updated
authorChristian Urban <urbanc@in.tum.de>
Thu, 27 Oct 2016 11:01:12 +0100
changeset 488 17f603095f0b
parent 487 41fe05bdc342 (diff)
parent 484 ddcc4ef4f82c (current diff)
child 489 5ecc1211752d
updated
Binary file handouts/ho05.pdf has changed
--- a/handouts/ho05.tex	Wed Oct 26 01:03:33 2016 +0100
+++ b/handouts/ho05.tex	Thu Oct 27 11:01:12 2016 +0100
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@
 answer, it will not make sense to replay this message, because
 next time this protocol is run, the nonce $B$ sends out will
 be different. So if we run this protocol, what can $B$ infer?
-It has send out an (unpredictable) nonce to $A$ and received
+It has sent out an (unpredictable) nonce to $A$ and received
 this challenge back, but encoded under the key $K_{AB}$. If
 $B$ assumes only $A$ and $B$ know the key $K_{AB}$ and the
 nonce is unpredictable, then $B$ is able to infer it must be
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@
 the only one that can decrypt them. While this sounds all
 good, it relies on the ability that people can associate me
 with my public key. That is not as trivial as it sounds. For
-example, if I would be the government, say Cameron, and try to
+example, if I would be the government, say Theresa Mayhem, and try to
 find out who are the trouble makers in the country, I would
 publish an innocent looking webpage and say I am The Guardian
 newspaper (or alternatively The Sun for all the juicy