slides04.tex
changeset 43 de3e32e10628
parent 41 b44341c0a7bb
child 44 1dcd758265f1
equal deleted inserted replaced
42:00fd79e0c41a 43:de3e32e10628
   390 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
   390 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
   391 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
   391 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
   392 It prevents problems when passwords are stolen. Man-in-the-middle attacks 
   392 It prevents problems when passwords are stolen. Man-in-the-middle attacks 
   393 still possible.\end{tabular}}
   393 still possible.\end{tabular}}
   394 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
   394 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
   395 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Your mobile phone or creditcard/pin might 
   395 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Your mobile phone or credit card/pin might 
   396 be stolen. SIM card become valuable.\end{tabular}}
   396 be stolen. SIM card become valuable.\end{tabular}}
   397 \item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
   397 \item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
   398 \only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright 
   398 \only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright 
   399 Banks need to establish an infrastructure. For you it might be inconvenient.\end{tabular}}
   399 Banks need to establish an infrastructure. For you it might be inconvenient.\end{tabular}}
   400 \item<7>[]{\bf\large Yes!}
   400 \item<7>[]{\bf\large Yes!}
   433 \begin{itemize}
   433 \begin{itemize}
   434 \item mean time to break the seals for a trained person: 100 s 
   434 \item mean time to break the seals for a trained person: 100 s 
   435 \end{itemize}\bigskip
   435 \end{itemize}\bigskip
   436 
   436 
   437 \item Andrew Appel defeated all security seals which were supposed to keep 
   437 \item Andrew Appel defeated all security seals which were supposed to keep 
   438 voting machines safe.
   438 voting machines safe
   439 \end{itemize}
   439 \end{itemize}
   440 
   440 
   441 
   441 
   442 \only<2>{
   442 \only<2>{
   443 \begin{textblock}{11}(1,1)
   443 \begin{textblock}{11}(1,1)
   474 
   474 
   475 \begin{itemize}
   475 \begin{itemize}
   476 \item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\
   476 \item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\
   477 \only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Voting machines, doors.\end{tabular}}
   477 \only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Voting machines, doors.\end{tabular}}
   478 \item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\
   478 \item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\
   479 \only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Casual thiefs, insider attacks.\end{tabular}}
   479 \only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Casual thieves, insider attacks.\end{tabular}}
   480 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
   480 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
   481 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
   481 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
   482 Needs a quite complicated security regiment.\end{tabular}}
   482 Needs a quite complicated security regiment.\end{tabular}}
   483 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
   483 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
   484 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright You might not notice tampering.\end{tabular}}
   484 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright You might not notice tampering.\end{tabular}}
   485 \item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
   485 \item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
   486 \only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright 
   486 \only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright 
   487 The ``hardware'' is cheap, but indirect costs can be quite high.\end{tabular}}
   487 The ``hardware'' is cheap, but indirect costs can be quite high.\end{tabular}}
   488 \item<7>[]{\bf\large No!} {\textcolor{gray}{Though in some areas they work: airport.}}
   488 \item<7>[]{\bf\large No!} {\textcolor{gray}{Though in some areas they work: airport, swimming pool}}
   489 \end{itemize}
   489 \end{itemize}
       
   490 
       
   491 
       
   492 \end{frame}}
       
   493 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   494 
       
   495 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   496 \mode<presentation>{
       
   497 \begin{frame}[t]
       
   498 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ex: Security by Obscurity\end{tabular}}
       
   499 
       
   500 You might think it is a good idea to keep a security relevant algorithm or 
       
   501 software secret.
       
   502 
       
   503 \begin{itemize}
       
   504 \item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\
       
   505 \only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}source code, an algorithm\end{tabular}}
       
   506 \item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\
       
   507 \only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
       
   508 Can be pretty high (Oystercards).\end{tabular}}
       
   509 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
       
   510 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
       
   511 Not really. The source code can be reverse engineered, stolen\ldots{}\end{tabular}}
       
   512 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
       
   513 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright You prevent
       
   514 scrutiny and independent advice. You also more likely than not,
       
   515 get it wrong.\end{tabular}}
       
   516 \item<5>[]{\bf\large No!}
       
   517 \end{itemize}
       
   518 
       
   519 
       
   520 \end{frame}}
       
   521 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   522 
       
   523 
       
   524 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   525 \mode<presentation>{
       
   526 \begin{frame}[t]
       
   527 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Voting as Security Problem\end{tabular}}
       
   528 
       
   529 What are the security requirements of a voting system?\bigskip
       
   530 
       
   531 \begin{itemize}
       
   532 \item<2->Integrity 
       
   533 \item<3->Ballot Secrecy
       
   534 \item<5->Voter Authentication
       
   535 \item<6->Enfranchisement
       
   536 \item<7->Availability
       
   537 \end{itemize}
       
   538 
       
   539 \only<2>{
       
   540 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
       
   541 \begin{tikzpicture}
       
   542 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] 
       
   543 {\small
       
   544 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
       
   545 \begin{center}
       
   546 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
       
   547 \begin{itemize}
       
   548 \item The outcome matches with the voter intend.
       
   549 \item There might be gigantic sums at stake.
       
   550 \end{itemize}
       
   551 \end{minipage}
       
   552 \end{center}
       
   553 \end{minipage}};
       
   554 \end{tikzpicture}
       
   555 \end{textblock}}
       
   556 
       
   557 \only<4>{
       
   558 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
       
   559 \begin{tikzpicture}
       
   560 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] 
       
   561 {\small
       
   562 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
       
   563 \begin{center}
       
   564 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
       
   565 \begin{itemize}
       
   566 \item Nobody can find out how you voted.
       
   567 \item (Stronger) Even if you try, you cannot prove how you voted.
       
   568 \end{itemize}
       
   569 \end{minipage}
       
   570 \end{center}
       
   571 \end{minipage}};
       
   572 \end{tikzpicture}
       
   573 \end{textblock}}
       
   574 
       
   575 \only<5>{
       
   576 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
       
   577 \begin{tikzpicture}
       
   578 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] 
       
   579 {\small
       
   580 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
       
   581 \begin{center}
       
   582 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
       
   583 \begin{itemize}
       
   584 \item Only authorised voters can vote up to the permitted number of votes.
       
   585 \end{itemize}
       
   586 \end{minipage}
       
   587 \end{center}
       
   588 \end{minipage}};
       
   589 \end{tikzpicture}
       
   590 \end{textblock}}
       
   591 
       
   592 \only<6>{
       
   593 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
       
   594 \begin{tikzpicture}
       
   595 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] 
       
   596 {\small
       
   597 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
       
   598 \begin{center}
       
   599 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
       
   600 \begin{itemize}
       
   601 \item Only authorised voters should be able to vote up to the permitted number of votes.
       
   602 \end{itemize}
       
   603 \end{minipage}
       
   604 \end{center}
       
   605 \end{minipage}};
       
   606 \end{tikzpicture}
       
   607 \end{textblock}}
       
   608 
       
   609 \only<7>{
       
   610 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
       
   611 \begin{tikzpicture}
       
   612 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] 
       
   613 {\small
       
   614 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
       
   615 \begin{center}
       
   616 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
       
   617 \begin{itemize}
       
   618 \item The voting system should accept all authorised votes and produce results in a timely manner.
       
   619 \end{itemize}
       
   620 \end{minipage}
       
   621 \end{center}
       
   622 \end{minipage}};
       
   623 \end{tikzpicture}
       
   624 \end{textblock}}
       
   625 
       
   626 \only<6>{
       
   627 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
       
   628 \begin{tikzpicture}
       
   629 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] 
       
   630 {\small
       
   631 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
       
   632 \begin{center}
       
   633 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
       
   634 \begin{itemize}
       
   635 \item Only authorised voters should be able to vote up to the permitted number of votes.
       
   636 \end{itemize}
       
   637 \end{minipage}
       
   638 \end{center}
       
   639 \end{minipage}};
       
   640 \end{tikzpicture}
       
   641 \end{textblock}}
       
   642 
       
   643 \end{frame}}
       
   644 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   645 
       
   646 
       
   647 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   648 \mode<presentation>{
       
   649 \begin{frame}[t]
       
   650 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ballot Boxes\end{tabular}}
       
   651 
       
   652 
       
   653 \begin{center}
       
   654 \includegraphics[scale=2.5]{pics/ballotbox.jpg}
       
   655 \end{center}
       
   656 
       
   657 
       
   658 \end{frame}}
       
   659 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   660 
       
   661 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   662 \mode<presentation>{
       
   663 \begin{frame}[t]
       
   664 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Problems with Voting\end{tabular}}
       
   665 
       
   666 
       
   667 \begin{center}\large
       
   668 \begin{tabular}{rcl}
       
   669 Integrity & vs. & Ballot Secrecy\bigskip\\
       
   670 Authentication & vs. &Enfranchisement   
       
   671 \end{tabular}
       
   672 \end{center}\bigskip\bigskip\pause
       
   673 
       
   674 Further constraints:
       
   675 
       
   676 \begin{itemize}
       
   677 \item costs
       
   678 \item accessibility
       
   679 \item convenience
       
   680 \item intelligibility 
       
   681 \end{itemize}
       
   682 \end{frame}}
       
   683 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   684 
       
   685 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   686 \mode<presentation>{
       
   687 \begin{frame}[t]
       
   688 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}}
       
   689 
       
   690 
       
   691 \begin{itemize}
       
   692 \item The Netherlands, between 1997 - 2006 had electronic voting machines\\
       
   693 \textcolor{gray}{(it has been found that they could be hacked and emitted radio signals)}
       
   694 
       
   695 \item Germany, had been used in pilot studies\\ 
       
   696 \textcolor{gray}{(in 2007 a law suit has reached the highest court and it rejected electronic voting
       
   697 on the grounds of not being understandable by the general public)}
       
   698 
       
   699 \item UK, used optical scan voting systems in a few polls
       
   700 \end{itemize}
       
   701 \end{frame}}
       
   702 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   703 
       
   704 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   705 \mode<presentation>{
       
   706 \begin{frame}[t]
       
   707 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}}
       
   708 
       
   709 \mbox{}\\[-12mm]
       
   710 \begin{itemize}
       
   711 \item US, used mechanical machines since the 50s, later punch cards, DREs and 
       
   712 optical scan voting machines \textcolor{gray}{(fantastic ``ecosystem'' for research)}
       
   713 
       
   714 \item Estonia used in 2007 the world's first Internet vote in national elections (there are earlier pilot studies)
       
   715 
       
   716 \item India, the biggest democracy uses e-voting devices  since at least 2003\\
       
   717 \textcolor{gray}{(keep-it-simple machines produced by a government owned company)}
       
   718 
       
   719 \item South Africa used software for its tallying in the 1993 elections (Nelson Mandela)
       
   720 \textcolor{gray}{(they found the software was rigged, but they were able to manually tally)}
       
   721 \end{itemize}
       
   722 \end{frame}}
       
   723 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   724 
       
   725 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   726 \mode<presentation>{
       
   727 \begin{frame}[t]
       
   728 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}A Brief History of Voting\end{tabular}}
       
   729 
       
   730 
       
   731 \begin{itemize}
       
   732 \item Athenians
       
   733 \begin{itemize}
       
   734 \item show of hands
       
   735 \item ballots on pieces of pottery
       
   736 \item different colours of stones
       
   737 \item ``facebook''-like autorisation 
       
   738 \end{itemize}\bigskip
       
   739 
       
   740 \item French Revolution and the US Constitution got things ``started'' with 
       
   741 paper ballots (you first had to bring your own, or later were pre-printed by the parties)
       
   742 \end{itemize}
       
   743 \end{frame}}
       
   744 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   745 
       
   746 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   747 \mode<presentation>{
       
   748 \begin{frame}[t]
       
   749 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Paper Ballots\end{tabular}}
       
   750 
       
   751 What can go wrong with paper ballots?
       
   752 
       
   753 \only<2>{
       
   754 \begin{center}
       
   755 \includegraphics[scale=0.8]{pics/tweet.jpg}\\
       
   756 \footnotesize William M.~Tweed, US Politician in 1860's\\
       
   757 ``As long as I count the votes, what are you going to do about it?''
       
   758 \end{center}}
       
   759 
       
   760 \only<3>{
       
   761 \medskip
       
   762 \begin{center}
       
   763 \begin{minipage}{10cm}
       
   764 {\bf Chain Voting Attack}
       
   765 \begin{enumerate}
       
   766 \item you obtain a blank ballot and fill it out as you want
       
   767 \item you give it to a voter outside the polling station
       
   768 \item voter receives a new blank ballot
       
   769 \item voter submits prefilled ballot
       
   770 \item voter gives blank ballot to you, you give money
       
   771 \item goto 1
       
   772 \end{enumerate}
       
   773 \end{minipage}
       
   774 \end{center}
       
   775 }
       
   776 
       
   777 \end{frame}}
       
   778 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   779 
       
   780 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   781 \mode<presentation>{
       
   782 \begin{frame}[t]
       
   783 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Mechanical Voting Machines\end{tabular}}
       
   784 
       
   785 \begin{itemize}
       
   786 \item<1-> Lever Voting Machines (ca.~1930 - 1990)
       
   787 \only<1>{
       
   788 \begin{center}
       
   789 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/leavermachine.jpg}
       
   790 \end{center}
       
   791 }
       
   792 \item<2->Punch Cards (ca.~1950 - 2000)
       
   793 \only<2>{
       
   794 \begin{center}
       
   795 \includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/punchcard1.jpg}\;\;
       
   796 \includegraphics[scale=0.46]{pics/punchcard2.jpg}
       
   797 \end{center}
       
   798 }
       
   799 \end{itemize}
       
   800 
       
   801 \end{frame}}
       
   802 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   803 
       
   804 
       
   805 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   806 \mode<presentation>{
       
   807 \begin{frame}[c]
       
   808 
       
   809 \begin{center}
       
   810 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting1.png}
       
   811 \end{center}
       
   812 
       
   813 
       
   814 \end{frame}}
       
   815 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   816 
       
   817 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   818 \mode<presentation>{
       
   819 \begin{frame}[c]
       
   820 
       
   821 \begin{center}
       
   822 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting2.png}
       
   823 \end{center}
       
   824 
       
   825 
       
   826 \end{frame}}
       
   827 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   828 
       
   829 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   830 \mode<presentation>{
       
   831 \begin{frame}[c]
       
   832 
       
   833 \begin{center}
       
   834 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting3.png}
       
   835 \end{center}
       
   836 
       
   837 
       
   838 \end{frame}}
       
   839 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   840 
       
   841 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   842 \mode<presentation>{
       
   843 \begin{frame}[c]
       
   844 
       
   845 \begin{center}
       
   846 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting4.png}
       
   847 \end{center}
   490 
   848 
   491 
   849 
   492 \end{frame}}
   850 \end{frame}}
   493 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
   851 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
   494 
   852