Handout 2 (E-Voting)

In security there are many counter-intuitive phenomena: for example I am happy (more or less) to use online banking every day, where if something goes wrong, I can potentially loose a lot of money, but I am staunchly against using electronic voting (lets call it e-voting for short). E-voting is an idea that is nowadays often promoted in order to counter low turnouts in elections¹ and generally sounds like a good idea. Right? Voting from the comfort of your own home, or on your mobile on the go, what could possibly go wrong? Even the UK's head of the Electoral Commission, Jenny Watson, argued in 2014 in a Guardian article that the UK should have e-voting. Her plausible argument is that 76% of pensioners in the UK vote (in a general election?), but only 44% of the under-25s. For which constituency politicians might therefore make more favourable (short-term) decisions is clear. So being not yet pensioner, I should be in favour of e-voting, no?

Well, it turns out there are many things that can go wrong with e-voting, as I like to argue in this handout. E-voting in a "secure way" seems to be one of the things in computer science that are still very much unsolved. It is not on the scale of Turing's halting problem, which is proved that it can never be solved in general, but it is unsolved with current technology. This is not just my opinion, but from shared by Alex Halderman, who is the world-expert on this subject and from whose course on Securing Digital Democracy I have most of my information and inspiration. It is also a controversial topic in many countries:

- The Netherlands between 1997–2006 had electronic voting machines, but "hacktivists" had found they can be hacked and also emitted radio signals revealing how you voted.
- Germany had used them in pilot studies, but in 2007 a law suit has reached
 the highest court and it rejected electronic voting on the grounds of not
 being understandable by the general public.
- UK used optical scan voting systems in a few trail polls, but to my knowledge does not use any e-voting in elections.
- The US used mechanical machines since the 1930s, later punch cards, now DREs and optical scan voting machines.
- Estonia used since 2007 the Internet for national elections. There were earlier pilot studies for voting via Internet in other countries.
- India uses e-voting devices since at least 2003. They used "keep-it-simple" machines produced by a government owned company.
- South Africa used software for its tallying in the 1993 elections (when Nelson Mandela was elected) and found that the tallying software was rigged, but they were able to tally manually.

¹In my last local election where I was eligible to vote only 48% of the population have cast their ballot. I was, I shamefully admit, one of the non-voters.

The reason that e-voting is such a hard problem is that we have requirements about the voting process that conflict with each other. The five main requirements are:

• Integrity

- The outcome of the vote matches with the voters' intend.
- There might be gigantic sums at stake and need to be defended against.

Ballot Secrecy

- Nobody can find out how you voted.
- (Stronger) Even if you try, you cannot prove how you voted.

• Voter Authentication

- Only authorised voters can vote up to the permitted number of votes.

• Enfranchisement

Authorised voters should have the opportunity to vote.

Availability

 The voting system should accept all authorised votes and produce results in a timely manner.

To tackle the problem of e-voting, we must first have a look into the history of voting and how paper-based ballots evolved. We know for sure that elections were held in Athens as early as 600 BC, but might even date to the time of Mesopotamia and also in India some kind of "republics" might have existed before the Alexander the Great invaded it. Have a look at Wikipedia about the history of democracy for more information.

Questions

Coming back to the question of why I use online banking, but prefer not to e-vote.

Why do I use e-polling in lectures?

Imagine you have a perfectly secure internet voting system, by which I mean nobody can tamper with or steal votes between your browser and the central server responsible for vote tallying. What can still go wrong with such a perfectly secure voting system, which is prevented in traditional elections with paper-based ballots?