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   595 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}\end{tabular}}
   595 
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   596 \begin{minipage}{11cm}
   597 
   597 From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk>\\
   598 Security theater is the practice of investing in countermeasures intended to provide the 
   598 To: cl-security-research@lists.cam.ac.uk\\
   599 \underline{feeling} of improved security while doing little or nothing to actually achieve it.\hfill{}\textcolor{gray}{Bruce Schneier}
   599 Subject: Tip off\\
   600 
   600 Date: Tue, 02 Oct 2012 13:12:50 +0100\\
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   603 
       
   604 
       
   605 From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk>
       
   606 Sender: cl-security-research-bounces@lists.cam.ac.uk
       
   607 To: cl-security-research@lists.cam.ac.uk
       
   608 Subject: Tip off
       
   609 Date: Tue, 02 Oct 2012 13:12:50 +0100
       
   610 
   601 
   611 I received the following tip off, and have removed the sender's
   602 I received the following tip off, and have removed the sender's
   612 coordinates. I suspect it is one of many security vendors who
   603 coordinates. I suspect it is one of many security vendors who
   613 don't even get the basics right; if you ever go to the RSA 
   604 don't even get the basics right; if you ever go to the RSA 
   614 conference, there are a thousand such firms in the hall, each
   605 conference, there are a thousand such firms in the hall, each
   615 with several eager but ignorant salesmen. A trying experience
   606 with several eager but ignorant salesmen. A trying experience.\\
   616 
   607 
   617 Ross
   608 Ross
       
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   619 I'd like to anonymously tip you off about this\\
       
   620 product:\\
       
   621 
       
   622 {\small http://www.strongauth.com/products/key-appliance.html}\\
       
   623 
       
   624 It sounds really clever, doesn't it?\\
       
   625 \ldots\\
       
   626 
       
   627 Anyway, it occurred to me that you and your colleagues might have a
       
   628 field day discovering weaknesses in the appliance and their
       
   629 implementation of security.  However, whilst I'd be willing to help
       
   630 and/or comment privately, it'd have to be off the record ;-)
       
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   639 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 1\end{tabular}}
       
   640 
       
   641 {\bf What assets are you trying to protect?}\bigskip
       
   642 
       
   643 This question might seem basic, but a surprising number of people never ask it. The question involves understanding the scope of the problem. For example, securing an airplane, an airport, commercial aviation, the transportation system, and a nation against terrorism are all different security problems, and require different solutions.
       
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   647 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm] 
       
   648 {\begin{minipage}{10cm}
       
   649 \small You like to prevent: ``It would be terrible if this sort of attack ever happens; we need to do everything in our power to prevent it.''
       
   650 \end{minipage}};
       
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   658 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 2\end{tabular}}
       
   659 
       
   660 {\bf What are the risks to these assets?}\bigskip
       
   661 
       
   662 Here we consider the need for security. Answering it involves understanding what is being defended, what the consequences are if it is successfully attacked, who wants to attack it, how they might attack it, and why.
       
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   670 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 3\end{tabular}}
       
   671 
       
   672 {\bf How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?}\bigskip
       
   673 
       
   674 Another seemingly obvious question, but one that is frequently ignored. If the security solution doesnŐt solve the problem, itŐs no good. This is not as simple as looking at the security solution and seeing how well it works. It involves looking at how the security solution interacts with everything around it, evaluating both its operation and its failures.
       
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   682 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 4\end{tabular}}
       
   683 
       
   684 {\bf What other risks does the security solution cause?}\bigskip
       
   685 
       
   686 This question addresses what might be called the problem of unintended consequences. Security solutions have ripple effects, and most cause new security problems. The trick is to understand the new problems and make sure they are smaller than the old ones.
       
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   694 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 5\end{tabular}}
       
   695 
       
   696 {\bf What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?}\bigskip
       
   697 
       
   698 Every security system has costs and requires trade-offs. Most security costs money, sometimes substantial amounts; but other trade-offs may be more important, ranging from matters of convenience and comfort to issues involving basic freedoms like privacy. Understanding these trade-offs is essential.
       
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   620 \end{document}
   704 \end{document}
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