Access Control and Privacy Policies (1)



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Security Engineers

According to Bruce Schneier, **security engineers** require a particular **mindset**:

"Security engineers — at least the good ones — see the world differently. They can't walk into a store without noticing how they might shoplift. They can't use a computer without wondering about the security vulnerabilities. They can't vote without trying to figure out how to vote twice. They just can't help it."



Chip-and-PIN



- Chip-and-PIN was introduced in the UK in 2004
- before that customers had to sign a receipt
- Is Chip-and-PIN a more secure system? What do you think?

(Some other countries still use the old method.)



"Chip-and-PIN is so effective in this country that fraudsters are starting to move their activities overseas," said Emile Abu-Shakra, spokesman for Lloyds TSB (in the Guardian, 2006).

- mag-stripe cards cannot be cloned anymore
- stolen or cloned cards need to be used abroad
- fraud on lost, stolen and counterfeit credit cards was down £60m (24%) on 2004's figure

Let's see...







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Let's see...









terminal producer

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Chip-and-PIN

• A "tamperesitant" terminal playing Tetris on youtube.

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWTzkD9M0sU)




Chip-and-PIN

- in 2006, Shell petrol stations stopped accepting Chip-and-PIN after £1m had been stolen from customer accounts
- in 2008, hundreds of card readers for use in Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium had been expertly tampered with shortly after manufacture so that details and PINs of credit cards were sent during the 9 months before over mobile phone networks to criminals in Lahore, Pakistan

Chip-and-PIN is Broken



 man-in-the-middle attacks by the group around Ross Anderson



on BBC Newsnight in 2010 or youtube

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Chip-and-PIN is Really Broken



- same group successfully attacked this year card readers and ATM machines
- the problem: several types of ATMs generate poor random numbers, which are used as nonces

The Problem...



• the burden of proof for fraud and financial liability was shifted to the costumer

Screwed Again



Responsibility

"You understand that you are financially responsible for all uses of RBS Secure."

https://www.rbssecure.co.uk/rbs/tdsecure/terms_of_ use.jsp

Web Applications





• What are pitfalls and best practices?

Scala + Play

```
package controllers
1
   import play.api.mvc._
2
3
   object Application extends Controller {
4
5
6
    // answering a GET request
7
     val index = Action { request =>
8
       Ok("Hello world!")
9
10
11
12
```

alternative response:

```
Ok("<H1>Hello world!</H1>").as(HTML)
```

```
object Application extends Controller {
1
2
     // presenting login form
3
     val index = Action { request =>
4
5
       val form = """<form method="post">
6
7
                    Login: <input type="text" name="login"><br>
                    Password: <input type="password" name="password"><br>
8
                    <input type="submit"></form>"""
9
10
11
       Ok(form).as(HTML)
12
      }
13
14
     // processing the received login data
15
16
     val receive = Action { request =>
17
       val form_data = Form (tuple ("login" -> text, "password" -> text))
18
19
       val (login, password) = form data.bindFromRequest() (request).get
20
21
22
       Ok("Received login: " + login + " and password: " + password)
23
24
25
```

Brute Forcing Passwords

• How fast can hackers crack SHA-1 passwords?

Brute Forcing Passwords

- How fast can hackers crack SHA-1 passwords?
- The answer is 2 billion attempts per second using a Radeon HD 7970

password length	time
5 letters	5 secs
6 letters	500 secs
7 letters	13 hours
8 letters	57 days
9 letters	15 years



5 letters $\approx 100^5 = 10$ billion combinations (1 letter - upper case, lower case, digits, symbols ≈ 100)



Scott McNealy:
 "You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it."



• How do recover from a break in?

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Thinking as a Defender

- What are we trying to protect?
- What properties are we trying to enforce?
- Who are the attackers? Capabilities? Motivations?
- What kind of attack are we trying to protect?
- Who can fix any vulnerabilities?
- What are the weaknesses of the system?
- What will successful attacks cost us?
- How likely are the attacks?
- Security almost always is **not** free!

The Security Mindset

- How things can go wrong.
- Think outside the box.

The difference between a criminal is to only think about how things can go wrong.