Access Control and Privacy Policies (3)

Email: christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk

Office: S1.27 (1st floor Strand Building)

Slides: KEATS (also home work is there)

The idea is to trick a privileged person to do something on your behalf:

root:
rm /tmp/*/*

The idea is to trick a privileged person to do something on your behalf:

root:

```
rm /tmp/*/*
```

```
the shell behind the scenes:
rm /tmp/dir<sub>I</sub>/file<sub>I</sub> /tmp/dir<sub>I</sub>/file<sub>I</sub> ...
```

this takes time

- attacker (creates a fake passwd file)
 mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd
- oot (does the daily cleaning)
 rm /tmp/*/*

records that /tmp/a/passwd should be deleted, but does not do it yet

- attacker (meanwhile deletes the fake passwd file, and establishes a link to the real passwd file) rm /tmp/a/passwd; rmdir /tmp/a; ln -s /etc /tmp/a
- ot now deletes the real passwd file

- attacker (creates a fake passwd file)
 mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd
- To prevent this kind of attack, you need additional policies (don't do such operations as root).

should be deleted, but does not do it yet

- attacker (meanwhile deletes the fake passwd file, and establishes a link to the real passwd file) rm /tmp/a/passwd; rmdir /tmp/a; ln -s /etc /tmp/a
- ot now deletes the real passwd file

Buffer Overflow Attacks



lectures so far

Buffer Overflow Attacks




lectures so far



today

Network Applications: Privilege Separation



 the idea is make the attack surface smaller and mitigate the consequences of an attack

Access Control in Unix

- access control provided by the OS
- authenticate principals (login)
- mediate access to files, ports, processes according to roles (user ids)
- roles get attached with privileges

The principle of least privilege: programs should only have as much privilege as they need

Process Ownership

access control in Unix is very coarse

root has UID = 0

Process Ownership

• access control in Unix is very coarse

root
user₁ user₂ ...www, mail, lp

root has UID = 0 you also have groups that can share access to a file but it is difficult to exclude access selectively

Access Control in Unix (2)

- privileges are specified by file access permissions ("everything is a file")
- there are 9 (plus 2) bits that specify the permissions of a file

```
$ ls - la
-rwxrw-r-- foo_file.txt
```

Login Process

• login processes run under UID = 0

ps -axl | grep login

• after login, shells run under UID = user (e.g. 501)

id cu

Login Process

• login processes run under UID = 0

ps -axl | grep login

• after login, shells run under UID = user (e.g. 501)

id cu

- non-root users are not allowed to change the UID — would break access control
- but needed for example for passwd


Setuid and Setgid

The solution is that unix file permissions are 9 + 2 Bits: Setuid and Setgid Bits

- When a file with setuid is executed, the resulting process will assume the UID given to the owner of the file.
- This enables users to create processes as root (or another user).
- Essential for changing passwords, for example.

chmod 4755 fobar file

Privilege Separation in OpenSSH



- pre-authorisation slave
- post-authorisation
- 25% codebase is privileged, 75% is unprivileged

Network Applications

ideally network application in Unix should be designed as follows:

- need two distinct processes
 - one that listens to the network; has no privilege
 - one that is privileged and listens to the latter only (but does not trust it)
- to implement this you need a parent process, which forks a child process
- this child process drops privileges and listens to hostile data
- after authentication the parent forks again and the new child becomes the user

• 1pr unfortunately runs with root privileges; you had the option to delete files after printing ...

• 1pr unfortunately runs with root privileges; you had the option to delete files after printing ...

- 1pr unfortunately runs with root privileges; you had the option to delete files after printing ...
- for debugging purposes (FreeBSD) Unix provides a "core dump", but allowed to follow links ...

- 1pr unfortunately runs with root privileges; you had the option to delete files after printing ...
- for debugging purposes (FreeBSD) Unix provides a "core dump", but allowed to follow links ...
- mkdir foo is owned by root

-rwxr-xr-x 1 root wheel /bin/mkdir

it first creates an i-node as root and then changes to ownership to the user's id

(race condition – can be automated with a shell script)

- 1pr unfortunately runs with root privileges; you had the option to delete files after printing ...
- o for de Only failure makes us experts. Theo de Raadt (OpenBSD, OpenSSH)

 o mkdir

-rwxr-xr-x 1 root wheel /bin/mkdir

it first creates an i-node as root and then changes to ownership to the user's id

(race condition – can be automated with a shell script)

- attacker (creates a fake passwd file)
 mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd
- ot (does the daily cleaning)
 rm /tmp/*/*

records that /tmp/a/passwd should be deleted, but does not do it yet

- attacker (meanwhile deletes the fake passwd file, and establishes a link to the real passwd file) rm /tmp/a/passwd; rmdir /tmp/a; ln -s /etc /tmp/a
- 4 root now deletes the real passwd file

- attacker (creates a fake passwd file)
 mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd
- To prevent this kind of attack, you need additional policies (don't do such operations as root).

should be deleted, but does not do it yet

- attacker (meanwhile deletes the fake passwd file, and establishes a link to the real passwd file) rm /tmp/a/passwd; rmdir /tmp/a; ln -s /etc /tmp/a
- ot now deletes the real passwd file



one general defence mechanism is **defence in depth**

Smash the Stack for Fun...

- "smashing the stack attacks" or "buffer overflow attacks"
- one of the most popular attacks
 50% of security incidents reported at CERT are related to buffer overflows)

http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls

 made popular in an article by Elias Levy (also known as Aleph One):

"Smashing The Stack For Fun and Profit"

Issue 49, Article 14

A Float Printed "Twice"

```
void foo (char *bar)
2
     float my_float = 10.5; // in hex: \x41\x28\x00\x00
     char buffer[28];
5
     printf("my float value = %f\n", my float);
     strcpy(buffer, bar);
     printf("my float value = %f\n", my float);
8
10
   int main (int argc, char **argv)
12
     foo("my string is too long !!!!! ");
13
     return 0;
14
15
```

The Problem

 The basic problem is that library routines in C look as follows:


```
void strcpy(char *src, char *dst) {
int i = 0;
while (src[i] != "\0") {
   dst[i] = src[i];
   i = i + 1;
}
}
```


- the resulting problems are often remotely exploitable
- can be used to circumvents all access control (for grooming botnets for further attacks)


Variants

There are many variants:

- return-to-lib-C attacks
- heap-smashing attacks
 (Slammer Worm in 2003 infected 90% of vulnerable systems within 10 minutes)
- "zero-days-attacks" (new unknown vulnerability)







```
int match(char *s1, char *s2) {
    while( *s1 != '\0' && *s2 != '\0' && *s1 == *s2
       s1++; s2++;
    return( *s1 - *s2 );
7
  void welcome() { printf("Welcome to the Machine!\)
  void goodbye() { printf("Invalid identity, exiting
10
  main(){
    char name[8];
    char pw[8];
13
14
     printf("login: ");
15
    get_line(name);
16
     printf("password: ");
17
    get line(pw);
18
19
```

Payloads

- the idea is you store some code to the buffer
- you then override the return address to execute this payload
- normally you start a root-shell

Payloads

- the idea is you store some code to the buffer
- you then override the return address to execute this payload
- normally you start a root-shell
- difficulty is to guess the right place where to "jump"

Payloads (2)

 another difficulty is that the code is not allowed to contain \x00:

xorl %eax, %eax

```
r void strcpy(char *src, char *dst) {
   int i = 0;
   while (src[i] != "\0") {
      dst[i] = src[i];
      i = i + 1;
   }
}
```

Format String Vulnerability

string is nowhere used:

```
#include<stdio.h>
   #include<string.h>
  // a program that "just" prints the argument
  // on the command line
6
   main(int argc, char **argv)
9
           char *string = "This is a secret string\n";
TΩ
           printf(argv[1]);
12
13
```

this vulnerability can be used to read out the stack

Protections against Buffer Overflow Attacks

- use safe library functions
- stack caneries
- ensure stack data is not executable (can be defeated)
- address space randomisation (makes one-size-fits-all more difficult)
- choice of programming language (one of the selling points of Java)

• Prevent common vulnerabilities from occurring (e.g. buffer overflows)

- Prevent common vulnerabilities from occurring (e.g. buffer overflows)
- Recover from attacks (traceability and auditing of security-relevant actions)

- Prevent common vulnerabilities from occurring (e.g. buffer overflows)
- Recover from attacks (traceability and auditing of security-relevant actions)
- Monitoring (detect attacks)

- Prevent common vulnerabilities from occurring (e.g. buffer overflows)
- Recover from attacks (traceability and auditing of security-relevant actions)
- Monitoring (detect attacks)
- Privacy, confidentiality, anonymity (to protect secrets)

- Prevent common vulnerabilities from occurring (e.g. buffer overflows)
- Recover from attacks (traceability and auditing of security-relevant actions)
- Monitoring (detect attacks)
- Privacy, confidentiality, anonymity (to protect secrets)
- Authenticity (needed for access control)

- Prevent common vulnerabilities from occurring (e.g. buffer overflows)
- Recover from attacks (traceability and auditing of security-relevant actions)
- Monitoring (detect attacks)
- Privacy, confidentiality, anonymity (to protect secrets)
- Authenticity (needed for access control)
- Integrity (prevent unwanted modification or tampering)

- Prevent common vulnerabilities from occurring (e.g. buffer overflows)
- Recover from attacks (traceability and auditing of security-relevant actions)
- Monitoring (detect attacks)
- Privacy, confidentiality, anonymity (to protect secrets)
- Authenticity (needed for access control)
- Integrity (prevent unwanted modification or tampering)
- Availability and reliability (reduce the risk of DoS attacks)

Homework

- Assume format string attacks allow you to read out the stack. What can you do with this information?
- Assume you can crash a program remotely. Why is this a problem?