sen-material: comparison slides09.tex

equal deleted inserted replaced

-:6334bb9143bc
+:d817bb2f80e5
 Fix: Replace messages 2 and 3 to include a timestamp:\bigskip
 \begin{minipage}{1.1\textwidth}
 \begin{center}
 \begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{-2mm}}r@ {\hspace{1mm}}l@{}}
-\bl{$S \rightarrow A :$} & \bl{$\{N_A, B, K_{\!AB}, T_S, \!\{K_{\!AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} \}_{K_{AS}}$}\\
+\bl{$S \rightarrow A :$} & \bl{$\{B, K_{\!AB}, T_S, \!\{K_{\!AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} \}_{K_{AS}}$}\\
 \bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} & \bl{$\{K_{AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} $}\\
 \end{tabular}
 \end{center}
 \end{minipage}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[t]
-\frametitle{Denning-Sacco Protocol}
+\frametitle{Denning-Sacco Fix}
 Denning-Sacco (1981) suggested to add the timestamp, but omit the handshake:\bigskip
 \begin{minipage}{1.1\textwidth}
 \begin{center}
 \begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{-2mm}}r@ {\hspace{1mm}}l@{}}
-\bl{$A \rightarrow S :$} & \bl{$A, B, N_A$}\\
+\bl{$A \rightarrow S :$} & \bl{$A, B$}\\
-\bl{$S \rightarrow A :$} & \bl{$\{N_A, B, K_{\!AB}, T_S, \!\{K_{\!AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} \}_{K_{AS}}$}\\
+\bl{$S \rightarrow A :$} & \bl{$\{B, K_{\!AB}, T_S, \!\{K_{\!AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} \}_{K_{AS}}$}\\
 \bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} & \bl{$\{K_{AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} $}\\
 \textcolor{lightgray}{$B \rightarrow A :$} & \textcolor{lightgray}{$\{N_B\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
 \textcolor{lightgray}{$A \rightarrow B :$} & \textcolor{lightgray}{$\{N_B-1\}_{K_{AB}}$}\\
 \end{tabular}
 \end{center}
 \end{minipage}\bigskip
 they argue \bl{$A$} and \bl{$B$} can check that the messages are not replays of earlier
-runs, by checking the time difference when the protocol is last used
+runs, by checking the time difference with when the protocol is last used
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[t]
-\frametitle{Denning-Sacco-Lowe Protocol}
+\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@{}c@{}}Denning-Sacco-Lowe Fix of Fix\end{tabular}}
 Lowe (1997) disagreed and said the handshake should be kept,
 otherwise:\bigskip
 \begin{minipage}{1.1\textwidth}
 \begin{center}
 \begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{-7mm}}r@ {\hspace{1mm}}l@{}}
-\bl{$A \rightarrow S :$} & \bl{$A, B, N_A$}\\
+\bl{$A \rightarrow S :$} & \bl{$A, B$}\\
-\bl{$S \rightarrow A :$} & \bl{$\{N_A, B, K_{\!AB}, T_S, \!\{K_{\!AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} \}_{K_{AS}}$}\\
+\bl{$S \rightarrow A :$} & \bl{$\{B, K_{\!AB}, T_S, \!\{K_{\!AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} \}_{K_{AS}}$}\\
 \bl{$A \rightarrow B :$} & \bl{$\{K_{AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} $}\\
 \bl{$I(A) \rightarrow B :$} & \bl{$\{K_{AB}, A, T_S\}_{K_{BS}} $}\hspace{5mm}\textcolor{black}{replay}\\
 \end{tabular}
 \end{center}
 \end{minipage}\bigskip
 \only<2>{\begin{itemize}
 \item London Health Programmes lost in June unencrypted details of more than 8 million people
 (no names, but postcodes and details such as gender, age and ethnic origin)
 \end{itemize}}
 \only<3>{\begin{itemize}
-\item also in June Sony got hacked: over 1M users' personal information, including passwords, email addresses, home addresses, dates of birth, and all Sony opt-in data associated with their accounts.
+\item also in June Sony, got hacked: over 1M users' personal information, including passwords, email addresses, home addresses, dates of birth, and all Sony opt-in data associated with their accounts.
 \end{itemize}}
 \end{minipage}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[c]
 \frametitle{Privacy and Big Data}
-Selected sources of ``Big Data'':
+Selected sources of ``Big Data'':\smallskip{}
 \begin{itemize}
 \item Facebook
 \begin{itemize}
 \item 40+ Billion photos (100 PB)
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[c]
-\frametitle{Cookies}
+\frametitle{Cookies\ldots}
 ``We have published a new cookie policy. It explains what cookies are
 and how we use them on our site. To learn more about cookies and
 their benefits, please view our cookie policy.\medskip
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[c]
 \frametitle{Scare Tactics}
+The actual policy reads:\bigskip
 ``As we explain in our Cookie Policy, cookies help you to get the most
 out of our websites.\medskip
 If you do disable our cookies you may find that certain sections of our
 website do not work. For example, you may have difficulties logging in
 \begin{itemize}
 \item Netflix offered in 2006 (and every year until 2010) a 1 Mio \$ prize for improving their movie rating algorithm
 \item dataset contained 10\% of all Netflix users (appr.~500K)
 \item names were removed, but included numerical ratings as well as times of rating
-\item average user rated 200 movies
 \item some information was \alert{perturbed} (i.e., slightly modified)
 \end{itemize}
 \hfill{\bf\alert{All OK?}}
 \frametitle{Re-identification Attack}
 Two researchers analysed the data:
 \begin{itemize}
-\item with 8 ratings (2 of them can be wrong) and dates that have a 14-day error, 98\% of the
+\item with 8 ratings (2 of them can be wrong) and corresponding dates that can have a margin 14-day error, 98\% of the
 records can be identified
 \item for 68\% only two ratings and dates are sufficient (for movie ratings outside the top 500)\bigskip\pause
 \item they took 50 samples from IMDb (where people can reveal their identity)
 \item 2 of them uniquely identified entries in the Netflix database (either by movie rating or by dates)
 \end{itemize}
 \begin{itemize}
 \item Birth data, postcode and gender (unique for\\ 87\% of the US population)
 \item Preferences in movies (99\% of 500K for 8 ratings)
 \end{itemize}\bigskip
-Therefore best practices / or even law:
+Therefore best practices / or even law (HIPAA, EU):
 \begin{itemize}
-\item only year dates (age: 90 years or over),
+\item only year dates (age group for 90 years or over),
 \item no postcodes (sector data is OK, similarly in the US)\\
 \textcolor{gray}{no names, addresses, account numbers, licence plates}
 \item disclosure information needs to be retained for 5 years
 \end{itemize}
 \frametitle{How to Safely Disclose Information?}
 \only<1>{
 \begin{itemize}
 \item Assume you make a survey of 100 randomly chosen people.
-\item Say 99\% of the people in the 10 - 40 age group have seen the
+\item Say 99\% of the surveyed people in the 10 - 40 age group have seen the
 Gangnam video on youtube.\bigskip
 \item What can you infer about the rest of the population?
 \end{itemize}}
 \only<2>{
 \begin{itemize}
 \item Is it possible to re-identify data later, if more data is released. \bigskip\bigskip\pause
 \item Not even releasing only  aggregate information prevents re-identification attacks.
 (GWAS was a public database of gene-frequency studies linked to diseases;
-you only needed enough data about phenotype (hair, eyes, skin colour...) in order
+you only needed partial DNA information  in order
 to identify whether an individual was part of the study --- DB closed in 2008)
 \end{itemize}}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

changeset 85	d817bb2f80e5
parent 84	6334bb9143bc
child 86	ac94033f220a