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+SPEAKER: David Basin+ +TITLE: Let's get physical: models and methods for real-world security +protocols+ +(Joint work with Patrick Schaller, Benedikt Schmidt, and Srdjan Capkun) + ++Traditional security protocols are mainly concerned with key establishment and +principal authentication, and rely on predistributed keys and properties of +cryptographic operators. In contrast, new application areas are emerging that +establish and rely on properties of the physical world. Examples include +secure localization, distance bounding, and device pairing protocols. + + ++We present a formal model extending standard, inductive, trace-based, symbolic +approaches in two directions. In terms of communication, we refine the +standard Dolev-Yao model to account for network topology, transmission delays, +and node positions. This results in a distributed intruder with restricted, +but more realistic, communication capabilities. On the level of messages, we +use an abstract message theory to establish facts independent of the concrete +protocol and message theory. To analyse the security of a given protocol, we +instantiate the abstract message theory so that properties of the +cryptographic operators under consideration are accurately modeled. We +describe the formalization of this model in Isabelle/HOL and present its +application to a distance bounding protocol, where the concrete message theory +includes exclusive-or and its associated equational theory. + + |
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