Access Control and Privacy Policies (9)

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Old-Fashioned Eng. vs. CS



bridges:

engineers can "look" at a bridge and have a pretty good intuition about whether it will hold up or not (redundancy; predictive theory)



code:

programmers have very little intuition about their code; often it is too expensive to have redundancy; not "continuous"



"Program testing can be a very effective way to show the presence of bugs, but it is hopelessly inadequate for showing their absence."

unfortunately attackers exploit bugs (Satan's computer vs Murphy's)

Dijkstra: shortest path algorithm, dining philosophers problem, semaphores

Proving Programs to be Correct

Theorem: There are infinitely many prime numbers. **Proof** ...

similarly

Theorem: The program is doing what it is sup+ed to be doing.

Long, long proof ...

This can be a gigantic proof. The only hope is to have help from the computer. 'Program' is here to be understood to be quite general (protocol, OS,...).


Mars Pathfinder Mission 1997




- despite NASA's famous testing procedures, the lander crashed frequently on Mars
- a scheduling algorithm was not used in the OS




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





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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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





medium pr.



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
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Priority Inheritance Scheduling


- Let a low priority process L temporarily inherit the high priority of H until L leaves the critical section unlocking the resource.
- Once the resource is unlocked *L* returns to its original priority level.




high priority



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






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
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
time

















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Priority Inheritance Scheduling

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- ...*L* needs to switch to the highest remaining priority of the threads that it blocks.

this error is already known since around 1999



- by Rajkumar, 1991
- *"it resumes the priority it had at the point of entry into the critical section"*



- by Jane Liu, 2000
- "The job J₁ executes at its inherited priority until it releases R; at that time, the priority of J₁ returns to its priority at the time when it acquires the resource R."
- gives pseudo code and totally bogus data structures
- interesting part "left as an exercise"



- by Laplante and Ovaska, 2011 (\$113.76)
- "when [the task] exits the critical section that caused the block, it reverts to the priority it had when it entered that section"

Priority Scheduling

- a scheduling algorithm that is widely used in real-time operating systems
- has been "proved" correct by hand in a paper in 1983
- but this algorithm turned out to be incorrect, despite its "proof"


Priority Scheduling


- a scheduling algorithm that is widely used in real-time operating systems
- has been "proved" correct by hand in a paper in 1983
- but this algorithm turned out to be incorrect, despite its "proof"
- we corrected the algorithm and then **really** proved that it is correct
- we implemented this algorithm in a small OS called PINTOS (used for teaching at Stanford)
- our implementation was much more efficient than their reference implementation


Design of AC-Policies


"what you specify is what you get but not necessarily what you want..."


main work by Chunhan Wu (PhD-student)














- working purely in the *dynamic world* does not work – infinite state space
- working purely on *static* policies also does not work – because of over approximation
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 - there is a role *r* which can both read and write *bin*-files

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- our solution: take a middle ground and record precisely the information of the initial state, but be less precise about every newly created object.

Big Proofs in CS

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Formal proofs in CS sound like science fiction? Completely irrelevant! Lecturer gone mad?

- in 2008, verification of a small C-compiler
 - "if my input program has a certain behaviour, then the compiled machine code has the same behaviour"
 - is as good as gcc -01, but much less buggy
- in 2010, verification of a micro-kernel operating system (approximately 8700 loc)
 - 200k loc of proof
 - 25 30 person years
 - found 160 bugs in the C code (144 by the proof)



Remember the Bridges example?

• Can we look at our programs and somehow ensure they are secure/bug free/correct?

Goal


Remember the Bridges example?

- Can we look at our programs and somehow ensure they are secure/bug free/correct?
- Very hard: Anything interesting about programs is equivalent to halting problem, which is undecidable.


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
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
- Can we look at our programs and somehow ensure they are secure/bug free/correct?
- Very hard: Anything interesting about programs is equivalent to halting problem, which is undecidable.
- Solution: We avoid this "minor" obstacle by being as close as +sible of deciding the halting problem, without actually deciding the halting problem. ⇒ static analysis




 depending on some initial input, a program (behaviour) will "develop" over time.








• to be avoided



• this needs more work



Concrete Example: Sign-Analysis

$$\langle Exp \rangle :::= \langle Exp \rangle + \langle Exp \rangle \\ | \langle Exp \rangle * \langle Exp \rangle \\ | \langle Exp \rangle = \langle Exp \rangle \\ | \langle num \rangle \\ | \langle var \rangle \\ \langle Stmt \rangle :::= \langle label \rangle : \\ | \langle var \rangle := \langle Exp \rangle \\ | jump? \langle Exp \rangle \langle label \rangle \\ | goto \langle label \rangle \\ \langle Prog \rangle ::= \langle Stmt \rangle \dots$$

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$$| \langle Exp \rangle * \langle Exp \rangle$$

$$| \langle Exp \rangle = \langle Exp \rangle$$

$$| \langle exp \rangle = \langle Exp \rangle$$

$$| \langle var \rangle$$

$$| \langle var \rangle$$

$$| \langle var \rangle ::= \langle label \rangle :$$

$$| \langle var \rangle := \langle Exp \rangle$$

$$| goto \langle label \rangle$$

$$\langle Prog \rangle ::= \langle Stmt \rangle \dots$$


Eval

$$\begin{bmatrix} n \end{bmatrix}_{env} & \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} & n \\ [x]_{env} & \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} & env(x) \\ [e_1 + e_2]_{env} & \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} & [e_1]_{env} + [e_2]_{env} \\ [e_1 * e_2]_{env} & \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} & [e_1]_{env} * [e_2]_{env} \\ [e_1 = e_2]_{env} & \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} & \begin{cases} I & \text{if } [e_1]_{env} = [e_2]_{env} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$ef \text{ eval}_\exp(e: \text{ Exp, env: Env}) : \text{ Int } = e \text{ match } \{ \\ \text{case Num(n) & n} \\ \text{case Var(x) & env(x)} \\ \text{case Plus(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e1, env) + eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e1, env) * eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e1, env) * eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e2, env) + eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e2, env) + eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e2, env) + eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e2, env) + eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e2, env) + eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e2, env) + eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e2, env) + eval_exp(e2, env) + eval_exp(e2, env)} \\ \text{case Equ(e1, e2) & eval_exp(e2, env) + eval_exp(e2, e$$

d

}



Some snippets

```
"" a := 1
n := 5
top: jmp? n = 0 done
a := a * n
n := n + -1
goto top
done:
```

top:	jmp? n = 0 done a := a * n	done:
	n := n + -1	
	goto top	
done:		
	J	

Eval for Stmts

Let *sn* be the snippets of a program


 $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} env$ [nil]_{env} $[Label(l:):: rest]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [rest]_{env}$ $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [rest]_{(env[x:=[e]_{env}])}$ $[x := e :: rest]_{env}$ $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} [sn(l)]_{env} & \text{if } [e]_{env} = \mathbf{I} \\ [rest]_{env} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$ $[jmp? e l :: rest]_{env}$ $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [sn(l)]_{eng}$ $[goto l :: rest]_{env}$

Start with $[sn("")]_{\varnothing}$

Eval in Code

```
def eval(sn: Snips) : Env = {
  def eval stmts(sts: Stmts, env: Env) : Env = sts match {
    case Nil & env
    case Label(1)::rest & eval stmts(rest, env)
    case Assign(x, e)::rest &
      eval stmts(rest, env + (x \rightarrow eval exp(e, env)))
    case Jump(b, 1)::rest &
      if (eval exp(b, env) == 1) eval stmts(sn(1), env)
      else eval stmts(rest, env)
    case Goto(1)::rest & eval_stmts(sn(1), env)
  }
  eval stmts(sn(""), Map())
}
```

The Idea



Replace all constants and variables by either +, - or 0. What we want to find out is what the sign of a and n is (they are always positive).

Sign Analysis?

e_{I}	e_2	$e_{I} + e_{2}$	e_{I}	e_2	$e_1 * e_2$
-	-	-	-	-	+
-	0	- -, 0, + <i>x</i>	-	0	0
-	+	-, 0, +	-	+	-
0	x	x	0	+ x -	0
+	-	-, 0, +	+	-	-
+	0	-, 0, + + +	+	0 +	0
+	+	+	+	+	+

$$[n]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \{+\} & \text{if } n > 0 \\ \{-\} & \text{if } n < 0 \\ \{0\} & \text{if } n = 0 \end{cases}$$
$$[x]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} env(x)$$
$$[e_1 + e_2]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [e_1]_{env} \oplus [e_2]_{env}$$
$$[e_1 * e_2]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [e_1]_{env} \otimes [e_2]_{env}$$
$$[e_1 = e_2]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{0, +\}$$

```
def aeval_exp(e: Exp, aenv: AEnv) : Set[Abst] = e match {
   case Num(0) => Set(Zero)
   case Num(n) if (n < 0) => Set(Neg)
   case Num(n) if (n > 0) => Set(Pos)
   case Var(x) => aenv(x)
   case Plus(e1, e2) =>
      aplus(aeval_exp(e1, aenv), aeval_exp(e2, aenv))
   case Times(aeval_exp(e1, aenv), aeval_exp(e2, aenv))
   case Equ(e1, e2) => Set(Zero, Pos)
}
```



- We want to find out whether a and n are always positive?
- After a few optimisations, we can indeed find this out.
 - if returns + or 0
 - branch into only one direction if you know
 - if x is +, then x + -1 cannot be negative
- What is this good for? Well, you do not need underflow checks (in order to prevent buffer-overflow attacks).