
diff -r a97b828bf87f -r 5e7976fa8577 handouts/ho02.tex
--- a/handouts/ho02.tex	Fri Oct 03 15:37:05 2014 +0100
+++ b/handouts/ho02.tex	Fri Oct 03 16:04:49 2014 +0100
@@ -430,15 +430,32 @@
 up with something workable yet.
 
 
+This conclusion does not imply that in some special cases
+Internet voting cannot be made to work securely. Just in a
+general election where stakes are very high, it does not work.
+For example a good-enough and workable in-lecture online
+voting system where students' votes are anonymous and students
+cannot tamper with the outcome, I am sure, can be implemented. 
+\bigskip
 
-%Why do I use e-polling in lectures?
+\noindent If you want to know more about e-voting, I recommend
+the highly entertaining online course by Alex Halderman at
+Coursera.
 
-%Imagine you have a perfectly secure internet voting system, by
-%which I mean nobody can tamper with or steal votes between
-%your browser and the central server responsible for vote
-%tallying. What can still go wrong with such a perfectly secure
-%voting system, which is prevented in traditional elections
-%with paper-based ballots?
+\begin{center}
+\url{https://www.coursera.org/course/digitaldemocracy}
+\end{center}
+
+\noindent There is also an entertaining TEDtalk by Barbara
+Simons called ``Why can I bank online but not vote online?''
+
+\begin{center}
+\url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wv3VuGZzdK8}
+\end{center}
+
+\noindent At the beginning she describes the complete break-in
+by the group of Alex Halderman at the try-out voting at
+Washington D.C.
 
 \end{document}
 




