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%\documentclass[10pt, conference, compsocconf]{IEEEtran}
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\begin{document}
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\pagestyle{empty}
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\noindent
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The co-authors Xingyuan Zhang and Christian Urban attest that the student
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Chunhan Wu did all the central
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work concerning the paper.\bigskip\bigskip
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\includegraphics[scale=0.9]{xingyuan.jpg}\\
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\noindent
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Xingyuan Zhang
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\bigskip\bigskip
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\mbox{}\hspace{-8mm}\includegraphics[scale=1.2]{christian.jpg}\\
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\noindent
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Christian Urban
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\newpage
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\title{A Formal Model and Correctness Proof for an Access Control Policy Framework}
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\author{Chunhan Wu\inst{1,2} \and Xingyuan Zhang\inst{1} \and Christian Urban\inst{2}}
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\institute{PLA University of Science and Technology, China \and King's College London, UK}
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%\author{\IEEEauthorblockN{Chunhan Wu\IEEEauthorrefmark{1}\IEEEauthorrefmark{2},
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%Xingyuan Zhang\IEEEauthorrefmark{1} and
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%Christian Urban\IEEEauthorrefmark{2}}
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%\IEEEauthorblockA{\IEEEauthorrefmark{1}PLA University of Science and Technology, Nanjing, China\\
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%Email: wuchunhan@gmail.com, xingyuanzhang@126.com}
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%\IEEEauthorblockA{\IEEEauthorrefmark{2}King's College London, London, UK\\
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%Email: christian.urban@kcl.ac.uk}
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%}
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\maketitle
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\begin{abstract}
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If an access control policy promises that a resource is protected in a
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system, how do we know it is really protected? To give an answer we
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formalise in this paper the Role-Compatibility Model---a framework,
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introduced by Ott, in which access control policies can be
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expressed. We also give a dynamic model determining which security
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related events can happen while a system is running. We prove that if
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a policy in this framework ensures a resource is protected, then there
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is really no sequence of events that would compromise the security of
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this resource. We also prove the opposite: if a policy does not
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prevent a security compromise of a resource, then there is a sequence
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of events that will compromise it. Consequently, a static policy
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check is sufficient (sound and complete) in order to guarantee or
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expose the security of resources before running the system. Our
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formal models and correctness proofs are mechanised in the
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Isabelle/HOL theorem prover using Paulson's inductive method for
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reasoning about valid sequences of events. Our results apply to the
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Role-Compatibility Model, but can be readily adapted to other
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role-based access control models.
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\end{abstract}
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%\begin{IEEEkeywords}
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%Security, Role-Based Access Control, Verification, Isabelle/HOL, Inductive Method
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%\end{IEEEkeywords}
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\bibliographystyle{abbrv}
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\bibliography{root}
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\end{document}
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%%% End:
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