

Access Control and Privacy Policies (7)


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Slides: KEATS (also homework is there)

Judgements

$$\Gamma \vdash F$$

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
entails sign



Gamma

stands for a collection of formulas
("assumptions")

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
Gimel (Phoenician), Gamma (Greek), C and G (Latin), Gim (Arabic),
?? (Indian), Ge (Cyrillic)

Inference Rules

premisses

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash F_1 \quad \Gamma \vdash F_2}{\Gamma \vdash F_1 \wedge F_2}$$

conclusion



Trusted Third Party

Simple protocol for establishing a secure connection via a mutually trusted 3rd party (server):

Message 1 $A \rightarrow S : A, B$

Message 2 $S \rightarrow A : \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}}$ and $\{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}}$

Message 3 $A \rightarrow B : \{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}$

Message 4 $A \rightarrow B : \{m\}_{K_{AB}}$

Encrypted Messages

- Alice sends a message m

Alice says m

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- Alice sends an encrypted message m
(with key K)

Alice says $\{m\}_K$

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- Decryption of Alice's message

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \text{Alice says } \{m\}_K \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{Alice says } K}{\Gamma \vdash \text{Alice says } m}$$

Encryption

- Encryption of a message

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash \text{Alice says } m \quad \Gamma \vdash \text{Alice says } K}{\Gamma \vdash \text{Alice says } \{m\}_K}$$

Trusted Third Party

- Alice calls Sam for a key to communicate with Bob
- Sam responds with a key that Alice can read and a key Bob can read (pre-shared)
- Alice sends the message encrypted with the key and the second key it received

A sends *S* : $\text{Connect}(A, B)$

S sends *A* : $\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}}$ and $\{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}}$

A sends *B* : $\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}$

A sends *B* : $\{m\}_{K_{AB}}$

Sending Rule

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash P \text{ says } F \quad \Gamma \vdash P \text{ sends } Q : F}{\Gamma \vdash Q \text{ says } F}$$

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$$P \text{ sends } Q : F \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (P \text{ says } F) \Rightarrow (Q \text{ says } F)$$

Trusted Third Party

A sends *S* : $\text{Connect}(A, B)$

S says $(\text{Connect}(A, B) \Rightarrow$

$$\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}} \wedge \{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}})$$

S sends *A* : $\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{AS}} \wedge \{\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}\}_{K_{AS}}$

A sends *B* : $\{K_{AB}\}_{K_{BS}}$

A sends *B* : $\{m\}_{K_{AB}}$

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$\Gamma \vdash B \text{ says } m?$

Challenge-Response Protocol

- an engine E and a transponder T share a key K
- E sends out a **nonce** N (random number) to T
- T responds with $\{N\}_K$
- if E receives $\{N\}_K$ from T then starts engine

Challenge-Response Protokol

E says N (start)

E sends $T : N$ (challenge)

$(T \text{ says } N) \Rightarrow (T \text{ sends } E : \{N\}_K \wedge$
 $T \text{ sends } E : \text{Id}(T))$ (response)

T says K (key)

T says $\text{Id}(T)$ (identity)

$(E \text{ says } \{N\}_K \wedge E \text{ says } \text{Id}(T)) \Rightarrow$
 $\text{start_engine}(T)$ (engine)

$\Gamma \vdash \text{start_engine}(T)?$