\documentclass[dvipsnames,14pt,t]{beamer}

\usepackage{../slides}

\usepackage{../graphics}

\usepackage{../langs}

\setmonofont[Scale=.88]{Consolas}

\newfontfamily{\consolas}{Consolas}

\hfuzz=220pt 

% beamer stuff 

\renewcommand{\slidecaption}{APP 03, King's College London}

\begin{document}

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\begin{frame}[t]

\frametitle{%

  \begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}

  \\

  \LARGE Access Control and \\[-3mm] 

  \LARGE Privacy Policies (3)\\[-6mm] 

  \end{tabular}}\bigskip\bigskip\bigskip

  \normalsize

  \begin{center}

  \begin{tabular}{ll}

  Email:  & christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk\\

  Office: & S1.27 (1st floor Strand Building)\\

  Slides: & KEATS (also home work is there)

  \end{tabular}

  \end{center}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}Network Applications:\\[-1mm] Privilege Separation\end{tabular}}

\begin{center}

  \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-.3, 0) rectangle (1.5,2);

  \draw (4.7,1) node {Internet};

  \draw (-2.7,1.7) node {\footnotesize Application};

  \draw (0.6,1.7) node {\footnotesize Interface};

  \draw (0.6,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}unprivileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}};

  \draw (-2.7,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}privileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1.8, 0) rectangle (-3.6,2);

  \draw[white] (1.7,1) node (X) {};

  \draw[white] (3.7,1) node (Y) {};

  \draw[red, <->, line width = 2mm] (X) -- (Y);

  \draw[red, <->, line width = 1mm] (-0.6,1) -- (-1.6,1);

  \end{tikzpicture}

\end{center}

\begin{itemize}

\item the idea is make the attack surface smaller and 

mitigate the consequences of an attack

\item you need an OS that supports different roles (root vs.~users)

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{Weaknesses of Unix AC}

\begin{itemize}

\item if you have too many roles (for example too finegrained AC), then

  hierarchy is too complex\medskip\\ \textcolor{gray}{you invite situations

    like\ldots let's be root}\bigskip

\item you can still abuse the system\ldots

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{A ``Cron''-Attack}

The idea is to trick a privileged person to do something on your

behalf:

\begin{itemize}

\item root:\\\texttt{rm /tmp/*/*}\bigskip\bigskip\pause

\small

\begin{minipage}{1.1\textwidth}

\textcolor{gray}{the shell behind the scenes:}\\

\textcolor{gray}{\texttt{rm /tmp/dir$_1$/file$_1$ /tmp/dir$_1$/file$_2$ /tmp/dir$_2$/file$_1$ \ldots}}\bigskip\\

\textcolor{gray}{this takes time}

\end{minipage}

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{A ``Cron''-Attack}

\begin{enumerate}

\item attacker \textcolor{gray}{(creates a fake passwd file)}\\ 

\texttt{mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd}\medskip

\item root \textcolor{gray}{(does the daily cleaning)}\\

\texttt{rm /tmp/*/*}\medskip\\

\hspace{2cm}\textcolor{gray}{records that \texttt{/tmp/a/passwd}}\\ 

\hspace{2cm}\textcolor{gray}{should be deleted, but does not do it yet}\medskip\\

\item attacker \textcolor{gray}{(meanwhile deletes the fake passwd file, and establishes a link to 

the real passwd file)}\\

\texttt{rm /tmp/a/passwd; rmdir /tmp/a;}\\\texttt{ln -s /etc /tmp/a}\\

\item root now deletes  the real passwd file

\end{enumerate}

\only<2>{

\begin{textblock}{11}(2,5)

\begin{tikzpicture}

\draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm] 

{\normalsize\color{darkgray}

\begin{minipage}{9.5cm}\raggedright

To prevent this kind of attack, you need additional

policies (don't do such operations as root).

\end{minipage}};

\end{tikzpicture}

\end{textblock}}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{\Large Buffer Overflow Attacks}

\begin{center}

\begin{columns}[b]

\begin{column}{.4\textwidth}

\centering

\includegraphics[scale=1.2]{../pics/barrier.jpg}\\

lectures so far

\end{column}

\begin{column}<2>{.4\textwidth}

\centering

\includegraphics[scale=0.32]{../pics/trainwreck.jpg}\\

today

\end{column}

\end{columns}

\end{center}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{Smash the Stack for Fun\ldots}

\begin{itemize}

\item {\bf Buffer Overflow Attacks} or\\ {\bf Smashing the Stack Attacks}\medskip

\item one of the most popular attacks, unfortunately\\ 

($>$ 50\% of security incidents reported at CERT are related 

to buffer overflows)

\begin{flushright}

\small\url{http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls}

\end{flushright}

\medskip

\item made popular in an article from 1996 by Elias Levy

(also known as Aleph One):\\

\begin{center}

{\bf ``Smashing The Stack For Fun and Profit''}

\end{center}\medskip

\begin{flushright}

\small\url{http://phrack.org/issues/49/14.html}

\end{flushright} 

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{A Long Printed ``Twice''}

\mbox{}\\[-10mm]

\footnotesize

\lstinputlisting[language=C,xleftmargin=4mm]{../progs/C0.c}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{``A Login Function'' (1)}

\mbox{}\\[-10mm]

\footnotesize

\lstinputlisting[language=C,xleftmargin=4mm]{../progs/C2a.c}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{``A Login Function'' (2)}

\mbox{}\\[-10mm]

\footnotesize

\lstinputlisting[language=C,xleftmargin=-3mm]{../progs/C2b.c}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{What the Hell Is Going On?}

\begin{itemize}

\item Let's start with a very simple program:

\end{itemize}

\lstinputlisting[language=C,xleftmargin=4mm]{../progs/example1.c}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{Memory}

\begin{itemize}

\item each process will get a chunk of memory that is organised as

follows:

\end{itemize}

\begin{center}

  \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=0.8]

  %\draw[step=1cm] (-3,-3) grid (3,3);

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-2, -3) rectangle (2,3);

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-2,1) -- (2,1);

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-2,-1) -- (2,-1);

  \draw (0,2) node {\large\tt text};

  \draw (0,0) node {\large\tt heap};

  \draw (0,-2) node {\large\tt stack};

  \draw (-2.7,3) node[anchor=north east] {\tt\begin{tabular}{@{}l@{}}lower\\ address\end{tabular}};

  \draw (-2.7,-3) node[anchor=south east] {\tt\begin{tabular}{@{}l@{}}higher\\ address\end{tabular}};

  \draw[->, line width=1mm] (-2.5,3) -- (-2.5,-3);

  \draw (2.7,-2) node[anchor=west] {\tt grows};

  \draw (2.7,-3) node[anchor=south west] {\tt\footnotesize older};

  \draw (2.7,-1) node[anchor=north west] {\tt\footnotesize newer};

  \draw[|->, line width=1mm] (2.5,-3) -- (2.5,-1);

  \end{tikzpicture}

\end{center}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{The Stack}

\begin{textblock}{7}(1,1)

  \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=0.8]

  %\draw[step=1cm] (-3,-1) grid (3,8);

  \draw[gray!20,fill=gray!20] (-1, 0) rectangle (1,-1);

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1,-1.2) -- (-1,7.4);

  \draw[line width=1mm] ( 1,-1.2) -- ( 1,7.4);

  \draw (0,-1) node[anchor=south] {\tt main};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1,0) -- (1,0);

  \draw (0,0) node[anchor=south] {\tt arg$_3$=3};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1,1) -- (1,1);

  \draw (0,1) node[anchor=south] {\tt arg$_2$=2};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1,2) -- (1,2);

  \draw (0,2) node[anchor=south] {\tt arg$_1$=1};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1,3) -- (1,3);

  \draw (0,3.1) node[anchor=south] {\tt ret};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1,4) -- (1,4);

  \draw (0,4) node[anchor=south] {\small\tt last sp};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1,5) -- (1,5);

  \draw (0,5) node[anchor=south] {\tt buf$_1$};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1,6) -- (1,6);

  \draw (0,6) node[anchor=south] {\tt buf$_2$};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1,7) -- (1,7);

  \draw (2,6.1) node[anchor=south] {\code{$esp}};

  \draw[<-,line width=0.5mm] (1.1,7) -- (2.5,7);

  \draw[->,line width=0.5mm] (1,4.5) -- (1.8,4.5) -- (1.8, 0) -- (1.1,0); 

  \draw[->,line width=0.5mm] (1,3.5) -- (2.5,3.5);

  \draw (2.6,3.1) node[anchor=south west] {\tt back to main()};

  \draw[->,red,line width=2mm] (2.5,0.1) -- (4.2,0.1);

\end{tikzpicture}

\end{textblock}

\begin{textblock}{7}(6.4,8)

\begin{bubble}[6.8cm]

\footnotesize

\lstinputlisting[language=C,xleftmargin=5mm]{../progs/example1.c} 

\end{bubble}

\end{textblock}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{Behind the Scenes}

machine code

\end{frame}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}Network Applications:\\[-1mm] Privilege Separation\end{tabular}}

\begin{center}

  \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-.3, 0) rectangle (1.5,2);

  \draw (4.7,1) node {Internet};

  \draw (-2.7,1.7) node {\footnotesize Application};

  \draw (0.6,1.7) node {\footnotesize Interface};

  \draw (0.6,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}unprivileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}};

  \draw (-2.7,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}privileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}};

  \draw[line width=1mm] (-1.8, 0) rectangle (-3.6,2);

  \draw[white] (1.7,1) node (X) {};

  \draw[white] (3.7,1) node (Y) {};

  \draw[red, <->, line width = 2mm] (X) -- (Y);

  \draw[red, <->, line width = 1mm] (-0.6,1) -- (-1.6,1);

  \end{tikzpicture}

\end{center}

\begin{itemize}

\item the idea is make the attack surface smaller and mitigate the

  consequences of an attack

\item you need an OS that supports different roles (root vs.~users)

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{Weaknesses of Unix AC}

Not just restricted to Unix:

\begin{itemize}

\item if you have too many roles (i.e.~too finegrained AC), then

  hierarchy is too complex\\ \textcolor{gray}{you invite situations

    like\ldots let's be root}\bigskip

\item you can still abuse the system\ldots

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{A ``Cron''-Attack}

\begin{enumerate}

\item attacker \textcolor{gray}{(creates a fake passwd file)}\\ 

\texttt{mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd}\medskip

\item root \textcolor{gray}{(does the daily cleaning)}\\

\texttt{rm /tmp/*/*}\medskip\\

\hspace{2cm}\textcolor{gray}{\small records that \texttt{/tmp/a/passwd}}\\ 

\hspace{2cm}\textcolor{gray}{\small should be deleted, but does not do it yet}\medskip\\

\item attacker \textcolor{gray}{(meanwhile deletes the fake passwd file, and establishes a link to 

the real passwd file)}\\

\texttt{rm /tmp/a/passwd; rmdir /tmp/a;}\\\texttt{ln -s /etc /tmp/a}\\

\item root now deletes  the real passwd file

\end{enumerate}

\only<2>{

\begin{textblock}{11}(2,5)

\begin{bubble}[8cm]

\normalsize To prevent this kind of attack, you need additional

policies (don't do such operations as root).

\end{bubble}

\end{textblock}}

\end{frame}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{The Problem}

\begin{itemize}

\item The basic problem is that library routines in C look as follows:

\end{itemize}

\begin{center}

\small\lstinputlisting[language=C,numbers=none]{../progs/app5.c}

\end{center}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{Variants}

There are many variants:

\begin{itemize}

\item return-to-lib-C attacks

\item heap-smashing attacks\\

\textcolor{gray}{\small(Slammer Worm in 2003 infected 90\% of vulnerable systems within 10 minutes)}\bigskip

\item ``zero-days-attacks'' (new unknown vulnerability)

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

{\small\lstinputlisting[language=C]{../progs/C2.c}}

\end{frame}

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%\mode<presentation>{

%\begin{frame}[c]

%

%\small

%A programmer might be careful, but still introduce vulnerabilities:\bigskip

%

%{\lstset{language=Java}\footnotesize

%\texttt{\lstinputlisting{../progs/C2a.c}}}

%

% 

%\end{frame}}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{Payloads}

\begin{itemize}

\item the idea is you store some code to the buffer

\item you then override the return address to execute this payload\medskip

\item normally you start a root-shell\pause

\item difficulty is to guess the right place where to ``jump''

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}

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\begin{frame}[c]

\frametitle{Payloads (2)}

\begin{itemize}

\item another difficulty is that the code is not allowed to contain \texttt{$\backslash$x00}:

\begin{center}

\texttt{xorl   \%eax, \%eax}

\end{center}

\end{itemize}\bigskip\bigskip

{\small

\lstinputlisting[language=C]{../progs/app5.c}}