diff -r 6c7996b6b471 -r ddac52c0014c handouts/ho06.tex
--- a/handouts/ho06.tex	Sat Jan 03 23:14:47 2015 +0000
+++ b/handouts/ho06.tex	Sun Mar 01 00:11:13 2015 +0000
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
 \end{quote}
 
 \noindent 
-You could go on to look up the definition of the third
+You could go on looking up the definition of the third
 non-article in this definition and so on. But let us assume
 you agreed with Bob to stop after three iterations with the
 third non-article word in the last definition, that is
@@ -80,21 +80,21 @@
 were barred from publishing their results used also a hash to
 prove they did the work and (presumably) managed to get into
 cars without a key; see Figure~\ref{paper}. This is very
-similar to the method about crosswords: They like to prove
-that they did the work, but not giving out the ``solution''.
-But this also shows what the problem with such a method is:
-yes, we can hide the secret temporarily, but if somebody else
-wants to verify it, then the secret has to be made public. Bob
-needs to know that \textit{folio} is the solution before he
-can verify the claim that somebody else had the solution
-first. Similarly with the paper: we need to wait until the
-authors are finally allowed to publish their findings in order
-to verify the hash. This might happen at some point, but
-equally it might never happen (what for example happens if the
-authors lose their copy of the paper because of a disk
-failure?). Zero-knowledge proofs, in contrast, can be
-immediately checked, even if the secret is not public yet
-and perhaps never will be.
+similar to the method above about crosswords: They like to
+prove that they did the work, but not giving out the
+``solution''. But this also shows what the problem with such a
+method is: yes, we can hide the secret temporarily, but if
+somebody else wants to verify it, then the secret has to be
+made public. Bob needs to know that \textit{folio} is the
+solution before he can verify the claim of Alice that she had
+the solution first. Similarly with the car-crypto paper: we
+need to wait until the authors are finally allowed to publish
+their findings in order to verify the hash. This might happen
+at some point, but equally it might never happen (what for
+example happens if the authors lose their copy of the paper
+because of a disk failure?). Zero-knowledge proofs, in
+contrast, can be immediately checked, even if the secret is
+not public yet and perhaps never will be.
 
 \begin{figure}
 \begin{center}
@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@
 If somehow Alice can find out before she committed to $H_i$,
 she can cheat. For this assume Alice does \emph{not} know an
 isomorphism between $G_1$ and $G_2$. If she knows which
-isomorphism Bob will ask for she can craft $H$ ins such a way
+isomorphism Bob will ask for she can craft $H$ in such a way
 that it is isomorphism with either $G_1$ or $G_2$ (but it
 cannot with both). Then in each case she would send Bob
 a correct answer and he would come to the conclusion that
@@ -407,6 +407,8 @@
 
 \end{document}
 
+http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2014/11/zero-knowledge-proofs-illustrated-primer.html
+
 http://btravers.weebly.com/uploads/6/7/2/9/6729909/zero_knowledge_technique.pdf
 http://zk-ssh.cms.ac/docs/Zero_Knowledge_Prinzipien.pdf
 http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~oded/PS/zk-tut02v4.ps