34 \item[$\Box$] Distributing ballots publicly before the election. |
34 \item[$\Box$] Distributing ballots publicly before the election. |
35 \item[$\Box$] Checking that a voter's ID (drivers license, passport) matches the voter. |
35 \item[$\Box$] Checking that a voter's ID (drivers license, passport) matches the voter. |
36 \item[$\Box$] Each ballot has a unique ID. When a voter is given a ballot, the ID is recorded. When the voter submits his or her ballot, this ID is checked against the record. |
36 \item[$\Box$] Each ballot has a unique ID. When a voter is given a ballot, the ID is recorded. When the voter submits his or her ballot, this ID is checked against the record. |
37 \end{itemize} |
37 \end{itemize} |
38 |
38 |
|
39 \item In the Estonian general election, votes can be cast via Internet |
|
40 some time before the election day. These votes cast via Internet can |
|
41 be changed an unlimited amount of times, the last vote is |
|
42 tabulated. You can even change your vote on the polling day in |
|
43 person. Which security requirement does this procedure address? |
|
44 |
39 \item What is the main difference between online banking and e-voting? |
45 \item What is the main difference between online banking and e-voting? |
40 (Hint: Why is the latter so hard to get secure?) |
46 (Hint: Why is the latter so hard to get secure?) |
41 |
47 |
|
48 \item Imagine, hypothetically, you have a perfectly secure Internet |
|
49 voting system, by which I mean nobody can tamper with or steal votes |
|
50 between your browser and the central server responsible for vote |
|
51 tallying. What can still go wrong with such a perfectly secure |
|
52 voting system, which is prevented in traditional elections with |
|
53 paper-based ballots? |
42 \end{enumerate} |
54 \end{enumerate} |
43 |
55 |
44 |
56 |
45 \end{document} |
57 \end{document} |
46 |
58 |