

Handout 4 (Access Control)

Access control is essentially about deciding whether to grant access to a resource or deny it. Sounds easy. No? Well it turns out that things are not as simple as they seem at first glance. Let us first look as a case-study at how access control is organised in Unix-like systems (Windows systems have similar access controls, although the details might be quite different).

Unix-Style Access Control

Following the Unix-philosophy that everything is considered as a file, even memory, ports and so on, access control in Unix is organised around 11 Bits that specify how a file can be accessed. These Bits are sometimes called the *permission attributes* of a file. There are typically three modes for access: **read**, **write** and **execute**. Moreover there are three user groups to which the modes apply: the owner of the file, the group the file is associated with and everybody else. A typical example of some files with permission attributes is as follows:

```
1 $ ls -ld . * */*
2 drwxr-xr-x ping staff 32768 Apr 2 2010 .
3 -rw----r-- ping students 31359 Jul 24 2011 manual.txt
4 -r--rw--w- bob students 4359 Jul 24 2011 report.txt
5 -rwsr--r-x bob students 141359 Jun 1 2013 microedit
6 dr--r-xr-x bob staff 32768 Jul 23 2011 src
7 -rw-r--r-- bob staff 81359 Feb 28 2012 src/code.c
8 -r--rw---- emma students 959 Jan 23 2012 src/code.h
```

The leading **d** in Lines 2 and 6 indicate that the file is a directory, whereby in the Unix-tradition the **.** points to the directory itself. The **..** points at the directory “above”, or parent directory. The second to fourth letter specify how the owner of the file can access the file. For example Line 3 states that **ping** can read and write the **manual.txt**, but cannot execute it. The next three letters specify how the group members of the file can access the file. In Line 4, for example, all students can read and write the file **report.txt**. Finally the last three letters specify how everybody else can access a file. This should all be relatively familiar and straightforward. No?

There are already some special rules for directories. If the execute attribute of a directory is *not* set, then one cannot change into the directory and one cannot access any file inside it. If the write attribute is not set, then one can change existing files (provide they are changeable), but one cannot create new files. If the read attribute is not set, one cannot search inside the directory (**ls -la** does not work) but one can access an existing file, provided one knows its name.

While the above might sound moderately complicated, the real complications with Unix-style file permissions involve the **setuid** and **setgid** attributes. For example the file **microedit** in Line 5 has the **setuid** attribute set (indicated by the **s** in place of the usual **x**). The purpose of **setuid** and **setgid** is to solve the following puzzle: The program **passwd** allows users to change their passwords.

Therefore `passwd` needs to have write access to the file `/etc/passwd`. But this file cannot be writable for every user, otherwise anyone can set anyone else's password. So changing securely passwords cannot be achieved with the simple Unix access rights discussed so far. While this situation might look like an anomaly, it is in fact an often occurring problem. For example looking at current active processes with `/bin/ps` requires access to internal data structures of the operating system. In fact any of the following actions cannot be configured for single users, but need privileged root access

- changing system databases (users, groups, routing tables and so on)
- opening a network port below 1024
- interacting with peripheral hardware, such as printers, harddisk etc
- overwriting operating system facilities, like process scheduling and memory management

This will typically involve quite a lot of programs on a Unix system. I counted XX programs with the `setuid` attribute set on my bog-standard MacOSX system. The problem is that if there is a security problem with one of them, then malicious users (or outside attackers) can gain root access.

Secrecy and Integrity