# HG changeset patch
# User Christian Urban <christian dot urban at kcl dot ac dot uk>
# Date 1414630191 0
# Node ID 03321ef4349a33d28b5676d55a82c08460455a7b
# Parent  4f4612d5f6702d470695d49f1fef166e1bb1b99e
updated

diff -r 4f4612d5f670 -r 03321ef4349a handouts/ho05.pdf
Binary file handouts/ho05.pdf has changed
diff -r 4f4612d5f670 -r 03321ef4349a handouts/ho05.tex
--- a/handouts/ho05.tex	Thu Oct 30 00:39:01 2014 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho05.tex	Thu Oct 30 00:49:51 2014 +0000
@@ -771,15 +771,37 @@
 \end{enumerate}
 
 \noindent The assumption is that the key $K$ is only known to
-the car and the transponder. Again, I leave it to you to find
+the car and the transponder. The claim is that $C$ and $T$ can
+authenticate to each other. Again, I leave it to you to find
 out the magic why this protocol is immune from
 person-in-the-middle attacks. 
 
 
 \subsubsection*{Further Reading}
 
-{\small
+If you want to know more about how cars can be hijacked,
+the paper  
+
+\begin{center}
 \url{http://www.cs.ru.nl/~rverdult/Gone_in_360_Seconds_Hijacking_with_Hitag2-USENIX_2012.pdf}}
+\end{center}
+
+\noindent is quite amusing to read. Obviously an even more
+amusing paper would be ``Dismantling Megamos Crypto: 
+Wirelessly Lockpicking a Vehicle Immobilizer'' but because
+of the court injuction by VW we are denied this entertainment.
+
+Person-in-the-middle-attacks in the ``wild'' are described 
+with real data in the blog post
+
+\begin{center}
+\url{http://www.renesys.com/2013/11/mitm-internet-hijacking}
+\end{center}
+
+\noindent The conclusion in this post is that person-in-the-middle-attacks
+can be launched from any place on Earth---it is not required 
+to sit in the ``middle'' of the communication of two people.
+You just have to route their traffic through a node you own.
 
 \end{document}