1345 \end{itemize} |
1345 \end{itemize} |
1346 |
1346 |
1347 \end{frame}} |
1347 \end{frame}} |
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1349 |
1349 |
1350 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1351 \mode<presentation>{ |
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1352 \begin{frame}[c] |
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1353 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 1\end{tabular}} |
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1354 |
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1355 {\bf What assets are you trying to protect?}\bigskip |
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1356 |
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1357 This question might seem basic, but a surprising number of people never ask it. The question involves understanding the scope of the problem. For example, securing an airplane, an airport, commercial aviation, the transportation system, and a nation against terrorism are all different security problems, and require different solutions. |
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1358 |
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1359 \only<2>{ |
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1360 \begin{tikzpicture} |
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1361 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm] |
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1362 {\begin{minipage}{10cm} |
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1363 \small You like to prevent: ``It would be terrible if this sort of attack ever happens; we need to do everything in our power to prevent it.'' |
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1364 \end{minipage}}; |
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1365 \end{tikzpicture}} |
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1366 \end{frame}} |
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1367 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1368 |
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1369 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1370 \mode<presentation>{ |
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1371 \begin{frame}[c] |
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1372 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 2\end{tabular}} |
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1373 |
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1374 {\bf What are the risks to these assets?}\bigskip |
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1375 |
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1376 Here we consider the need for security. Answering it involves understanding what is being defended, what the consequences are if it is successfully attacked, who wants to attack it, how they might attack it, and why. |
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1377 |
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1378 \end{frame}} |
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1379 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1380 |
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1381 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1382 \mode<presentation>{ |
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1383 \begin{frame}[c] |
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1384 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 3\end{tabular}} |
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1385 |
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1386 {\bf How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?}\bigskip |
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1387 |
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1388 Another seemingly obvious question, but one that is frequently ignored. If the security solution doesn't solve the problem, it's no good. This is not as simple as looking at the security solution and seeing how well it works. It involves looking at how the security solution interacts with everything around it, evaluating both its operation and its failures. |
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1389 |
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1390 \end{frame}} |
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1391 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1392 |
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1393 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1394 \mode<presentation>{ |
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1395 \begin{frame}[c] |
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1396 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 4\end{tabular}} |
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1397 |
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1398 {\bf What other risks does the security solution cause?}\bigskip |
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1399 |
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1400 This question addresses what might be called the problem of unintended consequences. Security solutions have ripple effects, and most cause new security problems. The trick is to understand the new problems and make sure they are smaller than the old ones. |
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1401 |
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1402 \end{frame}} |
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1404 |
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1405 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1406 \mode<presentation>{ |
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1407 \begin{frame}[c] |
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1408 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 5\end{tabular}} |
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1409 |
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1410 {\bf What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?}\bigskip |
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1411 |
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1412 Every security system has costs and requires trade-offs. Most security costs money, sometimes substantial amounts; but other trade-offs may be more important, ranging from matters of convenience and comfort to issues involving basic freedoms like privacy. Understanding these trade-offs is essential. |
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1413 |
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1414 \end{frame}} |
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1415 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1416 |
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1417 |
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1418 \end{document} |
1350 \end{document} |
1419 |
1351 |
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