# HG changeset patch # User cu # Date 1508717349 -3600 # Node ID e6e87d5839c0eb0a2df47d584fd50cda5b905bd8 # Parent f998179774942c9cb3565ada86761fab8cafe4c6 updated diff -r f99817977494 -r e6e87d5839c0 slides/slides05.pdf Binary file slides/slides05.pdf has changed diff -r f99817977494 -r e6e87d5839c0 slides/slides05.tex --- a/slides/slides05.tex Mon Oct 23 00:50:09 2017 +0100 +++ b/slides/slides05.tex Mon Oct 23 01:09:09 2017 +0100 @@ -42,6 +42,23 @@ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \begin{frame}[c] +\frametitle{Topical Slide} + +\begin{itemize} +\item Protocoll attack against Wifi clients + +\item you can force a client to install choosen keys (000\ldots{}000) + +\item all Unix-based devices are affected (Windows not so much, since + they do not fully implement the Wifi standard) +\end{itemize} + +\end{frame} +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + + +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +\begin{frame}[c] \frametitle{Protocols} \begin{center} diff -r f99817977494 -r e6e87d5839c0 slides/slides06.pdf Binary file slides/slides06.pdf has changed diff -r f99817977494 -r e6e87d5839c0 slides/slides06.tex --- a/slides/slides06.tex Mon Oct 23 00:50:09 2017 +0100 +++ b/slides/slides06.tex Mon Oct 23 01:09:09 2017 +0100 @@ -54,354 +54,6 @@ \end{frame} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Protocols} - -\begin{center} -\includegraphics[scale=0.11]{../pics/keyfob.jpg} -\quad -\includegraphics[scale=0.3025]{../pics/startstop.jpg} -\end{center} - -\begin{itemize} -\item Other examples: Wifi, Http-request, TCP-request, -card readers, RFID (passports)\ldots\medskip\pause - -\item The point is that we cannot control the network: An attacker -can install a packet sniffer, inject packets, modify packets, -replay messages\ldots{}fake pretty much everything. -\end{itemize} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Keyless Car Transponders} - -\begin{center} -\includegraphics[scale=0.1]{../pics/keyfob.jpg} -\quad -\includegraphics[scale=0.27]{../pics/startstop.jpg} -\end{center} - -\begin{itemize} -\item There are two security mechanisms: one remote central -locking system and one passive RFID tag (engine immobiliser). -\item How can I get in? How can thieves be kept out? -How to avoid MITM attacks? -\end{itemize}\medskip - -\footnotesize -\hfill Papers: Gone in 360 Seconds: Hijacking with Hitag2,\\ -\hfill Dismantling Megamos Crypto: Wirelessly Lockpicking\\ -\hfill a Vehicle Immobilizer - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Public-Key Infrastructure} - -\begin{itemize} -\item the idea is to have a certificate authority (CA) -\item you go to the CA to identify yourself -\item CA: ``I, the CA, have verified that public key \bl{$P^{pub}_{Bob}$} belongs to Bob''\bigskip -\item CA must be trusted by everybody -\item What happens if CA issues a false certificate? Who pays in case of loss? (VeriSign -explicitly limits liability to \$100.) -\end{itemize} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Man-in-the-Middle} - -``Normal'' protocol run:\bigskip - -\begin{itemize} -\item \bl{$A$} sends public key to \bl{$B$} -\item \bl{$B$} sends public key to \bl{$A$} -\item \bl{$A$} sends message encrypted with \bl{$B$}'s public key, \bl{$B$} decrypts it -with its private key -\item \bl{$B$} sends message encrypted with \bl{$A$}'s public key, \bl{$A$} decrypts it -with its private key -\end{itemize} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Man-in-the-Middle} - -Attack: - -\begin{itemize} -\item \bl{$A$} sends public key to \bl{$B$} --- \bl{$C$} intercepts this message and send his own public key -\item \bl{$B$} sends public key to \bl{$A$} --- \bl{$C$} intercepts this message and send his own public key -\item \bl{$A$} sends message encrypted with \bl{$C$}'s public key, \bl{$C$} decrypts it -with its private key, re-encrypts with \bl{$B$}'s public key -\item similar for other direction -\end{itemize} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Man-in-the-Middle} - -Potential Prevention? - -\begin{itemize} -\item \bl{$A$} sends public key to \bl{$B$} -\item \bl{$B$} sends public key to \bl{$A$} -\item \bl{$A$} encrypts message with \bl{$B$}'s public key, send's {\bf half} of the message -\item \bl{$B$} encrypts message with \bl{$A$}'s public key, send's {\bf half} of the message -\item \bl{$A$} sends other half, \bl{$B$} can now decrypt entire message -\item \bl{$B$} sends other half, \bl{$A$} can now decrypt entire message -\end{itemize}\pause - -%\bl{$C$} would have to invent a totally new message -\alert{Under which circumstances does this protocol prevent -MiM-attacks, or does it?} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Car Transponder (HiTag2)} - -\begin{enumerate} -\item \bl{$C$} generates a random number \bl{$N$} -\item \bl{$C$} calculates \bl{$(F,G) = \{N\}_K$} -\item \bl{$C \to T$}: \bl{$N, F$} -\item \bl{$T$} calculates \bl{$(F',G') = \{N\}_K$} -\item \bl{$T$} checks that \bl{$F = F'$} -\item \bl{$T \to C$}: \bl{$N, G'$} -\item \bl{$C$} checks that \bl{$G = G'$} -\end{enumerate}\pause - -\small -This process means that the transponder believes the car knows -the key \bl{$K$}, and the car believes the transponder knows -the key \bl{$K$}. They have authenticated themselves -to each other, or have they? - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] - -A Man-in-the-middle attack in real life: - -\begin{itemize} -\item the card only says yes to the terminal if the PIN is correct -\item trick the card in thinking transaction is verified by signature -\item trick the terminal in thinking the transaction was verified by PIN -\end{itemize} - -\begin{minipage}{1.1\textwidth} -\begin{center} -\mbox{}\hspace{-6mm}\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../pics/chip-attack.png} -\includegraphics[scale=0.3]{../pics/chipnpinflaw.png} -\end{center} -\end{minipage} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Problems with EMV} - -\begin{itemize} -\item it is a wrapper for many protocols -\item specification by consensus (resulted unmanageable complexity) -\item its specification is 700 pages in English plus 2000+ pages for testing, additionally some -further parts are secret -\item other attacks have been found -\end{itemize} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Protocols are Difficult} - -\begin{itemize} -\item even the systems designed by experts regularly fail\medskip -\item the one who can fix a system should also be liable for the losses\medskip -\item cryptography is often not the problem\bigskip\bigskip -\end{itemize} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - - - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{A Simple PK Protocol} - - -\begin{center} -\begin{tabular}{ll@{\hspace{2mm}}l} -1. & \bl{$A \to B :$} & \bl{$K^{pub}_A$}\smallskip\\ -2. & \bl{$B \to A :$} & \bl{$K^{pub}_B$}\smallskip\\ -3. & \bl{$A \to B :$} & \bl{$\{A,m\}_{K^{pub}_B}$}\smallskip\\ -4. & \bl{$B \to A :$} & \bl{$\{B,m'\}_{K^{pub}_A}$} -\end{tabular} -\end{center}\pause\bigskip - -unfortunately there is a simple man-in-the- middle-attack -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{A MITM Attack} - - -\begin{center} -\begin{tabular}{ll@{\hspace{2mm}}l} -1. & \bl{$A \to E :$} & \bl{$K^{pub}_A$}\smallskip\\ -2. & \bl{$E \to B :$} & \bl{$K^{pub}_E$}\smallskip\\ -3. & \bl{$B \to E :$} & \bl{$K^{pub}_B$}\smallskip\\ -4. & \bl{$E \to A :$} & \bl{$K^{pub}_E$}\smallskip\\ -5. & \bl{$A \to E :$} & \bl{$\{A,m\}_{K^{pub}_E}$}\smallskip\\ -6. & \bl{$E \to B :$} & \bl{$\{E,m\}_{K^{pub}_B}$}\smallskip\\ -7. & \bl{$B \to E :$} & \bl{$\{B,m'\}_{K^{pub}_E}$}\smallskip\\ -8. & \bl{$E \to A :$} & \bl{$\{E,m'\}_{K^{pub}_A}$} -\end{tabular} -\end{center}\pause\medskip - -and \bl{$A$} and \bl{$B$} have no chance to detect it -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Interlock Protocol} - -The interlock protocol (``best bet'' against MITM): - -\begin{center} -\begin{tabular}{ll@{\hspace{2mm}}l} -1. & \bl{$A \to B :$} & \bl{$K^{pub}_A$}\\ -2. & \bl{$B \to A :$} & \bl{$K^{pub}_B$}\\ -3. & & \bl{$\{A,m\}_{K^{pub}_B} \;\mapsto\; H_1,H_2$}\\ - & & \bl{$\{B,m'\}_{K^{pub}_A} \;\mapsto\; M_1,M_2$}\\ -4. & \bl{$A \to B :$} & \bl{$H_1$}\\ -5. & \bl{$B \to A :$} & \bl{$\{H_1, M_1\}_{K^{pub}_A}$}\\ -6. & \bl{$A \to B :$} & \bl{$\{H_2, M_1\}_{K^{pub}_B}$}\\ -7. & \bl{$B \to A :$} & \bl{$M_2$} -\end{tabular} -\end{center} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Splitting Messages} - -\begin{center} -$\underbrace{\texttt{\Grid{0X1peUVTGJK+H70mMjAM8p}}}_{\bl{\{A,m\}_{K^{pub}_B}}}$ -\end{center} - -\begin{center} -$\underbrace{\texttt{\Grid{0X1peUVTGJK}}}_{\bl{H_1}}$\quad -$\underbrace{\texttt{\Grid{+H70mMjAM8p}}}_{\bl{H_2}}$ -\end{center} - -\begin{itemize} -\item you can also use the even and odd bytes -\item the point is you cannot decrypt the halves, even if you - have the key -\end{itemize} - - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] - -\begin{center} -\begin{tabular}{l@{\hspace{9mm}}l} -\begin{tabular}[t]{@{}l@{}} -\bl{$A \to C : K^{pub}_A$}\\ -\bl{$C \to B : K^{pub}_C$}\\ -\bl{$B \to C : K^{pub}_B$}\\ -\bl{$C \to A : K^{pub}_C$}\medskip\\ -\bl{$\{A,m\}_{K^{pub}_C} \;\mapsto\; H_1,H_2$}\\ -\bl{$\{B,m'\}_{K^{pub}_C} \;\mapsto\; M_1,M_2$}\bigskip\\ -\bl{$\{C,a\}_{K^{pub}_B} \;\mapsto\; C_1,C_2$}\\ -\bl{$\{C,b\}_{K^{pub}_A} \;\mapsto\; D_1,D_2$} -\end{tabular} & -\begin{tabular}[t]{@{}l@{}} -\bl{$A \to C : H_1$}\\ -\bl{$C \to B : C_1$}\\ -\bl{$B \to C : \{C_1, M_1\}_{K^{pub}_C}$}\\ -\bl{$C \to A : \{H_1, D_1\}_{K^{pub}_A}$}\\ -\bl{$A \to C : \{H_2, D_1\}_{K^{pub}_C}$}\\ -\bl{$C \to B : \{C_2, M_1\}_{K^{pub}_B}$}\\ -\bl{$B \to C : M_2$}\\ -\bl{$C \to A : D_2$} -\end{tabular} -\end{tabular} -\end{center}\pause - -\footnotesize -\bl{$m$} = How is your grandmother? \bl{$m'$} = How is the -weather today in London? - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] - -\begin{itemize} -\item you have to ask something that cannot be imitated - (requires \bl{$A$} and \bl{$B$} know each other) -\item what happens if \bl{$m$} and \bl{$m'$} are voice - messages?\bigskip\pause - -\item So \bl{$C$} can either leave the communication unchanged, - or invent a complete new conversation - -\end{itemize} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[c] - -\begin{itemize} -\item the moral: establishing a secure connection from - ``zero'' is almost impossible---you need to rely on some - established trust\medskip - -\item that is why PKI relies on certificates, which however are - badly, badly realised - -\end{itemize} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \begin{frame}[c] diff -r f99817977494 -r e6e87d5839c0 slides/slides07.pdf Binary file slides/slides07.pdf has changed diff -r f99817977494 -r e6e87d5839c0 slides/slides07.tex --- a/slides/slides07.tex Mon Oct 23 00:50:09 2017 +0100 +++ b/slides/slides07.tex Mon Oct 23 01:09:09 2017 +0100 @@ -32,69 +32,57 @@ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \begin{frame}[t] -\frametitle{Taking Stock} - -\begin{itemize} -\item \ldots 9,000 customers of Tesco bank have their account suspended -\item \ldots 2 weeks ago there was a blackout for US websites because - of a DoS attack from IoT devices (see paper by Shamir et all) - -\item \ldots Dirty Cow\ldots Linux privilege-escalation bug under active exploit - (``any user can become root in < 5 seconds in my testing'') -\end{itemize} - -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% - -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[t] -\frametitle{Facebook Privacy} +\frametitle{Privacy vs Anonymity} \begin{itemize} -\item \large Who has a Facebook account?\pause\medskip -\item \large Who keeps the list of friends private?\pause\medskip +\item everybody agrees that anonymity has its uses (e.g., + voting, whistleblowers, peer-review, exams) -\item \large Who knows that this is completely pointless? -\textcolor{gray}{\small (at least at the end of 2013)}\pause\medskip -\end{itemize} +\end{itemize}\bigskip\pause -\only<4>{Create a fake account. Send a friend-request. -Facebook answers with ``People you may know'' feature. -Conveniently, it has also a ``see all'' button.} + +But privacy?\bigskip\medskip -\only<5>{\small\it ``Our policies explain that changing the -visibility of people on your friend list controls how they -appear on your Timeline, and that your friends may be visible -on other parts of the site, such as in News Feed, Search and -on other people's Timelines. This behavior is something we'll -continue to evaluate to make sure we're providing clarity.'' } +\textit{``You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.''}\\ +{\small\hfill{}Scott Mcnealy (CEO of Sun)}\bigskip\\ -\end{frame} -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + +\textit{``If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing + to fear.''}\medskip\pause -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[t] -\frametitle{Facebook Privacy Australia} - -\begin{itemize} -\item Tinger requires a Facabook profile when signing up. -\item Helpfully, FB Australia wants to encourage that your group - of friends to find and connect with other groups out in the - real world. -\item \ldots{}it reveals which of your Facebook friends are also - on Tinder (for Australia it is an opt-out) -\end{itemize} - +\textit{ + A few years ago a Google executive tried to allay worries about + Google pooring over all your emails on Gmail. He said something + along the lines: You are watched by an algorithm; this is like being + naked in front of your dog. + } \end{frame} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +\begin{frame}[c] +\frametitle{Privacy: State of the Art} + + \begin{center} + \begin{tabular}{cc} + \raisebox{-0.8mm}{\includegraphics[scale=0.28]{../pics/flight.jpg}} & + \includegraphics[scale=0.31]{../pics/airbus.jpg}\\ + \small Wright brothers, 1901 & \small Airbus, 2005 \\ + \end{tabular} + \end{center} + + \end{frame} +%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% + + + %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \begin{frame} \frametitle{UCAS (a charity)} -\mbox{}\\[-15mm]\mbox{} +\mbox{}\\[-10mm]\mbox{} \small \begin{quote} ``The Universities and Colleges Admissions Service received more @@ -162,35 +150,35 @@ \end{frame} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% -\begin{frame}[t] -\frametitle{Privacy vs Anonymity} +% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% +% \begin{frame}[t] +% \frametitle{Privacy vs Anonymity} -\begin{itemize} +% \begin{itemize} -\item everybody agrees that anonymity has its uses (e.g., - voting, whistleblowers, peer-review, exams) +% \item everybody agrees that anonymity has its uses (e.g., +% voting, whistleblowers, peer-review, exams) -\end{itemize}\bigskip\pause +% \end{itemize}\bigskip\pause -But privacy?\bigskip\medskip +% But privacy?\bigskip\medskip -\textit{``You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.''}\\ -{\small\hfill{}Scott Mcnealy (CEO of Sun)}\bigskip\\ +% \textit{``You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.''}\\ +% {\small\hfill{}Scott Mcnealy (CEO of Sun)}\bigskip\\ -\textit{``If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing - to fear.''}\medskip\pause +% \textit{``If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing +% to fear.''}\medskip\pause -\textit{ - A few years ago a Google executive tried to allay worries about - Google pooring over all your emails on Gmail. He said something - along the lines: You are watched by an algorithm; this is like being - naked in front of your dog. - } +% \textit{ +% A few years ago a Google executive tried to allay worries about +% Google pooring over all your emails on Gmail. He said something +% along the lines: You are watched by an algorithm; this is like being +% naked in front of your dog. +% } -\end{frame} +% \end{frame} %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% @@ -289,8 +277,8 @@ %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% \begin{frame}[c] -\frametitle{Privacy and Big Data} -\mbox{}\\[-16mm]\mbox{} +%\frametitle{Privacy and Big Data} +%\mbox{}\\[-16mm]\mbox{} Selected sources of ``Big Data'':\smallskip{}