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\newcommand{\dn}{\stackrel{\mbox{\scriptsize def}}{=}}% for definitions
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\begin{document}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}<1>[t]
\frametitle{%
  \begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}
  \\
  \LARGE Access Control and \\[-3mm] 
  \LARGE Privacy Policies (8)\\[-6mm] 
  \end{tabular}}\bigskip\bigskip\bigskip

  %\begin{center}
  %\includegraphics[scale=1.3]{pics/barrier.jpg}
  %\end{center}

\normalsize
  \begin{center}
  \begin{tabular}{ll}
  Email:  & christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk\\
  Of$\!$fice: & S1.27 (1st floor Strand Building)\\
  Slides: & KEATS (also homework is there)\\
  \end{tabular}
  \end{center}


\end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  \mode<presentation>{
  \begin{frame}[c]
  \frametitle{Last Week}

Andrew Secure RPC Protocol:
\bl{$A$} and \bl{$B$} share a key \bl{$K_{AB}$} and want to identify
each other\bigskip

 \begin{itemize}
 \item \bl{$A \,\text{sends}\, B :  A, N_A$} 
 \item \bl{$B\,\text{sends}\, A : \{N_A, K'_{AB}\}_{K_{AB}}$}
 \item \bl{$A \,\text{sends}\, B : \{N_A\}_{K'_{AB}}$}
 \end{itemize}
 
  \end{frame}}
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%    
    
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  \mode<presentation>{
  \begin{frame}[t]
  \frametitle{Protocols}
 
\mbox{} 
  
\begin{tabular}{l}
{\Large \bl{$A\;\text{sends}\; B : \ldots$}}\\
\onslide<2->{\Large \bl{$B\;\text{sends}\; A : \ldots$}}\\
\onslide<2->{\Large \;\;\;\;\;\bl{$:$}}\bigskip
\end{tabular}  
  
 \begin{itemize}
 \item by convention \bl{$A$}, \bl{$B$} are named principals \bl{Alice\ldots}\\
 but most likely they are programs, which just follow some instructions\bigskip
\item<2-> indicates one ``protocol run'', or session,  which specifies some 
order in the communication
\item<2-> there can be several sessions in parallel (think of wifi routers) 
\end{itemize} 
  
  \end{frame}}
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
  
   %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  \mode<presentation>{
  \begin{frame}[c]
  \frametitle{Last Week}


\bl{$A$} and \bl{$B$} share the key \bl{$K_{AB}$} and want to identify
each other\bigskip

 \begin{itemize}
 \item \bl{$A \,\text{sends}\, B :  A, N_A$} 
 \item \bl{$B\,\text{sends}\, A : \{N_A, K'_{AB}\}_{K_{AB}}$}
 \item \bl{$A \,\text{sends}\, B : \{N_A\}_{K'_{AB}}$}
 \end{itemize}
  \end{frame}}
  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%      
     
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  \mode<presentation>{
  \begin{frame}[c]
  \frametitle{Defeating Challenge-Response}

\noindent
A \alert{reflection attack}: an intruder \bl{$I$} impersonates \bl{$B$}.

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{-7mm}}c@{\hspace{1mm}}c@{}}
\begin{tabular}{@{}l@{}}
\onslide<1->{\bl{$A \,\text{sends}\, I :  A, N_A$}}\\ 
\onslide<4->{\bl{$I \,\text{sends}\, A :  \{N_A,\!K'_{\!AB}\}_{K_{\!AB}}$}}\\ 
\onslide<5->{\bl{$A \,\text{sends}\, I : \{N_A\}_{K'_{AB}}$}}\\
\end{tabular}
&
\begin{tabular}{@{}l@{}}
\onslide<2->{\bl{$I \,\text{sends}\, A :  B, N_A$}}\\ 
\onslide<3->{\bl{$A \,\text{sends}\, I :  \{N_A,\!K'_{\!AB}\}_{K_{\!AB}}$}}\\ 
\onslide<6->{\bl{$I \,\text{sends}\, A : \{N_A\}_{K'_{AB}}$}}\\
\end{tabular}
\end{tabular}
\end{center}\bigskip

\onslide<7->{Sounds stupid: ``\ldots answering a question with a counter question''\medskip\\
was originally developed at CMU for terminals to connect to 
workstations (e.g.~file servers)}

  \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%         

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{Identify Friend or Foe}

\begin{center}
\onslide<2->{\mbox{}\hspace{3.4cm}\includegraphics[scale=0.55]{pics/MigInMiddle.jpg}}
\end{center}

\begin{textblock}{6}(0.3,2)
198?: war between Angola (supported by Cuba)
and Namibia (supported by SA)
\end{textblock}

\begin{textblock}{3}(12.5,4.6)
  \onslide<2->{
  \begin{tikzpicture}
  \node at (0,0) [single arrow, fill=red,text=white, rotate=-50, shape border rotate=180]{``bystander''};
  \end{tikzpicture}}
  \end{textblock}

\begin{textblock}{3}(10.9,10)
  \onslide<2->{
  \begin{tikzpicture}
  \node at (0,0) [single arrow, fill=red,text=white, rotate=-40, shape border rotate=180]{attacker};
  \end{tikzpicture}}
  \end{textblock}
  
\only<3->{
\begin{textblock}{6}(0.3,9)
being outsmarted by Angola/Cuba
ended SA involvement
\end{textblock}}
\only<4->{
\begin{textblock}{6}(0.3,13)
IFF opened up a nice side-channel attack
\end{textblock}}
\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

  %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  \mode<presentation>{
  \begin{frame}[c]
  \frametitle{Encryption to the Rescue?}


 \begin{itemize}
 \item \bl{$A \,\text{sends}\, B :  \{A, N_A\}_{K_{AB}}$}\hspace{1cm} encrypted\bigskip 
 \item \bl{$B\,\text{sends}\, A : \{N_A, K'_{AB}\}_{K_{AB}}$}\bigskip
 \item \bl{$A \,\text{sends}\, B : \{N_A\}_{K'_{AB}}$}\bigskip
 \end{itemize}\pause
 
means you need to send a separate ``Hello'' signal (bad), or worse 
share a single key between many entities
\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%      

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{Protocol Attacks}

\begin{itemize}
\item replay attacks
\item reflection attacks
\item man-in-the-middle attacks
\item timing attacks
\item parallel session attacks
\item binding attacks (public key protocols)
\item changing environment / changing assumptions
\end{itemize}
\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
  
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{Replay Attacks}

Schroeder-Needham protocol: exchange of a symmetric key with a trusted 3rd-party \bl{$S$}: 

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{r@ {\hspace{1mm}}l}
\bl{$A \rightarrow S :$} & \bl{$A, B, N_A$}\\
\bl{$S \rightarrow A :$} & \bl{$\{N_A, B, K_{AB},\{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_{BS}} \}_{K_{AS}}$}\\
\bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} & \bl{$\{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_{BS}} $}\\
\bl{$B \rightarrow A :$} & \bl{$\{N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} & \bl{$\{N_B-1\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}\bigskip\pause

at the end both \bl{$A$} and \bl{$B$} should be in the possession of the secret key
\bl{$K_{AB}$} and know that the other principal has the key

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\bl{$A \rightarrow S :$} \bl{$A, B, N_A$}\\
\bl{$S \rightarrow A :$} \bl{$\{N_A, B, K_{AB},\{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_{BS}} \}_{K_{AS}}$}\\
\bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} \bl{$\{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_{BS}} $}\\
\bl{$B \rightarrow A :$} \bl{$\{N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} \bl{$\{N_B-1\}_{K_{AB}}$}\pause\\
\hspace{5cm}compromise \bl{$K_{AB}$}\pause\\
\bl{$A \rightarrow S :$} \bl{$A, B, N'_A$}\\
\bl{$S \rightarrow A :$} \bl{$\{N'_A, B, K'_{AB},\{K'_{AB}, A\}_{K_{BS}} \}_{K_{AS}}$}\pause\\
\bl{$I(A) \rightarrow B :$} \bl{$\{K_{AB}, A\}_{K_{BS}} $}\hspace{0.5cm} replay of older run\pause\\
\bl{$B \rightarrow I(A) :$} \bl{$\{N'_B\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\bl{$I(A) \rightarrow B :$} \bl{$\{N'_B-1\}_{K_{AB}}$}\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}\pause

\bl{$B$} believes it is following the correct protocol,
intruder \bl{$I$} can form the correct response because it knows \bl{$K_{AB}$} and
talk to \bl{$B$} masquerading as \bl{$A$}
\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{Replay Attacks}

Andrew Secure RPC protocol: exchanging a new key
between \bl{$A$} and \bl{$B$}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} \bl{$A, \{N_A\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\bl{$B \rightarrow A :$} \bl{$\{N_A+1, N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} \bl{$\{N_B+1\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\bl{$B \rightarrow A :$} \bl{$\{K^{new}_{AB}, N^{new}_B\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}\bigskip\pause

Assume nonces are represented as bit-sequences of the same length
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{@{}l@{}}
\bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} \bl{$A, \{N_A\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\bl{$B \rightarrow A :$} \bl{$\{N_A+1, N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
\bl{$A \rightarrow I(B) :$} \bl{$\{N_B+1\}_{K_{AB}}$}\hspace{0.5mm}intercepts\\
\bl{$I(B) \rightarrow A :$} \bl{$\{N_A+1, N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$}\hspace{0.5mm}resend 2nd msg\\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{Binding Attacks}

with public-private keys it is important that the public key is \alert{bound} 
to the right owner (verified by a certification authority \bl{$CA$})

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\bl{$A \rightarrow CA :$} \bl{$A, B, N_A$}\\
\bl{$CA \rightarrow A :$} \bl{$CA, \{CA, A, N_A, K^{pub}_{B}\}_{K^{pub}_{A}}$}\\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}\bigskip

\bl{$A$} knows \bl{$K^{prig}_A$} and can verify the message came from \bl{$CA$}
in response to \bl{$A$}'s message and trusts \bl{$K^{pub}_{B}$} is \bl{$B$}'s public key


\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   



%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{Binding Attacks}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{l}
\bl{$A \rightarrow I(CA) :$} \bl{$A, B, N_A$}\\
\bl{$I(A) \rightarrow CA :$} \bl{$A, I, N_A$}\\
\bl{$CA \rightarrow I(A) :$} \bl{$CA, \{CA, A, N_A, K^{pub}_{I}\}_{K^{pub}_{A}}$}\\
\bl{$I(CA) \rightarrow A :$} \bl{$CA, \{CA, A, N_A, K^{pub}_{I}\}_{K^{pub}_{A}}$}\\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}\pause

\bl{$A$} now encrypts messages for \bl{$B$} with the public key of \bl{$I$}
(which happily decrypts them with its private key)

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]

There are plenty of other protocols and attacks. This could go on ``forever''.\pause\bigskip

attacks because of changing environment

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[t]
\frametitle{Changing Environment Attacks}

\begin{itemize}
\item all protocols rely on some assumptions about the environment
(e.g., cryptographic keys cannot be broken)\bigskip\pause
\end{itemize}

\only<2>{
\begin{itemize}
\item in the ``good olden days'' (1960/70) rail transport was cheap, so fraud was not
worthwhile
\end{itemize}}

\only<3>{
\begin{itemize}
\item when it got expensive, some people bought cheaper monthly tickets for a suburban 
station and a nearby one, and one for the destination and a nearby one
\item a large investment later all barriers were automatic and tickets can record state
\end{itemize}}

\only<4>{
\begin{itemize}
\item But suddenly the environment changed: rail transport got privatised creating many companies
cheating each other
\item revenue from monthly tickets was distributed according to a formula where the ticket was bought
\end{itemize}}

\only<5>{
\begin{itemize}
\item apart from bad outsiders (passengers) you also had bad insiders (rail companies)
\item chaos and litigation ensued
\end{itemize}}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]

A Man-in-the-middle attack in real life:

\begin{itemize}
\item the card only says yes or no to the terminal if the PIN is correct
\item trick the card in thinking transaction is verified by signature
\item trick the terminal in thinking the transaction was verified by PIN
\end{itemize}

\begin{minipage}{1.1\textwidth}
\begin{center}
\mbox{}\hspace{-6mm}\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/chip-attack.png}
\includegraphics[scale=0.3]{pics/chipnpinflaw.png}
\end{center}
\end{minipage}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{Problems with EMV}

\begin{itemize}
\item it is a wrapper for many protocols
\item specification by consensus (resulted unmanageable complexity)
\item its specification is 700 pages in English plus 2000+ pages for testing, additionally some 
further parts are secret
\item other attacks have been found

\item one solution might be to require always online verification of the PIN with the bank
\end{itemize}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{Good Practices}

\begin{itemize}
\item explicit principles (you authenticate all data you might rely on)
\item the one who can fix a system should also be liable for the losses  
\end{itemize}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{Privacy et al}

Some terminology:

\begin{itemize}
\item \alert{secrecy} is the mechanism used to limit the number of 
principals with access to information (eg, cryptography or access controls)

\item \alert{confidentiality} is the obligation to protect the secrets of other people 
or organizations (secrecy for the benefit of an organisation)

\item \alert{anonymity} is the ability to leave no evidence of an activity (eg, sharing a secret)

\item \alert{privacy} is the ability or right to protect your personal secrets 
(secrecy for the benefit of an individual)

\end{itemize}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 


\end{document}

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