diff -r 76f9457b8f51 -r ddf7315450c9 handouts/ho02.tex
--- a/handouts/ho02.tex	Tue Oct 04 13:44:05 2016 +0100
+++ b/handouts/ho02.tex	Tue Oct 04 17:10:01 2016 +0100
@@ -3,18 +3,8 @@
 \usepackage{../langs}
 
 \begin{document}
-\fnote{\copyright{} Christian Urban, 2014, 2015}
+\fnote{\copyright{} Christian Urban, 2014, 2015, 2016}
 
-%https://www.usenix.org/sites/default/files/conference/protected-files/jets15_slides_epstein.pdf
-%
-%Jeremy Epstein, SRI International
-%
-%In April 2015, the  US  Commonwealth of Virginia decertified the Advanced Voting
-%Solutions (AVS) WinVote voting machine, after concluding that it was insecure.
-%This talk presents the results of Virginia's analysis of the WinVote, and
-%explores how we got to the point where a voting machine using an unpatched
-%version of Windows XP from 2004, using hardwired  WEP  keys and administrator
-%passwords, could be used for over a decade in most of Virginia.
 
 %% second angle of the problem
 %Jonathan Zittrain is interested in algorithmic accountability,
@@ -103,7 +93,7 @@
       scan voting machines are not as secure as they should
       be. Some states experimented with Internet voting, but
       all experiments have been security failures. One
-      exceptional election happened just after hurrican Sandy
+      exceptional election happened just after hurricane Sandy
       in 2012 when some states allowed emergency electronic
       voting. Voters downloaded paper ballots and emailed them
       back to election officials.
@@ -155,14 +145,14 @@
 \noindent The abstract says:
 
 \begin{quote}\it 
-In April 2015, the US Commonwealth of Virginia decertified the
+``In April 2015, the US Commonwealth of Virginia decertified the
 Advanced Voting Solutions (AVS) WinVote voting machine, after
 concluding that it was insecure. This talk presents the
 results of Virginia's analysis of the WinVote, and explores
 how we got to the point where a voting machine using an
 unpatched version of Windows XP from 2004, using hardwired WEP
 keys and administrator passwords, could be used for over a
-decade in most of Virginia.
+decade in most of Virginia.''
 \end{quote}
 
 The reason that e-voting is such a hard problem is that we
@@ -372,7 +362,7 @@
 for independent review. They also kept their source code
 secret. This meant Halderman and his group could not obtain a
 machine through the official channels, but whoever could hope
-that revented them from obtaining a machine? Ok, they got one.
+that prevented them from obtaining a machine? Ok, they got one.
 They then had to reverse engineer the source code in order to
 design an attack. What all this showed is that a shady
 security design is no match for a determined hacker. 
@@ -542,7 +532,7 @@
 can be made reasonably secure and fraud-safe. That does not
 mean there are no problems with online banking. But with
 enough thought, they can usually be overcome with technology
-we have currently avialable. This is different with e-voting:
+we have currently available. This is different with e-voting:
 even the best have not come up with something workable yet.