1 \documentclass[dvipsnames,14pt,t]{beamer} |
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3 \usepackage[T1]{fontenc} |
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4 \usepackage[latin1]{inputenc} |
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5 \usepackage{mathpartir} |
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6 \usepackage[absolute,overlay]{textpos} |
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7 \usepackage{ifthen} |
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8 \usepackage{tikz} |
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10 \usepackage{calc} |
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11 \usepackage{ulem} |
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12 \usepackage{courier} |
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18 \usetikzlibrary{shadows} |
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20 \usetikzlibrary{calc} |
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21 \usepackage{graphicx} |
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22 |
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23 \definecolor{javared}{rgb}{0.6,0,0} % for strings |
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26 \definecolor{javadocblue}{rgb}{0.25,0.35,0.75} % javadoc |
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27 |
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41 |
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43 morekeywords={abstract,case,catch,class,def,% |
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56 morestring=[b]""" |
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57 } |
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58 |
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59 \lstset{language=Scala, |
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60 basicstyle=\ttfamily, |
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61 keywordstyle=\color{javapurple}\bfseries, |
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62 stringstyle=\color{javagreen}, |
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63 commentstyle=\color{javagreen}, |
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64 morecomment=[s][\color{javadocblue}]{/**}{*/}, |
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68 numbersep=10pt, |
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69 tabsize=2, |
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70 showspaces=false, |
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71 showstringspaces=false} |
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72 |
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73 % beamer stuff |
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74 \renewcommand{\slidecaption}{APP 04, King's College London, 16 October 2012} |
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75 |
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76 |
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77 \begin{document} |
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78 |
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79 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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80 \mode<presentation>{ |
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81 \begin{frame}<1>[t] |
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82 \frametitle{% |
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83 \begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}} |
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84 \\ |
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85 \LARGE Access Control and \\[-3mm] |
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86 \LARGE Privacy Policies (4)\\[-6mm] |
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87 \end{tabular}}\bigskip\bigskip\bigskip |
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88 |
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89 %\begin{center} |
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90 %\includegraphics[scale=1.3]{pics/barrier.jpg} |
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91 %\end{center} |
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92 |
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93 \normalsize |
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94 \begin{center} |
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95 \begin{tabular}{ll} |
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96 Email: & christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk\\ |
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97 Of$\!$fice: & S1.27 (1st floor Strand Building)\\ |
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98 Slides: & KEATS (also homework is there)\\ |
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99 \end{tabular} |
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100 \end{center} |
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101 |
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102 |
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103 \end{frame}} |
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104 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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105 |
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106 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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107 \mode<presentation>{ |
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108 \begin{frame}[c] |
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109 \frametitle{Unix-Style Access Control} |
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110 |
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111 \begin{itemize} |
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112 \item Q: ``I am using Windows. Why should I care?'' \\ A: In Windows you have similar AC: |
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113 |
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114 \begin{center} |
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115 \begin{tabular}{l} |
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116 administrators group\\ |
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117 \hspace{5mm}(has complete control over the machine)\\ |
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118 authenticated users\\ |
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119 server operators\\ |
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120 power users\\ |
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121 network configuration operators\\ |
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122 \end{tabular} |
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123 \end{center}\medskip |
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124 |
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125 \item Modern versions of Windows have more fine-grained AC than Unix; they do not have a setuid bit, but |
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126 have \texttt{runas} (asks for a password).\pause |
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127 |
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128 \item OS-provided access control can \alert{\bf add} to your |
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129 security. |
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130 \end{itemize} |
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131 |
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132 |
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133 \end{frame}} |
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134 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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135 |
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136 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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137 \mode<presentation>{ |
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138 \begin{frame}[c] |
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139 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}Network Applications:\\[-1mm] Privilege Separation\end{tabular}} |
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140 |
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141 |
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142 \begin{center} |
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143 \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1] |
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144 |
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145 \draw[line width=1mm] (-.3, 0) rectangle (1.5,2); |
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146 \draw (4.7,1) node {Internet}; |
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147 \draw (-2.7,1.7) node {\footnotesize Application}; |
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148 \draw (0.6,1.7) node {\footnotesize Interface}; |
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149 \draw (0.6,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}unprivileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}}; |
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150 \draw (-2.7,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}privileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}}; |
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151 |
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152 \draw[line width=1mm] (-1.8, 0) rectangle (-3.6,2); |
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153 |
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154 \draw[white] (1.7,1) node (X) {}; |
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155 \draw[white] (3.7,1) node (Y) {}; |
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156 \draw[red, <->, line width = 2mm] (X) -- (Y); |
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157 |
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158 \draw[red, <->, line width = 1mm] (-0.6,1) -- (-1.6,1); |
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159 \end{tikzpicture} |
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160 \end{center} |
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161 |
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162 \begin{itemize} |
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163 \item the idea is make the attack surface smaller and |
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164 mitigate the consequences of an attack |
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165 \end{itemize} |
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166 |
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167 |
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168 \end{frame}} |
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169 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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170 |
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171 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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172 \mode<presentation>{ |
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173 \begin{frame}[c] |
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174 \frametitle{Shared Access Control} |
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175 |
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176 \begin{center} |
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177 \includegraphics[scale=0.7]{pics/pointsplane.jpg} |
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178 \end{center} |
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179 |
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180 \begin{textblock}{11}(10.5,10.5) |
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181 \small |
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182 To take an action you\\[-1mm] |
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183 need at least either: |
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184 \begin{itemize} |
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185 \item 1 CEO\\[-5mm] |
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186 \item 2 MDs, or\\[-5mm] |
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187 \item 3 Ds |
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188 \end{itemize} |
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189 \end{textblock} |
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190 |
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191 \end{frame}} |
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192 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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193 |
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194 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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195 \mode<presentation>{ |
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196 \begin{frame}[c] |
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197 \frametitle{Lessons from Access Control} |
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198 |
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199 Not just restricted to Unix: |
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200 |
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201 \begin{itemize} |
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202 \item if you have too many roles (i.e.~too finegrained AC), then |
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203 hierarchy is too complex\\ |
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204 \textcolor{gray}{you invite situations like\ldots let's be root}\bigskip |
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205 |
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206 \item you can still abuse the system\ldots |
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207 |
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208 \end{itemize} |
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209 |
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210 \end{frame}} |
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211 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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212 |
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213 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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214 \mode<presentation>{ |
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215 \begin{frame}[c] |
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216 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}A ``Cron''-Attack\end{tabular}} |
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217 |
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218 The idea is to trick a privileged person to do something on your behalf: |
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219 |
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220 \begin{itemize} |
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221 \item root:\\\texttt{rm /tmp/*/*}\bigskip\bigskip\pause |
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222 |
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223 \footnotesize |
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224 \begin{minipage}{1.1\textwidth} |
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225 \textcolor{gray}{the shell behind the scenes:}\\ |
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226 \textcolor{gray}{\texttt{rm /tmp/dir$_1$/file$_1$ /tmp/dir$_1$/file$_2$ /tmp/dir$_2$/file$_1$ \ldots}}\bigskip\\ |
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227 |
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228 \textcolor{gray}{this takes time} |
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229 \end{minipage} |
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230 \end{itemize} |
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231 |
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232 |
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233 \end{frame}} |
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234 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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235 |
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236 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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237 \mode<presentation>{ |
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238 \begin{frame}[c] |
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239 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}A ``Cron''-Attack\end{tabular}} |
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240 |
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241 \begin{enumerate} |
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242 \item attacker \textcolor{gray}{(creates a fake passwd file)}\\ |
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243 \texttt{mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd}\medskip |
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244 \item root \textcolor{gray}{(does the daily cleaning)}\\ |
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245 \texttt{rm /tmp/*/*}\medskip\\ |
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246 \hspace{2cm}\textcolor{gray}{\small records that \texttt{/tmp/a/passwd}}\\ |
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247 \hspace{2cm}\textcolor{gray}{\small should be deleted, but does not do it yet}\medskip\\ |
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248 |
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249 \item attacker \textcolor{gray}{(meanwhile deletes the fake passwd file, and establishes a link to |
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250 the real passwd file)}\\ |
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251 \texttt{rm /tmp/a/passwd; rmdir /tmp/a;}\\\texttt{ln -s /etc /tmp/a}\\ |
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252 \item root now deletes the real passwd file |
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253 \end{enumerate} |
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254 |
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255 \only<2>{ |
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256 \begin{textblock}{11}(2,5) |
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257 \begin{tikzpicture} |
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258 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm] |
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259 {\normalsize\color{darkgray} |
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260 \begin{minipage}{9cm}\raggedright |
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261 To prevent this kind of attack, you need additional |
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262 policies (don't do such operations as root). |
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263 \end{minipage}}; |
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264 \end{tikzpicture} |
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265 \end{textblock}} |
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266 |
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267 \end{frame}} |
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268 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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269 |
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270 |
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271 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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272 \mode<presentation>{ |
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273 \begin{frame}[c] |
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274 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier Analysis\end{tabular}} |
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275 |
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276 \textcolor{gray}{There is no absolutely secure system and security almost never comes for free.} |
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277 |
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278 \begin{itemize} |
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279 \item What assets are you trying to protect? |
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280 \item What are the risks to these assets? |
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281 \item How well does the security solution mitigate those risks? |
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282 \item What other risks does the security solution cause? |
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283 \item What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose? |
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284 \end{itemize} |
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285 |
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286 |
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287 \end{frame}} |
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288 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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289 |
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290 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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291 \mode<presentation>{ |
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292 \begin{frame}[t] |
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293 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Example: Credit Cards\end{tabular}} |
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294 |
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295 You might have the policy of not typing in your credit card online. Worthwhile or not? |
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296 \begin{itemize} |
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297 \item<2->What assets are you trying to protect?\\ |
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298 \only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}your credit card number\end{tabular}} |
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299 \item<3->What are the risks to these assets?\\ |
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300 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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301 With credit cards you loose a fixed amount \pounds{50}. Amazon \pounds{50}. \end{tabular}} |
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302 \item<4->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\ |
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303 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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304 Well, hackers steal credit cards from databases. They usually do not attack you individually.\end{tabular}} |
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305 \item<5->What other risks does the security solution cause? |
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306 \only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright None (?)\end{tabular}} |
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307 \item<6->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose? |
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308 \only<6>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Internet shopping is convenient and sometimes cheaper.\end{tabular}} |
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309 \item<7>[]{\bf\large No!} |
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310 \end{itemize}\pause\pause |
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311 |
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312 |
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313 \end{frame}} |
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314 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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315 |
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316 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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317 \mode<presentation>{ |
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318 \begin{frame}[c] |
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319 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Example: Firewalls\end{tabular}} |
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320 |
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321 \begin{center} |
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322 \includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/firewall.png} |
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323 \end{center} |
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324 |
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325 A firewall is a piece of software that controls incoming and outgoing traffic according to some rules. |
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326 \end{frame}} |
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327 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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328 |
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329 |
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330 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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331 \mode<presentation>{ |
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332 \begin{frame}[t] |
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333 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Example: Firewalls\end{tabular}} |
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334 |
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335 \begin{itemize} |
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336 \item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\ |
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337 \only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Whatever is behind the firewall |
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338 (credit cards, passwords, blueprints, \ldots)\end{tabular}} |
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339 \item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\ |
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340 \only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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341 With a small online shop you are already at risk. Pentagon, definitely.\end{tabular}} |
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342 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\ |
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343 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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344 Well, at home so not much. Everywhere else, if properly configurated then it does.\end{tabular}} |
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345 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause? |
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346 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright There might be backdoors or bugs in the firewall, |
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347 but generally they are secure. You choose to prevent certain traffic.\end{tabular}} |
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348 \item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose? |
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349 \only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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350 Minimal to modest. Firewalls are part of free software. You need a knowledgeable |
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351 person to set them up.\end{tabular}} |
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352 \item<7>[]{\bf\large Yes!} |
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353 \end{itemize}\pause\pause |
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354 |
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355 |
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356 \end{frame}} |
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357 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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358 |
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359 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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360 \mode<presentation>{ |
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361 \begin{frame}[t] |
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362 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ex: Two-Factor Authentication\end{tabular}} |
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363 |
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364 Google uses nowadays two-factor authentication. But it is an old(er) |
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365 idea. It is used for example in Germany and Netherlands for online transactions. |
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366 |
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367 \begin{center} |
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368 \includegraphics[scale=0.6]{pics/tan1.jpg}\hspace{5mm} |
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369 \includegraphics[scale=0.2]{pics/tan2.jpg} |
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370 \end{center} |
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371 |
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372 \pause |
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373 Or nowadays by SMS (restricts the validity of the numbers) or with a secure generator |
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374 |
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375 \begin{center} |
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376 \includegraphics[scale=0.08]{pics/pinsentry.jpg} |
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377 \end{center} |
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378 |
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379 \end{frame}} |
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380 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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381 |
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382 |
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383 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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384 \mode<presentation>{ |
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385 \begin{frame}[t] |
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386 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ex: Two-Factor Authentication\end{tabular}} |
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387 |
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388 \begin{itemize} |
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389 \item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\ |
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390 \only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Your bank account.\end{tabular}} |
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391 \item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\ |
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392 \only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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393 Nowadays pretty high risk.\end{tabular}} |
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394 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\ |
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395 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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396 It prevents problems when passwords are stolen. Man-in-the-middle attacks |
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397 still possible.\end{tabular}} |
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398 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause? |
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399 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Your mobile phone or credit card/pin might |
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400 be stolen. SIM card becomes more valuable.\end{tabular}} |
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401 \item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose? |
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402 \only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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403 Banks need to establish an infrastructure. For you it might be inconvenient.\end{tabular}} |
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404 \item<7>[]{\bf\large Yes!} |
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405 \end{itemize} |
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406 |
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407 |
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408 \end{frame}} |
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409 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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410 |
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411 |
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412 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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413 \mode<presentation>{ |
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414 \begin{frame}[t] |
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415 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Security Seals\end{tabular}} |
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416 |
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417 According to Ross Anderson: ``\ldots is a tamper-indicating device |
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418 designed to leave non-erasable, unambiguous evidence of unauthorized |
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419 entry or tampering.'' |
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420 |
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421 \begin{center} |
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422 \includegraphics[scale=0.45]{pics/seal.jpg} |
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423 \end{center}\mbox{}\\[-12mm] |
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424 |
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425 They also need some quite sophisticated policies (seal regiment). |
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426 \end{frame}} |
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427 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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428 |
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429 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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430 \mode<presentation>{ |
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431 \begin{frame}[t] |
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432 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Security Seals (2)\end{tabular}} |
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433 |
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434 \begin{itemize} |
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435 \item at the Argonne National Laboratory they tested 244 different security seals |
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436 \begin{itemize} |
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437 \item meantime to break the seals for a trained person: 100 s |
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438 \item including 19\% that were used for safeguard of nuclear material |
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439 \end{itemize}\bigskip |
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440 |
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441 \item Andrew Appel defeated all security seals which were supposed to keep |
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442 voting machines safe |
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443 \end{itemize} |
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444 |
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445 |
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446 \only<2>{ |
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447 \begin{textblock}{11}(1,1) |
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448 \begin{tikzpicture} |
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449 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm] |
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450 {\normalsize |
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451 \begin{minipage}{11cm}\raggedright\small |
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452 \begin{center} |
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453 \includegraphics[scale=0.25]{pics/appelseals.jpg} |
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454 \end{center} |
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455 \begin{center} |
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456 \begin{minipage}{10.5cm} |
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457 \begin{itemize} |
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458 \item The tamper-indicating tape can be lifted using a heat gun. |
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459 \item The security screw cap can be removed using a screwdriver, then the |
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460 serial-numbered top can be replaced (undamaged) onto a fresh (unnumbered) base. |
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461 \item The wire seal can be defeated using a \#4 wood screw. |
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462 \item The plastic strap seal can be picked using a jeweler's screwdriver. |
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463 \end{itemize} |
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464 \end{minipage} |
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465 \end{center} |
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466 \end{minipage}}; |
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467 \end{tikzpicture} |
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468 \end{textblock}} |
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469 |
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470 \end{frame}} |
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471 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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472 |
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473 |
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474 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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475 \mode<presentation>{ |
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476 \begin{frame}[t] |
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477 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Example: Security Seals\end{tabular}} |
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478 |
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479 \begin{itemize} |
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480 \item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\ |
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481 \only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Voting machines, doors.\end{tabular}} |
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482 \item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\ |
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483 \only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Casual thieves, insider attacks.\end{tabular}} |
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484 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\ |
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485 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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486 Needs a quite complicated security regiment.\end{tabular}} |
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487 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause? |
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488 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright You might not notice tampering.\end{tabular}} |
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489 \item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose? |
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490 \only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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491 The ``hardware'' is cheap, but indirect costs can be quite high.\end{tabular}} |
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492 \item<7>[]{\bf\large No!} {\textcolor{gray}{Though in some areas they work: airports, swimming pools, \ldots}} |
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493 \end{itemize} |
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494 |
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495 |
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496 \end{frame}} |
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497 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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498 |
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499 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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500 \mode<presentation>{ |
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501 \begin{frame}[t] |
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502 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ex: Security-by-Obscurity\end{tabular}} |
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503 |
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504 You might think it is a good idea to keep a security relevant algorithm or |
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505 software secret. |
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506 |
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507 \begin{itemize} |
|
508 \item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\ |
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509 \only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Source code, an algorithm and things that depend on it\end{tabular}} |
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510 \item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\ |
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511 \only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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512 Can be pretty high (Oystercards).\end{tabular}} |
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513 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\ |
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514 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright |
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515 Not really. The source code can be reverse engineered, stolen, coerced \ldots{}\end{tabular}} |
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516 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause? |
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517 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright You prevent |
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518 scrutiny and independent advice. You also more likely than not to |
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519 get it wrong.\end{tabular}} |
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520 \item<5>[]{\bf\large No!} |
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521 \end{itemize} |
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522 |
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523 |
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524 \end{frame}} |
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525 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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526 |
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527 |
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528 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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529 \mode<presentation>{ |
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530 \begin{frame}[t] |
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531 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Voting as Security Problem\end{tabular}} |
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532 |
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533 What are the security requirements of a voting system?\bigskip |
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534 |
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535 \begin{itemize} |
|
536 \item<2->Integrity |
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537 \item<3->Ballot Secrecy |
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538 \item<5->Voter Authentication |
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539 \item<6->Enfranchisement |
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540 \item<7->Availability |
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541 \end{itemize} |
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542 |
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543 \only<2>{ |
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544 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
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545 \begin{tikzpicture} |
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546 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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547 {\small |
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548 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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549 \begin{center} |
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550 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
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551 \begin{itemize} |
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552 \item The outcome matches with the voters' intend. |
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553 \item There might be gigantic sums at stake and need to be defended against. |
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554 \end{itemize} |
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555 \end{minipage} |
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556 \end{center} |
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557 \end{minipage}}; |
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558 \end{tikzpicture} |
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559 \end{textblock}} |
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560 |
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561 \only<4>{ |
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562 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
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563 \begin{tikzpicture} |
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564 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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565 {\small |
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566 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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567 \begin{center} |
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568 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
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569 \begin{itemize} |
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570 \item Nobody can find out how you voted. |
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571 \item (Stronger) Even if you try, you cannot prove how you voted. |
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572 \end{itemize} |
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573 \end{minipage} |
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574 \end{center} |
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575 \end{minipage}}; |
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576 \end{tikzpicture} |
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577 \end{textblock}} |
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578 |
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579 \only<5>{ |
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580 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
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581 \begin{tikzpicture} |
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582 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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583 {\small |
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584 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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585 \begin{center} |
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586 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
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587 \begin{itemize} |
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588 \item Only authorised voters can vote up to the permitted number of votes. |
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589 \end{itemize} |
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590 \end{minipage} |
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591 \end{center} |
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592 \end{minipage}}; |
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593 \end{tikzpicture} |
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594 \end{textblock}} |
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595 |
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596 \only<6>{ |
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597 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
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598 \begin{tikzpicture} |
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599 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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600 {\small |
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601 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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602 \begin{center} |
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603 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
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604 \begin{itemize} |
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605 \item Authorised voters should have the opportunity to vote. |
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606 \end{itemize} |
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607 \end{minipage} |
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608 \end{center} |
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609 \end{minipage}}; |
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610 \end{tikzpicture} |
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611 \end{textblock}} |
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612 |
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613 \only<7>{ |
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614 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
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615 \begin{tikzpicture} |
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616 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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617 {\small |
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618 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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619 \begin{center} |
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620 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
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621 \begin{itemize} |
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622 \item The voting system should accept all authorised votes and produce results in a timely manner. |
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623 \end{itemize} |
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624 \end{minipage} |
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625 \end{center} |
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626 \end{minipage}}; |
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627 \end{tikzpicture} |
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628 \end{textblock}} |
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629 |
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630 \end{frame}} |
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631 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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632 |
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633 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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634 \mode<presentation>{ |
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635 \begin{frame}[t] |
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636 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ballot Boxes\end{tabular}} |
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637 |
|
638 |
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639 \begin{center} |
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640 \includegraphics[scale=2.5]{pics/ballotbox.jpg} |
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641 \end{center} |
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642 |
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643 |
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644 \end{frame}} |
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645 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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646 |
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647 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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648 \mode<presentation>{ |
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649 \begin{frame}[t] |
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650 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Problems with Voting\end{tabular}} |
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651 |
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652 |
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653 \begin{center}\large |
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654 \begin{tabular}{rcl} |
|
655 Integrity & vs. & Ballot Secrecy\bigskip\\ |
|
656 Authentication & vs. &Enfranchisement |
|
657 \end{tabular} |
|
658 \end{center}\bigskip\bigskip\pause |
|
659 |
|
660 Further constraints: |
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661 |
|
662 \begin{itemize} |
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663 \item costs |
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664 \item accessibility |
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665 \item convenience |
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666 \item intelligibility |
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667 \end{itemize} |
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668 \end{frame}} |
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669 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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670 |
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671 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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672 \mode<presentation>{ |
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673 \begin{frame}[t] |
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674 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}} |
|
675 |
|
676 |
|
677 \begin{itemize} |
|
678 \item The Netherlands between 1997 - 2006 had electronic voting machines\\ |
|
679 \textcolor{gray}{(hacktivists had found: they can be hacked and also emitted radio signals revealing how you voted)} |
|
680 |
|
681 \item Germany had used them in pilot studies\\ |
|
682 \textcolor{gray}{(in 2007 a law suit has reached the highest court and it rejected electronic voting |
|
683 on the grounds of not being understandable by the general public)} |
|
684 |
|
685 \item UK used optical scan voting systems in a few polls |
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686 \end{itemize} |
|
687 \end{frame}} |
|
688 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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689 |
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690 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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691 \mode<presentation>{ |
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692 \begin{frame}[t] |
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693 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}} |
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694 |
|
695 \mbox{}\\[-12mm] |
|
696 \begin{itemize} |
|
697 \item US used mechanical machines since the 30s, later punch cards, now DREs and |
|
698 optical scan voting machines \textcolor{gray}{(fantastic ``ecosystem'' for study)} |
|
699 |
|
700 \item Estonia used in 2007 the Internet for national elections |
|
701 \textcolor{gray}{(there were earlier pilot studies in other countries)} |
|
702 |
|
703 \item India uses e-voting devices since at least 2003\\ |
|
704 \textcolor{gray}{(``keep-it-simple'' machines produced by a government owned company)} |
|
705 |
|
706 \item South Africa used software for its tallying in the 1993 elections (when Nelson Mandela was elected) |
|
707 \textcolor{gray}{(they found the tallying software was rigged, but they were able to tally manually)} |
|
708 \end{itemize} |
|
709 \end{frame}} |
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710 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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711 |
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712 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
713 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
714 \begin{frame}[t] |
|
715 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}A Brief History of Voting\end{tabular}} |
|
716 |
|
717 |
|
718 \begin{itemize} |
|
719 \item Athenians |
|
720 \begin{itemize} |
|
721 \item show of hands |
|
722 \item ballots on pieces of pottery |
|
723 \item different colours of stones |
|
724 \item ``facebook''-like authorisation |
|
725 \end{itemize}\bigskip |
|
726 |
|
727 \textcolor{gray}{problems with vote buying / no ballot privacy}\bigskip |
|
728 |
|
729 |
|
730 \item French Revolution and the US Constitution got things ``started'' with |
|
731 paper ballots (you first had to bring your own; later they were pre-printed by parties) |
|
732 \end{itemize} |
|
733 \end{frame}} |
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734 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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735 |
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736 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
737 \mode<presentation>{ |
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738 \begin{frame}[t] |
|
739 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ballot Boxes\end{tabular}} |
|
740 |
|
741 Security policies involved with paper ballots: |
|
742 |
|
743 \begin{enumerate} |
|
744 \item you need to check that the ballot box is empty at the start of the poll / no false bottom (to prevent ballot stuffing) |
|
745 \item you need to guard the ballot box during the poll until counting |
|
746 \item tallied by a team at the end of the poll (independent observers) |
|
747 \end{enumerate} |
|
748 |
|
749 \begin{center} |
|
750 \includegraphics[scale=1.5]{pics/ballotbox.jpg} |
|
751 \end{center} |
|
752 |
|
753 |
|
754 \end{frame}} |
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755 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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756 |
|
757 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
758 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
759 \begin{frame}[t] |
|
760 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Paper Ballots\end{tabular}} |
|
761 |
|
762 What can go wrong with paper ballots? |
|
763 |
|
764 \only<2>{ |
|
765 \begin{center} |
|
766 \includegraphics[scale=0.8]{pics/tweet.jpg}\\ |
|
767 \footnotesize William M.~Tweed, US Politician in 1860's\\ |
|
768 ``As long as I count the votes, what are you going to do about it?'' |
|
769 \end{center}} |
|
770 |
|
771 \only<3>{ |
|
772 \medskip |
|
773 \begin{center} |
|
774 \begin{minipage}{10cm} |
|
775 {\bf Chain Voting Attack} |
|
776 \begin{enumerate} |
|
777 \item you obtain a blank ballot and fill it out as you want |
|
778 \item you give it to a voter outside the polling station |
|
779 \item voter receives a new blank ballot |
|
780 \item voter submits prefilled ballot |
|
781 \item voter gives blank ballot to you, you give money |
|
782 \item goto 1 |
|
783 \end{enumerate} |
|
784 \end{minipage} |
|
785 \end{center} |
|
786 } |
|
787 |
|
788 \end{frame}} |
|
789 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
790 |
|
791 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
792 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
793 \begin{frame}[t] |
|
794 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Mechanical Voting Machines\end{tabular}} |
|
795 |
|
796 \begin{itemize} |
|
797 \item<1-> Lever Voting Machines (ca.~1930 - 1990) |
|
798 \only<1>{ |
|
799 \begin{center} |
|
800 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/leavermachine.jpg} |
|
801 \end{center} |
|
802 } |
|
803 \item<2->Punch Cards (ca.~1950 - 2000) |
|
804 \only<2>{ |
|
805 \begin{center} |
|
806 \includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/punchcard1.jpg}\;\; |
|
807 \includegraphics[scale=0.46]{pics/punchcard2.jpg} |
|
808 \end{center} |
|
809 } |
|
810 \end{itemize} |
|
811 |
|
812 |
|
813 |
|
814 \end{frame}} |
|
815 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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816 |
|
817 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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818 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
819 \begin{frame}[t] |
|
820 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Electronic Voting Machines\end{tabular}} |
|
821 |
|
822 \begin{center} |
|
823 \begin{tabular}{c} |
|
824 \includegraphics[scale=0.45]{pics/dre1.jpg}\; |
|
825 \includegraphics[scale=0.40]{pics/dre2.jpg}\\\hline\\ |
|
826 \includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/opticalscan.jpg} |
|
827 \end{tabular} |
|
828 \end{center} |
|
829 |
|
830 \only<1->{ |
|
831 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(1,4) |
|
832 DREs |
|
833 \end{textblock}} |
|
834 \only<1->{ |
|
835 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(1,11) |
|
836 Optical Scan |
|
837 \end{textblock}} |
|
838 |
|
839 \only<2>{ |
|
840 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(0.5,14.5) |
|
841 all are computers |
|
842 \end{textblock}} |
|
843 |
|
844 \end{frame}} |
|
845 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
846 |
|
847 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
848 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
849 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
850 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}DREs\end{tabular}} |
|
851 |
|
852 Direct-recording electronic voting machines\\ |
|
853 (votes are recorded for example memory cards) |
|
854 |
|
855 typically touchscreen machines |
|
856 |
|
857 usually no papertrail (hard to add: ballot secrecy) |
|
858 |
|
859 \begin{center} |
|
860 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/dre1.jpg} |
|
861 \end{center} |
|
862 |
|
863 |
|
864 \end{frame}} |
|
865 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
866 |
|
867 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
868 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
869 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
870 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Diebold Machines\end{tabular}} |
|
871 |
|
872 The work by J.~Alex Halderman: |
|
873 |
|
874 \begin{itemize} |
|
875 \item acquired a machine from an anonymous source\medskip |
|
876 \item the source code running the machine was tried to keep secret\medskip\pause |
|
877 |
|
878 \item first reversed-engineered the machine (extremely tedious) |
|
879 \item could completely reboot the machine and even install a virus that infects other Diebold machines |
|
880 \item obtained also the source code for other machines |
|
881 \end{itemize} |
|
882 |
|
883 \end{frame}} |
|
884 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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885 |
|
886 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
887 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
888 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
889 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Diebold Machines\end{tabular}} |
|
890 |
|
891 What could go wrong?\pause \;\;Failure-in-depth.\bigskip\pause |
|
892 |
|
893 A non-obvious problem: |
|
894 |
|
895 \begin{itemize} |
|
896 \item you can nowadays get old machines, which still store old polls |
|
897 |
|
898 \item the paper ballot box needed to be secured during the voting until counting; |
|
899 e-voting machines need to be secured during the entire life-time |
|
900 \end{itemize} |
|
901 |
|
902 \end{frame}} |
|
903 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
904 |
|
905 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
906 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
907 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
908 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Paper Trail\end{tabular}} |
|
909 |
|
910 Conclusion:\\ Any electronic solution should have a paper trail. |
|
911 |
|
912 \begin{center} |
|
913 \begin{tabular}{c} |
|
914 \includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/opticalscan.jpg} |
|
915 \end{tabular} |
|
916 \end{center}\pause |
|
917 |
|
918 You still have to solve problems about |
|
919 Voter registration, voter authentification, guarding against tampering |
|
920 |
|
921 \end{frame}} |
|
922 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
923 |
|
924 |
|
925 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
926 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
927 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
928 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting in India\end{tabular}} |
|
929 |
|
930 Their underlying engineering principle is ``keep-it-simple'': |
|
931 |
|
932 \begin{center} |
|
933 \begin{tabular}{c} |
|
934 \includegraphics[scale=1.05]{pics/indiaellection.jpg}\;\; |
|
935 \includegraphics[scale=0.40]{pics/india1.jpg} |
|
936 \end{tabular} |
|
937 \end{center}\medskip\pause |
|
938 |
|
939 Official claims: ``perfect'', ``tamperproof'', ``no need for technical improvements'' , ``infallible'' |
|
940 \end{frame}} |
|
941 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
942 |
|
943 |
|
944 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
945 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
946 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
947 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Lessons to be Learned\end{tabular}} |
|
948 |
|
949 \begin{itemize} |
|
950 \item keep a paper trail and design your system to keep this secure\medskip |
|
951 \item make the software open source (avoid security-by-obscurity))\medskip |
|
952 \item have a simple design in order to minimise the attack surface |
|
953 \end{itemize} |
|
954 |
|
955 \end{frame}} |
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956 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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957 |
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958 |
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959 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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960 \mode<presentation>{ |
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961 \begin{frame}[c] |
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962 |
|
963 \begin{center} |
|
964 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting1.png} |
|
965 \end{center} |
|
966 |
|
967 |
|
968 \end{frame}} |
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969 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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970 |
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971 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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972 \mode<presentation>{ |
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973 \begin{frame}[c] |
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974 |
|
975 \begin{center} |
|
976 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting2.png} |
|
977 \end{center} |
|
978 |
|
979 |
|
980 \end{frame}} |
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981 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
982 |
|
983 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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984 \mode<presentation>{ |
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985 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
986 |
|
987 \begin{center} |
|
988 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting3.png} |
|
989 \end{center} |
|
990 |
|
991 |
|
992 \end{frame}} |
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993 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
994 |
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995 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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996 \mode<presentation>{ |
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997 \begin{frame}[c] |
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998 |
|
999 \begin{center} |
|
1000 \includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting4.png} |
|
1001 \end{center} |
|
1002 |
|
1003 |
|
1004 \end{frame}} |
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1005 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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1006 |
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1007 |
|
1008 \end{document} |
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1009 |
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1010 %%% Local Variables: |
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1011 %%% mode: latex |
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1012 %%% TeX-master: t |
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1013 %%% End: |
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1014 |
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