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1 <!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN"> |
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2 <html> |
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3 <head> |
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4 <title>TPHOLs 2009</title> |
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5 <script src="http://maps.google.com/maps?file=api&v=2&key=ABQIAAAAPK7aMC4FDjV_GNRHDThC1BTTdYAvEcsK2WWznOVPgLglzb1KQhR1cqhbUMaTXEN7XtSXuQxbViAeQg" |
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11 var map = new GMap2(document.getElementById("map_canvas")); |
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12 var TUM = new GLatLng(48.12954444444, 11.588652777777778); |
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13 map.setCenter(TUM, 0); |
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21 </head> |
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22 |
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23 <BODY TEXT="#000000" |
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24 BGCOLOR="#4169E1" |
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25 LINK="#0000EF" |
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26 VLINK="#51188E" |
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27 ALINK="#FF0000" |
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28 onload="initialize()" onunload="GUnload()"> |
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29 |
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30 <TABLE WIDTH="100%" |
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31 BGCOLOR="#4169E1" |
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32 BORDER="0" |
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33 FRAME="border" |
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34 CELLPADDING="10" |
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35 CELLSPACING="2" |
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36 RULES="all"> |
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37 |
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38 <!-- left column --> |
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39 <TR> |
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40 <TD BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF" |
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41 WIDTH="20%" |
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42 VALIGN="TOP" |
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43 ROWSPAN="2"> |
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44 |
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45 <p align=center> |
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46 <a href="pictures/marienplatz.jpg"> |
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47 <img src="pictures/marienplatz_small.jpg" alt="Marienplatz" border=0></a> |
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48 <br> |
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49 <small>Marienplatz (city centre)</small><br> |
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50 </p> |
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51 |
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52 <p align=center> |
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53 <a href="pictures/englischer_garten.jpg"> |
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54 <img src="pictures/englischer_garten_small.jpg" alt="Englischer Garten" border=0></a> |
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55 <br> |
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56 <small>The English Garden</small><br> |
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57 </p> |
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58 |
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59 <p align=center> |
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60 <a href="pictures/chinesischer_turm.jpg"> |
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61 <img src="pictures/chinesischer_turm_small.jpg" alt="Chinesischer Turm" border=0></a> |
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62 <br> |
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63 <small>Chinese Tower (famous beer garden)</small><br> |
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64 </p> |
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65 |
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66 <p align=center> |
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67 <a href="pictures/cs_building.jpg"> |
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68 <img src="pictures/cs_building_small.jpg" alt="Computer science building" border=0></a> |
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69 <br><small>The Computer Science building of the TUM</small><br> |
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70 </p> |
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71 |
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72 <p align=center> |
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73 <a href="pictures/magistrale.jpg"> |
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74 <img src="pictures/magistrale_small.jpg" alt="Main hall of the computer science building" border=0></a> |
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75 <br> |
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76 <small>The main hall in the CS-building</small><br> |
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77 </p> |
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78 |
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79 <p align=center> |
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80 <a href="pictures/isar.jpg"> |
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81 <img src="pictures/isar_small.jpg" alt="The river Isar" border=0></a> |
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82 <br> |
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83 <small>The Isar river</small><br> |
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84 </p> |
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85 |
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86 <p align=center> |
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87 <A HREF="pictures/tphols09_poster.jpg"> |
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88 <IMG ALT="poster" SRC="pictures/tphols09_poster_small.jpg" align="top"></A> |
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89 <BR> |
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90 <small>The conference poster</small><br> |
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91 </p> |
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92 |
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93 </TD> |
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94 |
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95 |
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96 <!-- right column --> |
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97 <TD BGCOLOR="#FFFFFF" WIDTH="75%" VALIGN="TOP"> |
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98 <H3>SPEAKER: David Basin</H3> |
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99 |
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100 <H3>TITLE: Let's get physical: models and methods for real-world security |
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101 protocols</H3> |
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102 |
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103 (Joint work with Patrick Schaller, Benedikt Schmidt, and Srdjan Capkun) |
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104 |
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105 <p> |
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106 Traditional security protocols are mainly concerned with key establishment and |
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107 principal authentication, and rely on predistributed keys and properties of |
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108 cryptographic operators. In contrast, new application areas are emerging that |
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109 establish and rely on properties of the physical world. Examples include |
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110 secure localization, distance bounding, and device pairing protocols. |
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111 </p> |
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112 |
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113 <p> |
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114 We present a formal model extending standard, inductive, trace-based, symbolic |
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115 approaches in two directions. In terms of communication, we refine the |
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116 standard Dolev-Yao model to account for network topology, transmission delays, |
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117 and node positions. This results in a distributed intruder with restricted, |
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118 but more realistic, communication capabilities. On the level of messages, we |
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119 use an abstract message theory to establish facts independent of the concrete |
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120 protocol and message theory. To analyse the security of a given protocol, we |
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121 instantiate the abstract message theory so that properties of the |
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122 cryptographic operators under consideration are accurately modeled. We |
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123 describe the formalization of this model in Isabelle/HOL and present its |
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124 application to a distance bounding protocol, where the concrete message theory |
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125 includes exclusive-or and its associated equational theory. |
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126 </p> |
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127 </TD> |
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128 </TABLE> |
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129 |
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130 <hr> |
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131 <!-- Created: Thu Feb 28 19:21:12 CET 2008 --> |
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132 <!-- hhmts start --> |
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133 Last modified: Wed Apr 29 19:18:31 CEST 2009 |
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