Access Control and Privacy Policies (2)

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Homework

... I have a question about the homework. Is it required to submit the homework before the next lecture?

Thank you! Anonymous



future lectures

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future lectures



today

SmartWater



- seems helpful for preventing cable theft
- wouldn't be helpful to make your property safe, because of possible abuse
- security is always a tradeoff


Plain-text Passwords at IEEE

On 25 September 2012, a report on a data breach at IEEE:

- IEEE is a standards organisation (not-for-profit)
- many standards in CS are by IEEE
- 100k plain-text passwords were recorded in logs
- the logs were openly accessible on their FTP server

http://ieeelog.com

Plain-text Passwords at IEEE



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- wrote a script that cleared the cookie set after each guess
- has been fixed now

Smash the Stack for Fun ...

- "smashing the stack attacks" or "buffer overflow attacks"
- one of the most popular attacks; attack of the (last) decade (> 50% of security incidents reported at CERT are related to buffer overflows) http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls
- made popular in an article by Elias Levy (also known as Aleph One):

"Smashing The Stack For Fun and Profit"

http://www.phrack.org, Issue 49, Article 14

The Problem

• The basic problem is that library routines in C look as follows:

```
void strepy(char *src, char *dst) {
    int i = 0;
    while (src[i] != "\0") {
        dst[i] = src[i];
        i = i + 1;
    }
    }
```

- the resulting problems are often remotely exploitable
- can be used to circumvents all access control (botnets for further attacks)


Variants


There are many variants:


- return-to-lib-C attacks
- heap-smashing attacks (Slammer Worm in 2003 infected 90% of vulnerable systems within 10 minutes)
- "zero-days-attacks" (new unknown vulnerability)

my_float is printed twice:

```
1
   void foo (char *bar)
2
     float my float = 10.5; // in hex: x41x28x00x00
3
4
     char buffer[28];
5
     printf("my float value = %f\n", my float);
6
7
     strcpy(buffer, bar);
     printf("my float value = %f\n", my_float);
8
9
10
   int main (int argc, char **argv)
11
12
   {
     foo("my string is too long !!!!! ");
13
     return 0;
14
15
```







```
int match(char *s1, char *s2) {
1
     while ( *s1 != '\0' && *s2 != '\0' && *s1 == *s2 ) {
2
        s1++: s2++:
3
4
5
     return( *s1 - *s2 );
6
   }
7
   void welcome() { printf("Welcome to the Machine!\n"); exit(0); }
8
   void goodbye() { printf("Invalid identity, exiting!\n"); exit(1); }
9
10
   main() {
11
12
     char name[8];
     char pw[8];
13
14
     printf("login: ");
15
16
     get_line(name);
     printf("password: ");
17
18
     qet line(pw);
19
     if(match(name, pw) == 0)
20
        welcome();
21
22
     else
        goodbye();
23
24
```

A programmer might be careful, but still introduce vulnerabilities:

```
1 // Since gets() is insecure and produces lots of warnings,
2 // I use my own input function instead.
3 char ch:
   int i:
4
5
   void get_line(char *dst) {
6
     char buffer[8];
7
   i = 0;
8
     while ((ch = qetchar()) != ' \n') 
9
       buffer[i++] = ch;
10
11
  buffer[i] = ' \setminus 0';
12
     strcpy(dst, buffer);
13
14
   }
```



- the idea is you store some code as part to the buffer
- you then override the return address to execute this payload
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Payloads

- the idea is you store some code as part to the buffer
- you then override the return address to execute this payload
- normally you start a root-shell
- difficulty is to guess the right place where to "jump"

Payloads (2)

 another difficulty is that the code is not allowed to contain \x00:

xorl %eax, %eax

```
void strcpy(char *src, char *dst) {
    int i = 0;
    while (src[i] != "\0") {
        dst[i] = src[i];
        i = i + 1;
        }
    }
```

Format String Vulnerability

string is nowhere used:

```
#include<stdio.h>
1
2
   #include<string.h>
3
   // a program that just prints the argument
4
   // on the command line
5
6 //
   // trv and run it with %s
7
8
9
   main(int argc, char **argv)
10
11
            char *string = "This is a secret string\n";
12
13
14
            printf(argv[1]);
15
```

this vulnerability can be used to read out the stack

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Protections against BO Attacks

- use safe library functions
- ensure stack data is not executable (can be defeated)
- address space randomisation (makes one-size-fits-all more difficult)
- choice of programming language (one of the selling points of Java)

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- Integrity (prevent unwanted modification or tampering)
- Availability and reliability (reduce the risk of DoS attacks)

Homework

- Assume format string attacks allow you to read out the stack. What can you do with this information?
- Assume you can crash a program remotely. Why is this a problem?