# HG changeset patch
# User Christian Urban <christian dot urban at kcl dot ac dot uk>
# Date 1415295715 0
# Node ID 0b9a16ddd625e9614ef38bd59b5731fc4a5389fd
# Parent  47e06cb75837f6c90de4251fc734dd90f08f3c94
updated

diff -r 47e06cb75837 -r 0b9a16ddd625 handouts/ho02.pdf
Binary file handouts/ho02.pdf has changed
diff -r 47e06cb75837 -r 0b9a16ddd625 handouts/ho02.tex
--- a/handouts/ho02.tex	Thu Nov 06 12:32:05 2014 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho02.tex	Thu Nov 06 17:41:55 2014 +0000
@@ -449,9 +449,11 @@
 For example a good-enough and workable in-lecture online
 voting system where students' votes are anonymous and students
 cannot tamper with the outcome, I am sure, can be implemented. 
-\bigskip
+
 
-\noindent If you want to know more about e-voting, I recommend
+\subsubsection*{Further Reading}
+
+If you want to know more about e-voting, I recommend
 the highly entertaining online course by Alex Halderman at
 Coursera.
 
diff -r 47e06cb75837 -r 0b9a16ddd625 handouts/ho03.pdf
Binary file handouts/ho03.pdf has changed
diff -r 47e06cb75837 -r 0b9a16ddd625 handouts/ho03.tex
--- a/handouts/ho03.tex	Thu Nov 06 12:32:05 2014 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho03.tex	Thu Nov 06 17:41:55 2014 +0000
@@ -487,13 +487,15 @@
 amount of time. If we now use an address that lets us jump to
 any address in the grey area we are done. The target machine
 will execute these \pcode{NOP} operations until it reaches the
-shellcode. A moment of thought should convince you that this
-trick can hugely improve our odds of finding the right
-address---depending on the size of the buffer, it might only
-take a few tries to get the shellcode to run. And then we are
-in. The code for such an attack is shown in Figure~\ref{C3}.
-It is directly taken from the original paper about ``Smashing
-the Stack for Fun and Profit'' (see pointer given at the end).
+shellcode. That is why this NOP-part is often called
+\emph{NOP-sledge}. A moment of thought should convince you
+that this trick can hugely improve our odds of finding the
+right address---depending on the size of the buffer, it might
+only take a few tries to get the shellcode to run. And then we
+are in. The code for such an attack is shown in
+Figure~\ref{C3}. It is directly taken from the original paper
+about ``Smashing the Stack for Fun and Profit'' (see pointer
+given at the end).
 
 \begin{figure}[p]
 \lstinputlisting[language=C]{../progs/C3.c}
diff -r 47e06cb75837 -r 0b9a16ddd625 handouts/ho05.pdf
Binary file handouts/ho05.pdf has changed
diff -r 47e06cb75837 -r 0b9a16ddd625 handouts/ho05.tex
--- a/handouts/ho05.tex	Thu Nov 06 12:32:05 2014 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho05.tex	Thu Nov 06 17:41:55 2014 +0000
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@
 Now the big question is, why on earth does this splitting
 of messages in half and additional message exchange help
 with defending against person-in-the-middle attacks? Well,
-let's try to be such an attacker. As before we intercept
+let's try to be an attacker. As before we intercept
 the messages where public keys are exchanged and inject
 our own.
 
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@
 With this the protocol has ended. $E$ was able to decrypt all
 messages, but what messages did $A$ and $B$ receive and from
 whom? Do you notice that $A$ and $B$ will find out that
-something strange has happened and probably not talk on this
+something strange is going on and probably not talk on this
 channel anymore? I leave you to think about it.
 
 Recall from the beginning that a person-in-the middle