slides/slides10.tex
author Christian Urban <christian dot urban at kcl dot ac dot uk>
Tue, 10 Dec 2013 07:49:48 +0000
changeset 153 af8fff37dd1c
parent 152 0c62ec6dc691
child 154 525c512629c7
permissions -rw-r--r--
added

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\begin{document}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}<1>[t]
\frametitle{%
  \begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}
  \\
  \LARGE Access Control and \\[-3mm] 
  \LARGE Privacy Policies (10)\\[-6mm] 
  \end{tabular}}\bigskip\bigskip\bigskip

  %\begin{center}
  %\includegraphics[scale=1.3]{pics/barrier.jpg}
  %\end{center}

\normalsize
  \begin{center}
  \begin{tabular}{ll}
  Email:  & christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk\\
  Office: & S1.27 (1st floor Strand Building)\\
  Slides: & KEATS (also homework is there)\\
  \end{tabular}
  \end{center}

\end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%     


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\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{\mbox{}\\[20mm]\huge Revision}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{1st Lecture}

\begin{itemize}
\item hashes and salts to guaranty data integrity\bigskip
\item storing passwords (brute force attacks and dictionary attacks)
\end{itemize}


\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{frame}[fragile,t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}2nd Lecture:\\ E-Voting\end{tabular}}

\begin{itemize}
\item Integrity 
\item Ballot Secrecy
\item Voter Authentication
\item Enfranchisement
\item Availability
\end{itemize}



\end{frame}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{frame}[fragile,t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}2nd Lecture:\\ E-Voting\end{tabular}}

Online Banking vs.~E-Voting

\begin{itemize}
\item online banking: if fraud occurred you try to identify who did what (somebody's account got zero)\bigskip
\item e-voting: some parts can be done electronically, but not the actual voting (final year project: online voting)
\end{itemize}



\end{frame}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   


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\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}3rd Lecture:\\ Buffer Overflow Attacks\end{tabular}}

\begin{itemize}
\item the problem arises from the way C/C++ organises its function calls\\[-8mm]\mbox{}
\end{itemize}

\begin{center}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}3rd Lecture:\\ Unix Access Control\end{tabular}}

\begin{itemize}
\item privileges are specified by file access permissions (``everything is a file'') 
\end{itemize}\medskip

\begin{center}
  \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]
  
  \draw[line width=1mm] (-.3, 0) rectangle (1.5,2);
  \draw (4.7,1) node {Internet};
  \draw (-2.7,1.7) node {\footnotesize Application};
  \draw (0.6,1.7) node {\footnotesize Interface};
  \draw (0.6,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}unprivileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}};
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  \draw[red, <->, line width = 1mm] (-0.6,1) -- (-1.6,1);
  \end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}

\begin{itemize}
\item the idea is make the attack surface smaller and 
mitigate the consequences of an attack
\end{itemize}

\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{frame}[fragile,t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}3rd Lecture:\\ Unix Access Control\end{tabular}}

\begin{itemize}
\item when a file with setuid is executed, the resulting process will assume the 
UID given to the owner of the file
\end{itemize}

\small\tt
\begin{center}
\begin{verbatim}
$ ls -ld . * */*
drwxr-xr-x 1 ping staff  32768 Apr  2 2010 .
-rw----r-- 1 ping students  31359 Jul 24 2011 manual.txt
-r--rw--w- 1 bob students   4359 Jul 24 2011 report.txt
-rwsr--r-x 1 bob students 141359 Jun  1 2013 microedit
dr--r-xr-x 1 bob staff  32768 Jul 23 2011 src
-rw-r--r-- 1 bob staff  81359 Feb 28 2012 src/code.c
-r--rw---- 1 emma students    959 Jan 23 2012 src/code.h
\end{verbatim}
\end{center}


\end{frame}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{frame}[fragile,t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}4th Lecture:\\ Security Levels\end{tabular}}

Bell-LaPadula access model:

 \begin{itemize}
  \item \alert{Read Rule}: A principal \bl{$P$} can read an object \bl{$O$} if and only if
  \bl{$P$}'s security level is at least as high as \bl{$O$}'s.
  \item \alert{Write Rule}: A principal \bl{$P$} can write an object \bl{$O$} if and only if
  \bl{$O$}'s security level is at least as high as \bl{$P$}'s.\medskip

  \item Meta-Rule: All principals in a system should have a sufficiently high security level
  in order to access an object.
  \end{itemize}\bigskip

\end{frame}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%    

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{frame}[fragile,t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}4th Lecture:\\ Security Levels\end{tabular}}

Biba (data integrity)

  \begin{itemize}
  \item Biba: {\bf `no read down'} - {\bf `no write up'}
  \item \alert{Read Rule}: A principal \bl{$P$} can read an object \bl{$O$} if and only if
  \bl{$P$}'s security level is lower or equal than \bl{$O$}'s.
  \item \alert{Write Rule}: A principal \bl{$P$} can write an object \bl{$O$} if and only if
  \bl{$O$}'s security level is lower or equal than \bl{$P$}'s.
  \end{itemize}

\end{frame}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%    


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{frame}[fragile,t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}4th Lecture:\\ Protocols\end{tabular}}

A mutual authentication protocol

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\bl{$A \rightarrow B$:} & \bl{$N_a$}\\  
\bl{$B \rightarrow A$:} & \bl{$\{N_a, N_b\}_{K_{ab}}$}\\
\bl{$A \rightarrow B$:} & \bl{$N_b$}\\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}


\end{frame}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{frame}[fragile,t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}5th Lecture:\\ Access Control Logic\end{tabular}}


\begin{itemize}
\item formulas
\item judgements
\end{itemize}\pause

\begin{center}
  \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]
  
  \draw[line width=1mm] (-.3, 0) rectangle (1.5,2);
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\end{center}


\end{frame}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\begin{frame}[fragile,t]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}5th Lecture:\\ Access Control Logic\end{tabular}}

\begin{center}
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\end{center}


\end{frame}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   


%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}5th Lecture:\\ Inference Rules\end{tabular}}


\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]
  
  \draw (0.0,0.0) node 
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\end{center}


\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}8th Lecture:\\ Privacy\end{tabular}}

\begin{itemize}
\item differential privacy for annonymizing research data
\item Tor webservice
\end{itemize}


\end{frame}}
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
\mode<presentation>{
\begin{frame}[c]
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}9th Lecture:\\ Privacy\end{tabular}}

\begin{itemize}
\item zero-knowledge proofs
\item requires NP problems, for example graph isomorphisms
\end{itemize}


\end{frame}}
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\end{document}

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