.com/uploads/6/7/2/9/6729909/zero_knowledge_technique.pdf
 http://zk-ssh.cms.ac/docs/Zero_Knowledge_Prinzipien.pdf
 http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/PS/zk-tut02v4.ps

Binary file handouts/ho09.pdf has changed

--- a/handouts/ho09.tex	Sat Jan 03 23:14:47 2015 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho09.tex	Sun Mar 01 00:11:13 2015 +0000
@@ -573,8 +573,10 @@
 \url{http://www.scala-lang.org}
 \end{quote}
 
-Let us have a look at the Scala code shown in Figure~\ref{code}.
-It shows the entire code 
+Let us have a look at the Scala code shown in
+Figure~\ref{code}. It shows the entire code for the
+interpreter, though the implementation is admittedly no
+frills.
 
 \begin{figure}[t]
 \small
@@ -596,6 +598,12 @@
  
 \end{document}
 
+%% list of static analysers for C
+http://spinroot.com/static/index.html
+
+%% NASA coding rules for C
+http://pixelscommander.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/P10.pdf
+
 %%% Local Variables: 
 %%% mode: latex
 %%% TeX-master: t

Binary file hws/hw01.pdf has changed

--- a/hws/hw01.tex	Sat Jan 03 23:14:47 2015 +0000
+++ b/hws/hw01.tex	Sun Mar 01 00:11:13 2015 +0000
@@ -40,6 +40,26 @@
   the business of stealing cars. What attack would be easier to
   perform if the lights do not flash?)
 
+\item Imagine you are at your home a broadband contract with
+      TalkTalk. You do not like their service and want to
+      switch, say, to ???. The procedure between the Internet
+      providers is that you contact ??? and set up a new
+      contract and they will automatically inform TalkTalk to
+      terminate the old contract. TalkTalk will then send you
+      a letter to confirm that you want to terminate. If they
+      do not hear from you otherwise, they will terminate the
+      contract and will request any outstanding cancellation
+      fees. Can you imagine in which situations this way of
+      doing things can cause you a lot of headaches? For this
+      consider that TalkTalk needs approximately 14 days to
+      reconnect you.
+      
+\item A water company has a device that transmits the meter
+      reading when their company car drives by. How can this 
+      transmitted data be abused, if not properly encrypted?      
+      If you identified an abuse, then how would you 
+      encrypt the data so that such an abuse is prevented.
+
 %\item Imagine there was recently a break in where computer criminals
 %  stole a large password database containing 
 

Binary file slides/slides06.pdf has changed

--- a/slides/slides06.tex	Sat Jan 03 23:14:47 2015 +0000
+++ b/slides/slides06.tex	Sun Mar 01 00:11:13 2015 +0000
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@
 
 \begin{itemize}
 \item \alert{\bf Completeness} If Alice knows the secret, Bob
-      accepts Alice ``proof'' for sure.\bigskip
+      accepts Alice's ``proof'' for sure.\bigskip
 \item \alert{\bf Soundness} If Alice does not know the secret,
       Bob accepts her ``proof'' with a very small probability.