Access Control and Privacy Policies (10)

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- hashes and salts to guaranty data integrity
- storing passwords (brute force attacks and dictionary attacks)

2nd Lecture: E-Voting


- Integrity
- Ballot Secrecy
- Voter Authentication
- Enfranchisement
- Availability

2nd Lecture: E-Voting


Online Banking vs. E-Voting

- online banking: if fraud occurred you try to identify who did what (somebody's account got zero)
- e-voting: some parts can be done electronically, but not the actual voting (final year project: online voting)


• the problem arises from the way C/C++ organises its function calls




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
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
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
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
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
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



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



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

























3rd Lecture: Unix Access Control

• privileges are specified by file access permissions ("everything is a file")



• the idea is make the attack surface smaller and mitigate the consequences of an attack

3rd Lecture: Unix Access Control

• when a file with setuid is executed, the resulting process will assume the UID given to the owner of the file

\$ ls -ld . * */*
drwxr-xr-x 1 ping staff 32768 Apr 2 2010 .
-rw---r-- 1 ping students 31359 Jul 24 2011 manual.txt
-r--rw--w- 1 bob students 4359 Jul 24 2011 report.txt
-rwsr--r-x 1 bob students 141359 Jun 1 2013 microedit
dr--r-xr-x 1 bob staff 32768 Jul 23 2011 src
-rw-r--r- 1 bob staff 81359 Feb 28 2012 src/code.c
-r--rw---- 1 emma students 959 Jan 23 2012 src/code.h

4th Lecture: Security Levels

Bell-LaPadula access model:

- Read Rule: A principal *P* can read an object *O* if and only if *P*'s security level is at least as high as *O*'s.
- Write Rule: A principal *P* can write an object *O* if and only if *O*'s security level is at least as high as *P*'s.
- Meta-Rule: All principals in a system should have a sufficiently high security level in order to access an object.

4th Lecture: Security Levels

Biba (data integrity)

- Biba: 'no read down' 'no write up'
- Read Rule: A principal *P* can read an object *O* if and only if *P*'s security level is lower or equal than *O*'s.
- Write Rule: A principal *P* can write an object *O* if and only if *O*'s security level is lower or equal than *P*'s.

4th Lecture: Protocols


A mutual authentication protocol

5th Lecture: Access Control Logic

- formulas
- judgements

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
5th Lecture: Access Control Logic

 $\Gamma \vdash F$ \leftarrow a single formula

entails sign

Gamma stands for a collection of formulas ("assumptions")

5th Lecture: Inference Rules



8th Lecture: Privacy

• differential privacy for annonymizing research data

User tell me
$$f(x) \Rightarrow$$
 Database
 $\Leftarrow f(x) + \text{noise}$ x_1, \dots, x_n

- f(x) can be released, if f is insensitive to individual entries x_1, \ldots, x_n
- The intuition: whatever is learned from the dataset would be learned regardless of whether x_i participates

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- Tor webservice



- zero-knowledge proofs
- requires NP problems, for example graph isomorphisms



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- random number generators