

# Access Control and Privacy Policies (2)

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Slides: KEATS (also home work is there)

# Homework

... I have a question about the homework.

Is it required to submit the homework before the next lecture?

Thank you!  
Anonymous

# SmartWater



- seems helpful for preventing cable theft
- wouldn't be helpful to make your property safe, because of possible abuse
- security is always a tradeoff

# Plaintext Passwords from IEEE

On 25 September 2012, a report on a data breach at IEEE:


- IEEE is a standards organisation (not for profit)
- many standards in CS are by IEEE
- 100k plain-text passwords were recorded in logs
- the logs were openly accessible on their FTP server

`http://ieeelog.com`

# Plaintext Passwords from IEEE

On 25 S

- IEEE is
- many s
- 100k p
- the log



IEEE:

og.com

# Virgin Mobile (USA)

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- wrote a script that cleared the cookie set after each guess
- has been fixed now



# Smash the Stack for Fun ...

- "smashing the stack attacks" or "buffer overflow attacks"
- one of the most popular attacks; attack of the (last) decade (> 50% of security incidents reported at CERT are related to buffer overflows)

<http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls>

- made popular in an article by Elias Levy (also known as Aleph One):

**"Smashing The Stack For Fun and Profit"**

<http://www.phrack.org>, Issue 49, Article 14

# The Problem

- The basic problem is that library routines in C look as follows:

```
1 void strcpy(char *src, char *dst) {
2     int i = 0;
3     while (src[i] != "\0") {
4         dst[i] = src[i];
5         i = i + 1;
6     }
7 }
```

- the resulting problems are often remotely exploitable
- can be used to circumvent all access control (botnets for further attacks)


# Variants



There are many variants:




- return-to-lib-C attacks
- heap-smashing attacks  
(Slammer Worm in 2003 infected 90% of vulnerable systems within 10 minutes)
- “zero-days-attacks” (new unknown vulnerability)

my\_float is printed twice:

```
1 void foo (char *bar)
2 {
3     float my_float = 10.5;    // in hex: \x41\x28\x00\x00
4     char buffer[28];
5
6     printf("my float value = %f\n", my_float);
7     strcpy(buffer, bar);
8     printf("my float value = %f\n", my_float);
9 }
10
11 int main (int argc, char **argv)
12 {
13     foo("my string is too long !!!!! ");
14     return 0;
15 }
```







```
1 int match(char *s1, char *s2) {
2     while( *s1 != '\0' && *s2 != '\0' && *s1 == *s2 ){
3         s1++; s2++;
4     }
5     return( *s1 - *s2 );
6 }
7
8 void welcome() { printf("Welcome to the Machine!\n"); exit(0); }
9 void goodbye() { printf("Invalid identity, exiting!\n"); exit(1); }
10
11 main(){
12     char name[8];
13     char pw[8];
14
15     printf("login: ");
16     get_line(name);
17     printf("password: ");
18     get_line(pw);
19
20     if(match(name, pw) == 0)
21         welcome();
22     else
23         goodbye();
24 }
```



## A programmer might be careful, but still introducing vulnerabilities:

```
1 // Since gets() is insecure and produces lots of warnings,  
2 // I use my own input function instead.  
3 char ch;  
4 int i;  
5  
6 void get_line(char *dst) {  
7     char buffer[8];  
8     i = 0;  
9     while ((ch = getchar()) != '\n') {  
10        buffer[i++] = ch;  
11    }  
12    buffer[i] = '\0';  
13    strcpy(dst, buffer);  
14 }
```

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- you then override the return address to execute this payload
- normally you start a root-shell
- difficulty is to guess the place where to "jump"

# Payloads (2)

- another difficulty is that the code is not allowed to contain `\x00`:

```
xorl %eax, %eax
```

```
1 void strcpy(char *src, char *dst) {
2     int i = 0;
3     while (src[i] != "\0") {
4         dst[i] = src[i];
5         i = i + 1;
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7 }
```

# Format String Vulnerability

string is nowhere used:

```
1 #include<stdio.h>
2 #include<string.h>
3
4 main(int argc, char **argv)
5 {
6     char *string = "This is a secret string\n";
7
8     printf(argv[1]);
9 }
```

this vulnerability can be used to read out the stack

# Protections against BO Attacks

- use safe library functions
- ensure stack data is not executable (can be defeated)
- address space randomisation (makes one-size-fits-all more difficult)
- choice of programming language (one of the selling points of Java)

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- Authenticity (needed for access control)
- Integrity (prevent unwanted modification or tampering)
- Availability and reliability (reduce the risk of DoS attacks)

# Homework

- Assume format string attacks allow you to read out the stack. What can you do with this information.
- Assume you can crash a program remotely. Why is this a problem?