590 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
590 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
591 |
591 |
592 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
592 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
593 \mode<presentation>{ |
593 \mode<presentation>{ |
594 \begin{frame}[c] |
594 \begin{frame}[c] |
595 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}\end{tabular}} |
595 |
596 |
596 \begin{minipage}{11cm} |
597 |
597 From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk>\\ |
598 Security theater is the practice of investing in countermeasures intended to provide the |
598 To: cl-security-research@lists.cam.ac.uk\\ |
599 \underline{feeling} of improved security while doing little or nothing to actually achieve it.\hfill{}\textcolor{gray}{Bruce Schneier} |
599 Subject: Tip off\\ |
600 |
600 Date: Tue, 02 Oct 2012 13:12:50 +0100\\ |
601 \end{frame}} |
|
602 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
603 |
|
604 |
|
605 From: Ross Anderson <Ross.Anderson@cl.cam.ac.uk> |
|
606 Sender: cl-security-research-bounces@lists.cam.ac.uk |
|
607 To: cl-security-research@lists.cam.ac.uk |
|
608 Subject: Tip off |
|
609 Date: Tue, 02 Oct 2012 13:12:50 +0100 |
|
610 |
601 |
611 I received the following tip off, and have removed the sender's |
602 I received the following tip off, and have removed the sender's |
612 coordinates. I suspect it is one of many security vendors who |
603 coordinates. I suspect it is one of many security vendors who |
613 don't even get the basics right; if you ever go to the RSA |
604 don't even get the basics right; if you ever go to the RSA |
614 conference, there are a thousand such firms in the hall, each |
605 conference, there are a thousand such firms in the hall, each |
615 with several eager but ignorant salesmen. A trying experience |
606 with several eager but ignorant salesmen. A trying experience.\\ |
616 |
607 |
617 Ross |
608 Ross |
|
609 \end{minipage} |
|
610 |
|
611 \end{frame}} |
|
612 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
613 |
|
614 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
615 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
616 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
617 |
|
618 \begin{minipage}{11cm} |
|
619 I'd like to anonymously tip you off about this\\ |
|
620 product:\\ |
|
621 |
|
622 {\small http://www.strongauth.com/products/key-appliance.html}\\ |
|
623 |
|
624 It sounds really clever, doesn't it?\\ |
|
625 \ldots\\ |
|
626 |
|
627 Anyway, it occurred to me that you and your colleagues might have a |
|
628 field day discovering weaknesses in the appliance and their |
|
629 implementation of security. However, whilst I'd be willing to help |
|
630 and/or comment privately, it'd have to be off the record ;-) |
|
631 \end{minipage} |
|
632 |
|
633 \end{frame}} |
|
634 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
635 |
|
636 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
637 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
638 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
639 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 1\end{tabular}} |
|
640 |
|
641 {\bf What assets are you trying to protect?}\bigskip |
|
642 |
|
643 This question might seem basic, but a surprising number of people never ask it. The question involves understanding the scope of the problem. For example, securing an airplane, an airport, commercial aviation, the transportation system, and a nation against terrorism are all different security problems, and require different solutions. |
|
644 |
|
645 \only<1>{ |
|
646 \begin{tikzpicture} |
|
647 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm] |
|
648 {\begin{minipage}{10cm} |
|
649 \small You like to prevent: ``It would be terrible if this sort of attack ever happens; we need to do everything in our power to prevent it.'' |
|
650 \end{minipage}}; |
|
651 \end{tikzpicture}} |
|
652 \end{frame}} |
|
653 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
654 |
|
655 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
656 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
657 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
658 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 2\end{tabular}} |
|
659 |
|
660 {\bf What are the risks to these assets?}\bigskip |
|
661 |
|
662 Here we consider the need for security. Answering it involves understanding what is being defended, what the consequences are if it is successfully attacked, who wants to attack it, how they might attack it, and why. |
|
663 |
|
664 \end{frame}} |
|
665 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
666 |
|
667 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
668 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
669 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
670 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 3\end{tabular}} |
|
671 |
|
672 {\bf How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?}\bigskip |
|
673 |
|
674 Another seemingly obvious question, but one that is frequently ignored. If the security solution doesnŐt solve the problem, itŐs no good. This is not as simple as looking at the security solution and seeing how well it works. It involves looking at how the security solution interacts with everything around it, evaluating both its operation and its failures. |
|
675 |
|
676 \end{frame}} |
|
677 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
678 |
|
679 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
680 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
681 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
682 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 4\end{tabular}} |
|
683 |
|
684 {\bf What other risks does the security solution cause?}\bigskip |
|
685 |
|
686 This question addresses what might be called the problem of unintended consequences. Security solutions have ripple effects, and most cause new security problems. The trick is to understand the new problems and make sure they are smaller than the old ones. |
|
687 |
|
688 \end{frame}} |
|
689 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
690 |
|
691 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
692 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
693 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
694 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier: Step 5\end{tabular}} |
|
695 |
|
696 {\bf What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?}\bigskip |
|
697 |
|
698 Every security system has costs and requires trade-offs. Most security costs money, sometimes substantial amounts; but other trade-offs may be more important, ranging from matters of convenience and comfort to issues involving basic freedoms like privacy. Understanding these trade-offs is essential. |
|
699 |
|
700 \end{frame}} |
|
701 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
618 |
702 |
619 |
703 |
620 \end{document} |
704 \end{document} |
621 |
705 |
622 %%% Local Variables: |
706 %%% Local Variables: |