Access Control and Privacy Policies (2)

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This Course is about "Satan's Computer"

Ross Anderson and Roger Needham wrote:

"In effect, our task is to program a computer which gives answers which are subtly and maliciously wrong at the most inconvenient possible moment... we hope that the lessons learned from programming Satan's computer may be helpful in tackling the more common problem of programming Murphy's."

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Murphy's computer



Satan's computers

Defence in Depth

urbanc:\$6\$3WWbKfr1\$4vblknvGr6FcDeF92R5xFn3mskfdnEn...:...

- hashes help when password databases are leaked
- salts help with protecting against dictionary attacks and help people who have the same password on different sites
- but they do not protect against a focused attack against a single password and also do not make poorly chosen passwords any better

Subtle Points

- in our web-application the salt needed to remain secret; in password files the salt is public
- the NYT has the "resource" unlocked at first and locks it depending on the cookie data
- our "web-application" has the resource locked at first, and unlocks it depending on the cookie data

How to Salt?

- $\texttt{1salt} \ \Rightarrow \ \texttt{8189effef4d4f7411f4153b13ff72546dd682c69}$
- $2salt \Rightarrow 1528375d5ceb7d71597053e6877cc570067a738f$
- 3salt \Rightarrow d646e213d4f87e3971d9dd6d9f435840eb6a1c06
- 4salt \Rightarrow 5b9e85269e4461de0238a6bf463ed3f25778cbba
- in Unix systems: hash(salt + password), or even hash¹⁵⁰⁰(salt + password)

Today's Lecture

online banking vs e-voting solved unsolved

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What are the security requirements of a voting system?

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Integrity

- The outcome matches with the voters' intend.
- There might be gigantic sums at stake and need to be defended against.

What are the security requirements of a voting system?

- Integrity
- Ballot Secrecy

What are the security requirements of a voting system?

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- Nobody can find out how you voted.
- (Stronger) Even if you try, you cannot prove how you voted.

What are the security requirements of a voting system?

- Integrity
- Ballot Secrecy
- Voter Authentication

• Only authorised voters can vote up to the permitted number of votes.

What are the security requirements of a voting system?

- Integrity
- Ballot Secrecy
- Voter Authentication
- Enfranchisement

• Authorised voters should have the opportunity to vote.

What are the security requirements of a voting system?

- Integrity
- Ballot Secrecy
- Voter Authentication
- Enfranchisement
- Availability

• The voting system should accept all authorised votes and produce results in a timely manner.

Problems with Voting

Integrity vs. Ballot Secrecy

Authentication vs. Enfranchisement



Integrity vs. Ballot Secrecy

Authentication vs. Enfranchisement

Further constraints:

- o costs
- accessibility
- onvenience
- intelligibility

Traditional Ballot Boxes



Traditional Ballot Boxes



mechanical, but they need a "protocol"

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Motives for E-Voting

- 76% of pensioners in the UK vote, but only 44% of the under-25s
- convenience
- speed

E-Voting

- The Netherlands between 1997 2006 had electronic voting machines (hacktivists had found: they can be hacked and also emitted radio signals revealing how you voted)
- Germany had used them in pilot studies (in 2007 a law suit has reached the highest court and it rejected electronic voting on the grounds of not being understandable by the general public)
- UK used optical scan voting systems in a few test polls, but abandoned any wide deployment



- US used mechanical machines since the 30s, later punch cards, now DREs and optical scan voting machines
- Estonia used in 2007 the Internet for national elections (there were earlier pilot studies in other countries)
- India uses e-voting devices since at least 2003 ("keep-it-simple" machines produced by a government owned company)
- South Africa used software for its tallying in the 1993 elections (when Nelson Mandela was elected) (they found the tallying software was rigged, but they were able to tally manually)

E-Voting in Estonia

- worlds first general election that used internet voting (2007)
- builds on the Estonian ID card (a smartcard like CC)
- Internet voting can be used before the election (votes can be changed an unlimited amount of times, last vote is tabulated, you can even change your vote on the polling day in person)
- in the 2011 parliamentary election 24% voted via Internet

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- in the 2011 parliamentary election 24% voted via Internet
- needs to trust the integrity of voters' computers, central server components and the election staff

```
#!/usr/bin/python2.7
                                 from https://github.com/
I
  # -*- coding: UTF8 -*-
                                  vvk-ehk/evalimine/
2
3
   4
   Copyright: Eesti Vabariigi Valimiskomisjon
5
   (Estonian National Electoral Committee), www.vvk.ee
6
   Written in 2004-2013 by Cybernetica AS, www.cyber.ee
7
8
   This work is licensed under the Creative Commons
9
   Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
τo
   To view a copy of this license, visit
TΤ
   http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/.
12
   13
14
   def analyze(ik, vote, votebox):
15
16
       #
           TODO: implement security checks
17
           such as verifying the correct size
       #
18
           of the encrypted vote
       #
19
20
       return []
21
```

E-Voting in **Theory**

- Alice prepares and audits a ballot, then casts an encrypted ballot, which requires her to authenticate to a server.
- A bulletin board posts Alice's name and encrypted ballot. Anyone, including Alice, can check the bulletin board and find her encrypted vote posted.
- When the election closes, all votes are shuffled and the system produces a non-interactive proof of a correct shuffling. (zero-knowledge-proofs)
- After a reasonable complaint period to let auditors check the shuffling, all shuffled ballots are decrypted, and the system provides a decryption proof for each decrypted ballot. (zero-knowledge-proofs)
- Perform a tally of the decrypted votes.
- An auditor can download the entire election data and verify the shuffle, decryptions and tally.
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A Brief History of Voting

• Athenians

- show of hands
- ballots on pieces of pottery
- different colours of stones
- "facebook"-like authorisation

problems with vote buying / no ballot privacy

• French Revolution and the US Constitution got things "started" with paper ballots (you first had to bring your own; later they were pre-printed by parties)

Ballot Boxes

Security policies with paper ballots:

- you need to check that the ballot box is empty at the start of the poll / no false bottom (to prevent ballot stuffing)
- you need to guard the ballot box during the poll until counting
- tallied by a team at the end of the poll (independent observers)



Which security requirements do paper ballots satisfy better than voice voting?

- Integrity
- Enfranchisement
- Ballot secrecy
- Voter authentication
- Availability



What can go wrong with paper ballots?



What can go wrong with paper ballots?



William M. Tweed, US Politician in 1860's "As long as I count the votes, what are you going to do about it?"

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Paper Ballots

What can go wrong with paper ballots?

Chain Voting Attack

- you obtain a blank ballot and fill it out as you want
- you give it to a voter outside the polling station
- voter receives a new blank ballot
- oter submits prefilled ballot
- voter gives blank ballot to you, you give money



Mechanical Voting Machines

• Lever Voting Machines (ca. 1930 - 1990)



Mechanical Voting Machines

- Lever Voting Machines (ca. 1930 1990)
- Punch Cards (ca. 1950 2000)





Electronic Voting Machines

DREs



Optical Scan



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Electronic Voting Machines

DREs



Optical Scan

all are computers



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Direct-recording electronic voting machines (votes are recorded for example on memory cards) typically touchscreen machines usually no papertrail



Alex Halderman:

- acquired a machine from an anonymous source
- they try to keep secret the source code running the machine

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- acquired a machine from an anonymous source
- they try to keep secret the source code running the machine
- first reversed-engineered the machine (extremely tedious)
- could completely reboot the machine and even install a virus that infects other Diebold machines
- obtained also the source code for other machines

What could go wrong?

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What could go wrong? Failure-in-depth.

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A non-obvious problem:

- you can nowadays get old machines, which still store old polls
- the paper ballot box needed to be secured during the voting until counting; e-voting machines need to be secured during the entire life-time



Conclusion: Any electronic solution should have a paper trail.



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You still have to solve problems about voter registration, voter authentication, guarding against tampering

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E-Voting in India

Their underlying engineering principle is "keep-it-simple":



E-Voting in India

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Official claims: "perfect", "tamperproof", "no need for technical improvements", "infallible"

Lessons Learned

- keep a paper trail and design your system to keep this secure
- make the software open source (avoid security-by-obscurity)
- have a simple design in order to minimise the attack surface

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But overall in times of NSA/state sponsered cyber-crime, e-voting is too hard with current technology.

Online Banking vs. E-Voting

- online banking: if fraud occurred you try to identify who did what (somebody's account got zero)
- e-voting: some parts can be done electronically, but not the actual voting

Student In-Lecture Polling



- guaranties anonymity
- integrity by electronic means
- how to achieve the same in "software"?



• anonymity through one-time pads

004	Privat- und Geschäft TAN-Block-Nr.		VB-Nr. 001		db OnlineBanking				
				nmer 000 0000000 00 VB-Nr. 001 waten Sie diese Liste geschätzt vor dem Zogriff dweh Deitte/Unb				ntonummer 000 0000000 00	
995391	440778	548458	572019	461758	053485	A34793	257429	417359	286267
639254	386637	088926	639791	899715	312214	892280	930407	696225	150176
574243	772004	340593	420139	132938	920445	179611	631682	\$51255	67872
514888	049584	529081	052545	823473	298315	947799	242799	447726	21656
002316	361839	186610	416867	253593	411294	656891	520171	666751	153119
591326	682671	963497	813325	468229	805545	730175	282896	175865	98551
814439	274606	196562	596191	561995	875273	225105	124509	799524	185681
715597	784225	686347	427245	137458	545471	950618	154033	609018	531798
234047	021589	659691	070557	789805	169961	548579	198757	159915	506545
365287	575317	238868	079192	715121	149878	101047	\$\$7943	705685	772162



• anonymity through one-time pads

Ib OnlineBanking		VB		101	TAN-Block		004			
Bitte bewahren Sie diese Liste geochétzt vor dem Zogriff durch Dritte/Unbefugte an sicherer Stelle auf.										
786267	417359	257429	838743	063486	461758	572014	548458	440778	995391	
858176	696225	938493	892280	312214	899715	639791	088926	386637	639254	
867872	\$51255	631682	179611	920445	132938	420139	340593	772694	574243	
121656	449926	242799	947799	298315	823473	052545	529081	049584	514000	
55119	666751	526171	656291	411294	253593	416867	186610	361639	002316	
998551	175865	282896	736175	005545	468229	813325	965497	682671	591326	
385483	799524	124509	225105	875273	561995	596191	196562	274606	814439	
331796	609018	154033	950618	545471	137458	427245	686367	784223	715597	
506545	159915	198757	548579	169961	719105	070357	659691	021589	234047	
772162	705685	\$87943	101047	169878	715121	979192	238868	575317	365287	

• solving the problem of distribution



The adventures of citizen Michael C. Robertson



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


curtain, right about here.











Drawings: Koen Hottentot — Story: Rop Gonggrijp / Barry Wels — Color: Adam Swiecky — Translation: Jaap Weel

Unix-Style Access Control

How to do access control? In Unix you have

- you have users and you have groups/roles:
- some special roles: root

Unix-Style Access Control

• Q: "I am using Windows. Why should I care?" A: In Windows you have similar AC:


administrators group (has complete control over the machine) authenticated users server operators power users network configuration operators

• Modern versions of Windows have more fine-grained AC than Unix; they do not have a setuid bit, but have runas (asks for a password).

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- Q: "I am using Windows. Why should I care?" A: In Windows you have similar AC:
 - administrators group (has complete control over the machine) authenticated users server operators power users network configuration operators
- Modern versions of Windows have more fine-grained AC than Unix; they do not have a setuid bit, but have runas (asks for a password).
- OS-provided access control can add to your security.

Network Applications: Privilege Separation



• the idea is make the attack surface smaller and mitigate the consequences of an attack

Lessons from Access Control

Not just restricted to Unix:

- if you have too many roles (i.e. too finegrained AC), then hierarchy is too complex you invite situations like...let's be root
- you can still abuse the system...

A "Cron"-Attack

- The idea is to trick a privileged person to do something on your behalf:
- root:
 - rm /tmp/*/*

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the shell behind the scenes: rm /tmp/dir₁/file₁ /tmp/dir₁/file₂ /tmp/dir₂/file₁ ...

this takes time

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A "Cron"-Attack

- attacker (creates a fake passwd file) mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd
- or (does the daily cleaning)
 rm /tmp/*/*

records that /tmp/a/passwd should be deleted, but does not do it yet

- attacker (meanwhile deletes the fake passwd file, and establishes a link to the real passwd file) rm /tmp/a/passwd; rmdir /tmp/a; ln -s /etc /tmp/a
- I root now deletes the real passwd file

A "Cron"-Attack

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 mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd
- ro To prevent this kind of attack, you need additional policies (don't do such operations as root).

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