updated
authorChristian Urban <christian dot urban at kcl dot ac dot uk>
Tue, 05 Jan 2016 01:37:31 +0000
changeset 442 cceb3d2dcba0
parent 441 80fd3cd5675f
child 443 67d7d239c617
updated
handouts/ho07.tex
handouts/ho08.tex
hws/hw01.pdf
hws/hw02.pdf
hws/hw03.pdf
hws/hw04.pdf
hws/hw05.pdf
hws/hw05.tex
hws/hw06.pdf
hws/hw07.pdf
hws/hw08.pdf
hws/hw08.tex
hws/hw10.pdf
hws/so04.pdf
slides/slides12.pdf
slides/slides12.tex
style.sty
--- a/handouts/ho07.tex	Thu Dec 03 13:46:18 2015 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho07.tex	Tue Jan 05 01:37:31 2016 +0000
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 %http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~yuxiangw/docs/Differential%20Privacy.pdf
 %https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gx13lgEudtU
 %https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/Differential-Privacy-as-a-Response-to-the-Reidentification-Threat-Klinefelter-and-Chin.pdf
+%http://research.neustar.biz/2014/09/08/differential-privacy-the-basics/
 
 \section*{Handout 7 (Privacy)}
 
--- a/handouts/ho08.tex	Thu Dec 03 13:46:18 2015 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho08.tex	Tue Jan 05 01:37:31 2016 +0000
@@ -877,3 +877,6 @@
 
 The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and Applications
 https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/765.pdf
+
+Bitcoin book
+http://chimera.labs.oreilly.com/books/1234000001802/ch04.html#public_key_derivation
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--- a/hws/hw05.tex	Thu Dec 03 13:46:18 2015 +0000
+++ b/hws/hw05.tex	Tue Jan 05 01:37:31 2016 +0000
@@ -49,19 +49,6 @@
 Write down three facts that $A$ can infer after this protocol has been
 successfully completed?
 
-\item (\textbf{Deleted}: same as 2) Before starting a TCP connection, client and servers
-perform a three-way handshake:
-
-\begin{center}
-\begin{tabular}{rl}
-$A \rightarrow S$: & SYN\\
-$S \rightarrow A$: & SYN-ACK\\
-$A \rightarrow S$: & ACK\\
-\end{tabular}
-\end{center}
-
-How can this protocol be abused causing trouble on the server?
-
 \item Write down a protocol which establishes a secret key
 between $A$ and $B$ using a mutually trusted third party $S$.
 You can assume $A$ and $S$, respectfully $B$ and $S$, share 
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--- a/hws/hw08.tex	Thu Dec 03 13:46:18 2015 +0000
+++ b/hws/hw08.tex	Tue Jan 05 01:37:31 2016 +0000
@@ -3,6 +3,13 @@
 
 \begin{document}
 
+
+% For Alice to cheat, she has to get her transaction into the blockchain.
+% For this she has to solve proof-of-work puzzles faster than anybody
+% else. Is it possible for her to precompute several blocks that would
+% validate a fraudulent transaction by her? Give a short explanation
+% for your reasoning.  
+
 \section*{Homework 8}
 
 \begin{enumerate}
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--- a/slides/slides12.tex	Thu Dec 03 13:46:18 2015 +0000
+++ b/slides/slides12.tex	Tue Jan 05 01:37:31 2016 +0000
@@ -81,6 +81,29 @@
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \begin{frame}[t]
+\frametitle{Bitcoins for Real}
+
+\begin{itemize}
+\item you need a public-private key (the hash of the 
+public key to determines your bitcoin address) 
+
+\item if you want to receive bitcoins, you publicise 
+this address
+
+\item there are $2^{160}$ possibilities\\ 
+(no check for duplicates)\bigskip\pause
+
+\item transactions contain ``payment scripts''
+ (non-Turing-complete scripting language)\bigskip
+ 
+ \small simplest script: pay-to-public-key
+\end{itemize}
+
+\end{frame}
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
+
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+\begin{frame}[t]
 \frametitle{Bitcoin Keys}
 
 \begin{center}
@@ -349,8 +372,8 @@
 
 \small
 \[
-\bl{\begin{array}{@{}l@{}}\text{New}\\ \text{Difficulty}\end{array} \dn
-\begin{array}{@{}l@{}}\text{Old}\\ \text{Difficulty}\end{array} 
+\bl{\begin{array}{@{}l@{}}\text{New}\\ \text{Hardness}\end{array} \dn
+\begin{array}{@{}l@{}}\text{Old}\\ \text{Hardness}\end{array} 
 * \frac{\text{Actual time for the last 2016 blocks}}{20160}}
 \]
 
@@ -561,29 +584,6 @@
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
 
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
-\begin{frame}[t]
-\frametitle{Bitcoins for Real}
-
-\begin{itemize}
-\item you need a public-private key (the hash of the 
-public key to determines your bitcoin address) 
-
-\item if you want to receive bitcoins, you publicise 
-this address
-
-\item there are $2^{160}$ possibilities\\ 
-(no check for duplicates)\bigskip\pause
-
-\item transactions contain ``payment scripts''
- (non-Turing-complete scripting language)\bigskip
- 
- \small simplest script: pay-to-public-key
-\end{itemize}
-
-\end{frame}
-%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
-
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \begin{frame}[t]
@@ -682,7 +682,8 @@
   (you cannot charge them back)\ldots{} bad luck
 
 \item you can send bitcoins to a ``non-existing'' address
-  (Mt.~Gox)
+  
+\item you send them to a script that can never be satisfied  
 \end{itemize}
 
 \end{frame}
@@ -715,6 +716,7 @@
 \begin{itemize}
   \item Don't gamble! I am not a first mover in such things.
   \item Cool idea, but I am sure there will be a Bitcoin~2.0.
+  (can for example mining pools force to be paid more?)
   \item It still depends on a lot of old-fashioned security 
   (e.g.~keeping private-keys secret)\bigskip
 
--- a/style.sty	Thu Dec 03 13:46:18 2015 +0000
+++ b/style.sty	Tue Jan 05 01:37:31 2016 +0000
@@ -41,7 +41,8 @@
 
 
 \newcommand{\HEADER}{{\bf Please submit your solutions to the
-email address 7ccsmsen at gmail dot com. Please submit only
+email address 7ccsmsen at gmail dot com. Please submit only one
+homework per email. Please also submit only
 ASCII text or PDFs. Every solution should be preceded by the
 corresponding question, like: