# **Access Control and Privacy Policies (1)**



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# **Security Engineers**

According to Bruce Schneier, security engineers require a particular mindset:

"Security engineers — at least the good ones — see the world differently. They can't walk into a store without noticing how they might shoplift. They can't use a computer without wondering about the security vulnerabilities. They can't vote without trying to figure out how to vote twice. They just can't help it."







## **Chip-and-PIN**





- Chip-and-PIN was introduced in the UK in 2004
- before that customers had to sign a receipt
- Is Chip-and-PIN a more secure system? What do you think?

(Some other countries still use the old method.)

### Yes...

"Chip-and-PIN is so effective in this country that fraudsters are starting to move their activities overseas," said Emile Abu-Shakra, spokesman for Lloyds TSB (in the Guardian, 2006).

- mag-stripe cards cannot be cloned anymore
- stolen or cloned cards need to be used abroad
- fraud on lost, stolen and counterfeit credit cards was down £60m (24%) on 2004's figure

### Let's see...







### Let's see...









terminal producer

# **Chip-and-PIN**

 A "tamperesitant" terminal playing Tetris on youtube.

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWTzkD9M0sU)



## **Chip-and-PIN**


- in 2006, Shell petrol stations stopped accepting Chip-and-PIN after £1m had been stolen from customer accounts
- in 2008, hundreds of card readers for use in Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium had been expertly tampered with shortly after manufacture so that details and PINs of credit cards were sent during the 9 months before over mobile phone networks to criminals in Lahore, Pakistan

# **Chip-and-PIN** is Broken





 man-in-the-middle attacks by the group around Ross Anderson



on BBC Newsnight in 2010 or youtube

# **Chip-and-PIN** is Really Broken





- same group successfully attacked this year card readers and ATM machines
- the problem: several types of ATMs generate poor random numbers, which are used as nonces

### The Problem...









terminal producer

 the burden of proof for fraud and financial liability was shifted to the costumer

## **Screwed Again**



### Responsibility

"You understand that you are financially responsible for all uses of RBS Secure."


https://www.rbssecure.co.uk/rbs/tdsecure/terms\_of\_
use.jsp

# **Web Applications**



• What are pitfalls and best practices?

## **Web Applications**



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• What are pitfalls and best practices?

# Scala + Play

#### simple response from the server:

```
package controllers
import play.api.mvc._

object Application extends Controller {

// answering a GET request

val index = Action { request =>

Ok("Hello world!")
}
```

#### alternative response:

```
Ok("<H1>Hello world!</H1>").as(HTML)
```

```
object Application extends Controller {
1
2
     // GET request -> present login form
3
     val index = Action { request =>
4
5
       val form =
6
7
           """<form method="post">
              Login: <input type="text" name="login"><br>
8
              Password: <input type="password" name="password"><br>
9
              <input type="submit"></form>"""
10
11
12
       Ok(form).as(HTML)
13
14
     // POST data: processing the login data
15
16
     val receive = Action { request =>
17
       val form_data = Form (tuple ("login" -> text, "password" -> text))
18
19
       val (login, password) = form data.bindFromRequest() (request).get
20
21
22
       Ok("Received login: " + login + " and password: " + password)
23
24
```





















- cookies: max 4KB data
- cookie theft, cross-site scripting attacks
- session cookies, persistent cookies, HttpOnly cookies, third-party cookies, zombie cookies

#### EU Privacy Directive about Cookies:

"In May 2011, a European Union law was passed stating that websites that leave non-essential cookies on visitors' devices have to alert the visitor and get acceptance from them. This law applies to both individuals and businesses based in the EU regardless of the nationality of their website's visitors or the location of their web host. It is not enough to simply update a website's terms and conditions or privacy policy. The deadline to comply with the new EU cookie law was 26th May 2012 and failure to do so could mean a fine of up to

- £500,000."
- session cookies, persistent cookies, HttpOnly cookies, third-party cookies, zombie cookies

# **My First Webapp**

#### GET request:

- read cookie from client
- $oldsymbol{0}$  if none is present, set visits to  $oldsymbol{0}$
- if cookie is present, extract visits
- if visits is greater or equal 10, print valued customer message otherwise just normal message
- increase visits by 1 and store new cookie with client

```
object Application extends Controller {
2
3
     def gt_cookie(c: Option[Cookie]) : Int = c match {
4
       case Some(s) if (s.value.forall( .isDigit)) => s.value.toInt
       case => 0
5
6
7
     def mk cookie(i: Int) : Cookie = {
8
       Cookie ("visits", i.toString)
9
10
11
     // GET request: read cookie data first
12
13
     def index = Action { request =>
14
       val visits cookie = request.cookies.get("visits")
15
       val visits = gt_cookie(visits_cookie)
16
17
       val msq1 = "You are a valued customer who has visited this site %d
18
       val msg2 = "You have visited this site %d times."
19
       val msg =
20
21
          if (visits >= 10) msg1.format(visits) else msg2.format(visits)
22
       //send with new cookie
23
       Ok(msq).as(HTML).withCookies(mk_cookie(visits + 1))
24
25
26
                                           APP 01, King's College London, 25, September 2012 - p. 17/22
```

## **Brute Forcing Passwords**

• How fast can hackers crack SHA-1 passwords?

# **Brute Forcing Passwords**

- How fast can hackers crack SHA-1 passwords?
- The answer is 2 billion attempts per second using a Radeon HD 7970

#### password length time

5 letters 5 secs

6 letters 500 secs

7 letters 13 hours

8 letters 57 days

9 letters 15 years

5 letters  $\approx 100^5 = 10$  billion combinations (1 letter - upper case, lower case, digits, symbols  $\approx$  100)

graphics card

ca. £.300

# **Privacy**

Scott McNealy:"You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it."

### **Passwords**

How do recover from a break in?

### Thinking as a Defender

- What are we trying to protect?
- What properties are we trying to enforce?
- Who are the attackers? Capabilities? Motivations?
- What kind of attack are we trying to protect?
- Who can fix any vulnerabilities?
- What are the weaknesses of the system?
- What will successful attacks cost us?
- How likely are the attacks?
- Security almost always is **not** free!

## **The Security Mindset**

- How things can go wrong.
- Think outside the box.

The difference between a criminal is to only think about how things can go wrong.