109 \draw (4,0) node (Y) {\includegraphics[scale=0.1]{pics/gman.png}}; |
109 \draw (4,0) node (Y) {\includegraphics[scale=0.1]{pics/gman.png}}; |
110 \draw[red, <->, line width = 2mm] (X) -- (Y); |
110 \draw[red, <->, line width = 2mm] (X) -- (Y); |
111 \end{tikzpicture} |
111 \end{tikzpicture} |
112 \end{textblock} |
112 \end{textblock} |
113 |
113 |
114 \begin{textblock}{1}(1,6) |
114 \begin{textblock}{1}(1,5) |
115 \begin{bubble}[11cm] |
115 \begin{bubble}[11cm] |
116 \footnotesize |
116 \small |
117 Annonymous Hacker operating a 10k bonnet using the ZeuS |
117 Anonymous Hacker operating a 10k bonnet using the ZeuS |
118 hacking tool wrote:\medskip\\ ``FYI I do not cash out the bank |
118 hacking tool wrote:\medskip\\ ``FYI I do not cash out the bank |
119 accounts or credit cards, I just sell the information (I know, |
119 accounts or credit cards, I just sell the information (I know, |
120 its just as bad...), there isn't even a law against |
120 its just as bad...), there isn't even a law against |
121 such in most countries, dealing with stolen information is |
121 such in most countries, dealing with stolen information is |
122 most of the time a legally greyzone (I was just as surprised |
122 most of the time a legally greyzone (I was just as surprised |
123 when I looked it up), I'm not talking about 3rd world |
123 when I looked it up), I'm not talking about 3rd world |
124 countries, but about European like Spain (The Mariposa botnet |
124 countries, but about European like Spain (The Mariposa botnet |
125 owner never got charged, because a botnet isn't illegal, only |
125 owner never got charged, because a botnet isn't illegal, only |
126 abusing CC information is, but that did other guys).''\\ |
126 abusing CC information is, but that did other guys).'' |
127 \hfill{}\url{www.goo.gl/UWluh0} |
127 \hfill{}\url{www.goo.gl/UWluh0} |
128 \end{bubble} |
128 \end{bubble} |
129 \end{textblock} |
129 \end{textblock} |
130 |
130 |
131 \end{frame} |
131 \end{frame} |
277 |
277 |
278 \begin{itemize} |
278 \begin{itemize} |
279 \item {\bf Policy}\\ |
279 \item {\bf Policy}\\ |
280 {\small What is supposed to be achieved?} |
280 {\small What is supposed to be achieved?} |
281 \item {\bf Mechanism}\\ |
281 \item {\bf Mechanism}\\ |
282 {\small Cypher, access controls, tamper resistance} |
282 {\small Cipher, access controls, tamper resistance, \ldots} |
283 \item {\bf Assurance}\\ |
283 \item {\bf Assurance}\\ |
284 {\small The amount of reliance you can put on the mechanism.} |
284 {\small The amount of reliance you can put on the mechanism.} |
285 \item {\bf Incentive}\\ |
285 \item {\bf Incentive}\\ |
286 {\small The motive that the people guarding and maintaining the |
286 {\small The motive that the people guarding and maintaining the |
287 system have to do their job properly, and also the motive |
287 system have to do their job properly, and also the motive |
316 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
316 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
317 |
317 |
318 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
318 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
319 \begin{frame}[c] |
319 \begin{frame}[c] |
320 \frametitle{Yes \ldots} |
320 \frametitle{Yes \ldots} |
|
321 |
|
322 \ldots if you believe the banks:\bigskip |
321 |
323 |
322 \begin{bubble}[10cm] |
324 \begin{bubble}[10cm] |
323 \small ``Chip-and-PIN is so effective in this country [UK] |
325 \small ``Chip-and-PIN is so effective in this country [UK] |
324 that fraudsters are starting to move their activities |
326 that fraudsters are starting to move their activities |
325 overseas,''\smallskip\\ |
327 overseas,''\smallskip\\ |
481 \includegraphics[scale=1.5]{pics/anderson.jpg} |
483 \includegraphics[scale=1.5]{pics/anderson.jpg} |
482 \end{flushright} |
484 \end{flushright} |
483 |
485 |
484 \begin{itemize} |
486 \begin{itemize} |
485 \item same group successfully attacked in 2012 card readers and ATM machines |
487 \item same group successfully attacked in 2012 card readers and ATM machines |
486 \item the problem: several types of ATMs generate poor random numbers, |
488 \item the problem was: several types of ATMs generate poor random numbers, |
487 which are used as nonces |
489 which are used as nonces |
488 \end{itemize} |
490 \end{itemize} |
489 |
491 |
490 \end{frame} |
492 \end{frame} |
491 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
493 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
515 \end{textblock} |
517 \end{textblock} |
516 |
518 |
517 \begin{textblock}{1}(4.5,9.9) |
519 \begin{textblock}{1}(4.5,9.9) |
518 \begin{tabular}{c} |
520 \begin{tabular}{c} |
519 \includegraphics[scale=0.13]{pics/rman.png}\\[-1mm] |
521 \includegraphics[scale=0.13]{pics/rman.png}\\[-1mm] |
520 \small costumer / you |
522 \small customer / you |
521 \end{tabular} |
523 \end{tabular} |
522 \end{textblock} |
524 \end{textblock} |
523 |
525 |
524 \begin{textblock}{1}(4.5,7.5) |
526 \begin{textblock}{1}(4.5,7.5) |
525 \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1.3] |
527 \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1.3] |
569 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
571 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
570 \begin{frame}[c] |
572 \begin{frame}[c] |
571 \frametitle{The Bad Guy Again} |
573 \frametitle{The Bad Guy Again} |
572 |
574 |
573 \begin{bubble}[10cm] |
575 \begin{bubble}[10cm] |
574 \footnotesize |
576 \small |
575 The anonymous hacker from earlier:\medskip\\ ``Try to use |
577 The anonymous hacker from earlier:\medskip\\ ``Try to use |
576 `Verified-By-Visa' and `Mastercard-Securecode' as rarely as |
578 `Verified-By-Visa' and `Mastercard-Securecode' as rarely as |
577 possible. If only your CVV2 code is getting sniffed, you are |
579 possible. If only your CVV2 code is getting sniffed, you are |
578 not liable for any damage, because the code is physically |
580 not liable for any damage, because the code is physically |
579 printed and could have been stolen while you payed with your |
581 printed and could have been stolen while you payed with your |
1118 \item Any methods employed by Panopticlick\\ |
1120 \item Any methods employed by Panopticlick\\ |
1119 \mbox{}\hfill $\rightarrow$ \textcolor{blue}{\url{https://panopticlick.eff.org/}} |
1121 \mbox{}\hfill $\rightarrow$ \textcolor{blue}{\url{https://panopticlick.eff.org/}} |
1120 \end{itemize} |
1122 \end{itemize} |
1121 |
1123 |
1122 Even when you disabled cookies entirely, have JavaScript turned off and use a VPN service.\\\pause |
1124 Even when you disabled cookies entirely, have JavaScript turned off and use a VPN service.\\\pause |
1123 And numerous sites use it. |
1125 (And numerous sites use it.) |
1124 |
1126 |
1125 \end{frame}} |
1127 \end{frame}} |
1126 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
1128 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
1127 |
1129 |
1128 |
1130 |
1198 |
1200 |
1199 \begin{itemize} |
1201 \begin{itemize} |
1200 \item There is no single book I am following |
1202 \item There is no single book I am following |
1201 \begin{center} |
1203 \begin{center} |
1202 \includegraphics[scale=0.012]{pics/andersonbook1.jpg} |
1204 \includegraphics[scale=0.012]{pics/andersonbook1.jpg} |
1203 \includegraphics[scale=0.23]{pics/accesscontrolbook.jpg} |
1205 %%\includegraphics[scale=0.23]{pics/accesscontrolbook.jpg} |
1204 \end{center}\medskip\pause |
1206 \end{center}\medskip\pause |
1205 |
1207 |
1206 \item The question ``Is this relevant for the exams'' is not appreciated!\medskip\\ |
1208 \item The question ``Is this relevant for the exams'' is not appreciated!\medskip\\ |
1207 |
1209 |
1208 Whatever is in the homework sheets (and is not marked optional) is relevant for the |
1210 Whatever is in the homework (and is not marked optional) is relevant for the |
1209 exam. No code needs to be written. |
1211 exam. No code needs to be written. |
1210 \end{itemize} |
1212 \end{itemize} |
1211 |
1213 |
1212 \end{frame}} |
1214 \end{frame}} |
1213 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
1215 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |