Access Control and Privacy Policies (7)


Email: christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk

Office: S1.27 (1st floor Strand Building)
Slides: KEATS (also homework is there)

Judgements


$$\Gamma \vdash F$$

Judgements



Gamma stands for a collection of formulas ("assumptions")


Judgements




Gamma
stands for a collection of formulas
("assumptions")

Gimel (Phoenician), Gamma (Greek), C and G (Latin), Gim (Arabic), ?? (Indian), Ge (Cyrillic)

Inference Rules




Inference Rules



P says $F \vdash Q$ says $F \land P$ says G

Inference Rules



$$\underbrace{P\operatorname{says} F}_{\Gamma} \vdash \underbrace{Q\operatorname{says} F}_{E} \land \underbrace{P\operatorname{says} G}_{E_{\Gamma}}$$

$$rac{\Gamma dash F_1 \Rightarrow F_2 \quad \Gamma dash F_1}{\Gamma dash F_2}$$

$$rac{\Gamma dash F}{\Gamma dash P}$$
 says F

$$\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{del_file}$$

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There is an inference rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash F}{\Gamma \vdash P \operatorname{says} F}$$

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 Γ contains already Alice says del_file. So we can use the rule

$$\overline{\Gamma, F \vdash F}$$

Done. Qed.

$$\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{del_file}$$

There is an inference rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash F}{\Gamma \vdash P \operatorname{says} F}$$

So we can derive $\Gamma \vdash Alice says del_file$.

 Γ contains already Alice says del_file. So we can use the rule

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What is wrong with this?

Done. Qed.

Digression: Proofs in CS

Formal proofs in CS sound like science fiction? Completely irrelevant! Lecturers gone mad!

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Formal proofs in CS sound like science fiction? Completely irrelevant! Lecturers gone mad!

- in 2008, verification of a small C-compiler
 - "if my input program has a certain behaviour, then the compiled machine code has the same behaviour"
 - is as good as gcc -01, but less buggy
- in 2010, verification of a micro-kernel operating system (approximately 8700 loc)
 - 200k loc of proof
 - 25 30 person years
 - found 160 bugs in the C code (144 by the proof)



Bob Harper (CMU)



Frank Pfenning (CMU)

published a proof about a specification in a journal (2005), \sim 31pages



Bob Harper (CMU)



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
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
Andrew Appel (Princeton)

relied on their proof in a security critical application


Proof-Carrying Code



Proof-Carrying Code





Proof-Carrying Code














Mars Pathfinder Mission 1997



- despite NASA's famous testing procedure, the lander crashed frequently on Mars
- problem was an algorithm not used in the OS


Priority Inheritance Protocol


- ...a scheduling algorithm that is widely used in real-time operating systems
- has been "proved" correct by hand in a paper in 1983
- ...but the first algorithm turned out to be incorrect, despite its "proof"

Priority Inheritance Protocol


- ...a scheduling algorithm that is widely used in real-time operating systems
- has been "proved" correct by hand in a paper in 1983
- ...but the first algorithm turned out to be incorrect, despite its "proof"
- we specified the algorithm and then proved that the specification makes "sense"
- we implemented our specification in C on top of PINTOS (used for teaching at Stanford)
- our implementation was much more efficient than their reference implementation

Regular Expression Matching






Regular Expression Matching



 I needed a proof in order to make sure my program is correct

Regular Expression Matching



 I needed a proof in order to make sure my program is correct

End Digression.
(Our small proof is 0.0005% of the OS-proof.)

One More Thing

- I arrived at King's last year
- Maxime Crochemore told me about a string algorithm (suffix sorting) that appeared at a conference in 2007 (ICALP)
- "horribly incomprehensible", no implementation, but claims to be the best O(n + k) algorithm

One More Thing

- I arrived at King's last year
- Maxime Crochemore told me about a string algorithm (suffix sorting) that appeared at a conference in 2007 (ICALP)
- "horribly incomprehensible", no implementation, but claims to be the best O(n + k) algorithm
- Jian Jiang found 1 error and 1 superfluous step in this algorithm
- he received 88% for the project and won the prize for the best 7CCSMPRJ project in the department
- no proof ... yet

Trusted Third Party

Simple protocol for establishing a secure connection via a mutually trusted 3rd party (server):

```
Message 1 A 	o S:A,B
Message 2 S 	o A: \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}} and \{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}}
Message 3 A 	o B: \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}
Message 4 A 	o B: \{m\}_{K_{AB}}
```

Encrypted Messages

ullet Alice sends a message mAlice says m

Encrypted Messages

ullet Alice sends a message m Alice says m

ullet Alice sends an encrypted message m (with key K)

Alice says $\{m\}_K$

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Decryption of Alice's message

$$rac{\Gamma \vdash ext{Alice says } \{m\}_K \quad \Gamma \vdash ext{Alice says } K}{\Gamma \vdash ext{Alice says } m}$$

Encryption

• Encryption of a message

```
rac{\Gamma \vdash 	ext{Alice says } m \quad \Gamma \vdash 	ext{Alice says } K}{\Gamma \vdash 	ext{Alice says } \{m\}_K}
```

Trusted Third Party

- Alice calls Sam for a key to communicate with Bob
- Sam responds with a key that Alice can read and a key Bob can read (pre-shared)
- Alice sends the message encrypted with the key and the second key it recieved

```
A sends S : Connect(A,B) S sends A : \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}} and \{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}} A sends B : \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}} A sends B : \{m\}_{K_{AB}}
```

Sending Rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash P \text{ says } F \quad \Gamma \vdash P \text{ sends } Q : F}{\Gamma \vdash Q \text{ says } F}$$

Sending Rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash P \text{ says } F \quad \Gamma \vdash P \text{ sends } Q : F}{\Gamma \vdash Q \text{ says } F}$$

$$P$$
 sends $Q:F\stackrel{ ext{def}}{=}$ $(P$ says $F)\Rightarrow (Q$ says $F)$

Trusted Third Party

```
A 	ext{ sends } S : 	ext{Connect}(A,B) \ S 	ext{ says } (	ext{Connect}(A,B) \Rightarrow \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}} \wedge \{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}}) \ S 	ext{ sends } A : \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}} \wedge \{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}} \ A 	ext{ sends } B : \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AB}} \ A 	ext{ sends } B : \{m\}_{K_{AB}}
```

Trusted Third Party

```
\begin{array}{l} A \ \mathsf{sends} \ S : \mathsf{Connect}(A,B) \\ S \ \mathsf{says} \ (\mathsf{Connect}(A,B) \Rightarrow \\ \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}} \wedge \{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}}) \\ S \ \mathsf{sends} \ A : \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}} \wedge \{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}} \\ A \ \mathsf{sends} \ B : \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}} \\ A \ \mathsf{sends} \ B : \{m\}_{K_{AB}} \end{array}
```

 $\Gamma \vdash B$ says m?

Challenge-Response Protocol

- ullet and a transponder T share a key K
- ullet E sends out a nonce N (random number) to T
- ullet T responds with $\{N\}_K$
- if E receives $\{N\}_K$ from T, it starts engine

Challenge-Response Protocol

```
E \text{ says } N \qquad \qquad \text{(start)} \\ E \text{ sends } T:N \qquad \text{(challenge)} \\ (T \text{ says } N) \Rightarrow (T \text{ sends } E:\{N\}_K \land \\ \qquad \qquad T \text{ sends } E: \text{Id}(T)) \quad \text{(response)} \\ T \text{ says } K \qquad \qquad \text{(key)} \\ T \text{ says } \text{Id}(T) \qquad \qquad \text{(identity)} \\ (E \text{ says } \{N\}_K \land E \text{ says } \text{Id}(T)) \Rightarrow \\ \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{start\_engine}(T) \quad \text{(engine)} \\ \end{cases}
```

$$\Gamma \vdash \mathsf{start_engine}(T)$$
?

Exchange of a Fresh Key

 $m{A}$ and $m{B}$ share a ("super-secret") key $m{K}_{AB}$ and want to share another key

ullet assumption K_{AB} is only known to A and B

- ullet A sends $B:A,\{N_A\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ullet B sends $A:\{N_A+1,N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ullet A sends $B:\{N_B+1\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ullet B sends $A:\{K_{AB}^{new},N_{B}^{new}\}_{K_{AB}}$

Assume K_{AB}^{new} is compromised by I

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```

$$ullet$$
 B sends $A:\{N_A+1,N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$

$$ullet$$
 A sends $B:\{N_B+1\}_{K_{AB}}$

$$ullet$$
 B sends $A:\{K_{AB}^{new},N_{B}^{new}\}_{K_{AB}}$

ullet A sends $B:\{msg\}_{K_{AB}^{new}}$

Assume K_{AB}^{new} is compromised by I

The Attack

An intruder I convinces A to accept the compromised key K_{AB}^{new}

- ullet A sends $B:A,\{N_A\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ullet B sends $A:\{N_A+1,N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$
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- ullet B sends $A:\{K_{AB}^{new},N_{B}^{new}\}_{K_{AB}}$ recorded by I
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- ullet B sends $A:\{M_A+1,M_B\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ullet A sends $B:\{M_B+1\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ullet B sends $I:\{K_{AB}^{newer},N_{B}^{newer}\}_{K_{AB}}$ intercepted by I
- ullet I sends $A:\{K_{AB}^{new},N_{B}^{new}\}_{K_{AB}}$

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- ullet I sends $A:\{K_{AB}^{new},N_{B}^{new}\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ullet $A \operatorname{sends} B: \{msg\}_{K_{AB}^{new}} \quad I$ can read it also

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 $m{A}$ and $m{B}$ share the key $m{K}_{AB}$ and want to identify each other

- ullet A sends $B:A,N_A$
- ullet B sends $A:\{N_A,K_{AB}'\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ullet A sends $B:\{N_A\}_{K_{AB}'}$

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- ullet A sends $B:A,N_A$
- ullet B sends $A:\{N_A,K_{AB}'\}_{K_{AB}}$
- ullet A sends $B:\{N_A\}_{K'_{AB}}$

Unfortunately, an intruder I can impersonate B.

A sends $I:A,N_A$

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I sends $A:B,N_A$

A sends $I:\{N_A,\!K_{\!AB}'\}_{K_{\!AB}}$

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```
A sends I:A,N_A I sends A:B,N_A
```

I sends $A:\{N_A,K_{AB}'\}_{K_{AB}}$ A sends $I:\{N_A,K_{AB}'\}_{K_{AB}}$

Unfortunately, an intruder I can impersonate B.

```
A sends I:A,N_A I sends A:B,N_A
```

I sends $A:\{N_A,\!K_{\!AB}'\}_{K_{\!AB}}\,A$ sends $I:\{N_A,\!K_{\!AB}'\}_{K_{\!AB}}$

A sends $I:\{N_A\}_{K_{AB}'}$

Unfortunately, an intruder I can impersonate B.

```
A sends I:A,N_A I sends A:B,N_A I sends A:\{N_A,K_{AB}'\}_{K_{AB}} A sends I:\{N_A,K_{AB}'\}_{K_{AB}}
```

A sends $I:\{N_A\}_{K_{AB}'}$ I sends $A:\{N_A\}_{K_{AB}'}$

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