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1 \documentclass{article} |
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2 \usepackage{../style} |
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3 |
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4 \begin{document} |
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5 |
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6 \section*{Handout 7 (Privacy)} |
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7 |
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8 The first motor car was invented around 1886. For ten years, |
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9 until 1896, the law in the UK and elsewhere required a person |
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10 to walk in front of any moving car waving a red flag. Cars |
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11 were such a novelty that most people did not know what to make |
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12 of them. The person with the red flag was intended to warn the |
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13 public, for example horse owners, about the impending |
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14 novelty---a car. In my humble opinion, we are at the same |
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15 stage of development with privacy. Nobody really knows what it |
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16 is about or what it is good for. All seems very hazy. The |
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17 result is that the world of ``privacy'' looks a little bit |
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18 like the old Wild West. For example, UCAS, a charity set up to |
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19 help students apply to universities, has a commercial unit |
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20 that happily sells your email addresses to anybody who forks |
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21 out enough money in order to bombard you with spam. Yes, you |
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22 can opt out very often, but in case of UCAS any opt-out will |
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23 limit also legit emails you might actually be interested |
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24 in.\footnote{The main objectionable point, in my opinion, is |
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25 that the \emph{charity} everybody has to use for HE |
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26 applications has actually very honourable goals (e.g.~assist |
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27 applicants in gaining access to universities), but in their |
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28 small print (or better under the link ``About us'') reveals |
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29 they set up their organisation so that they can also |
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30 shamelessly sell email addresses the ``harvest''. Everything |
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31 is of course very legal\ldots{}moral?\ldots{}well that is in |
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32 the eye of the beholder. See: |
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33 |
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34 \url{http://www.ucas.com/about-us/inside-ucas/advertising-opportunities} |
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35 or |
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36 \url{http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/mar/12/ucas-sells-marketing-access-student-data-advertisers}} |
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37 |
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38 Verizon, an ISP who provides you with connectivity, has found |
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39 a ``nice'' side-business too: When you have enabled all |
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40 privacy guards in your browser, the few you have at your |
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41 disosal, Verizon happily adds a kind of cookie to your |
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42 HTTP-requests.\footnote{\url{http://webpolicy.org/2014/10/24/how-verizons-advertising-header-works/}} |
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43 As shown in the picture below, this cookie will be sent to |
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44 every web-site you visit. The web-sites then can forward the |
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45 cookie to advertisers who in turn pay Verizon to tell them |
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46 everything they want to know about the person who just made |
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47 this request, that is you. |
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48 |
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49 \begin{center} |
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50 \includegraphics[scale=0.21]{../pics/verizon.png} |
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51 \end{center} |
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52 |
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53 \noindent How disgusting? Even worse, Verizon is not known for |
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54 being the cheapest ISP on the planet (completely the |
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55 contrary), and also not known for providing the fastest |
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56 possible speeds, but rather for being among the few ISPs in |
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57 the US with a quasi-monopolistic ``market distribution''. |
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58 Well, we could go on and on\ldots{}and that has not even |
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59 started us yet with all the naughty things NSA \& Friends are |
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60 up to. |
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61 |
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62 Why does privacy matter? Nobody, I think, has a conclusive |
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63 answer to this question. Maybe the following four notions |
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64 clarify the picture somewhat: |
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65 |
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66 \begin{itemize} |
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67 \item \textbf{Secrecy} is the mechanism used to limit the |
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68 number of principals with access to information (e.g., |
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69 cryptography or access controls). For example I better |
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70 keep my password secret, otherwise people from the wrong |
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71 side of the law might impersonate me. |
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72 |
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73 \item \textbf{Confidentiality} is the obligation to protect |
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74 the secrets of other people or organisations (secrecy |
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75 for the benefit of an organisation). For example as a |
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76 staff membee at King's I have access to data, even |
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77 private data, I am allowed to use in my work but not |
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78 allowed to disclose to anyone else. |
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79 |
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80 \item \textbf{Anonymity} is the ability to leave no evidence of |
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81 an activity (e.g., sharing a secret). This is not equal |
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82 with privacy---anonymity is required in many |
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83 circumstances, for example for whistle-blowers, |
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84 voting, exam marking and so on. |
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85 |
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86 \item \textbf{Privacy} is the ability or right to protect your |
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87 personal secrets (secrecy for the benefit of an |
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88 individual). For example, in a job interview, I might |
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89 not like to disclose that I am pregnant, if I were |
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90 a woman, or that I am a father. Similarly, I might not |
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91 like to disclose my location data, because thieves might |
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92 break into my house if they know I am away at work. |
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93 Privacy is essentially everything which `shouldn't be |
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94 anybodies business'. |
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95 |
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96 \end{itemize} |
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97 |
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98 \noindent While this might provide us with some rough |
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99 definitions, the problem with privacy is that it is an |
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100 extremely fine line what should stay private and what should |
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101 not. For example, since I am working in academia, I am very |
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102 happy to be essentially a digital exhibitionist: I am happy to |
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103 disclose all `trivia' related to my work on my personal |
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104 web-page. This is a kind of bragging that is normal in |
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105 academia (at least in the CS field). I am even happy that |
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106 Google maintains a profile about all of my academic papers and |
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107 their citations. |
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108 |
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109 On the other hand I would be very peeved if anybody had a too |
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110 close look on my private live---it shouldn'd be anybodies |
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111 business. The reason is that knowledge about my private life |
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112 usually is used against me. As mentioned above, public |
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113 location data might mean I get robbed. If supermarkets build a |
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114 profile of my shopping habits, they will use it to |
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115 \emph{their} advantage---surely not to \emph{my} advantage. |
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116 Also whatever might be collected about my life will always be |
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117 an incomplete, or even misleading, picture---I am sure my |
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118 creditworthiness score was temporarily(?) destroyed by not |
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119 having a regular income in this country (before coming to |
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120 King's I worked in Munich). To correct such incomplete or |
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121 flawed data there is, since recently, a law that allows you to |
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122 check what information is held about you for determining your |
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123 creditworthiness. But this concerns only a very small part of |
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124 the data that is held about me/you. |
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125 |
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126 This is an endless field. I let you ponder about the two |
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127 statements that are often float about in discussions about |
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128 privacy: |
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129 |
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130 \begin{itemize} |
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131 \item \textit{``You have zero privacy anyway. Get over it.''}\\ |
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132 \mbox{}\hfill{}Scott Mcnealy (CEO of Sun) |
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133 |
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134 \item \textit{``If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing |
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135 to fear.''} |
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136 \end{itemize} |
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137 |
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138 \noindent There are some technical problems that are easier to |
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139 discuss and that often have privacy implications. The problem |
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140 I want to focus on is how to safely disclose datasets. What |
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141 can go wrong with this can be illustrated with three examples: |
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142 |
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143 \begin{itemize} |
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144 \item In 2006 a then young company called Netflix offered a 1 |
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145 Mio \$ prize to anybody who could improve their movie |
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146 rating algorithm. For this they disclosed a dataset |
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147 containing 10\% of all Netflix users (appr.~500K). They |
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148 removed names, but included numerical ratings as well as |
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149 times of ratings. Though some information was perturbed |
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150 (i.e., slightly modified). |
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151 |
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152 Two researchers took that data and compared it with |
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153 public data available from the International Movie |
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154 Database (IMDb). They found that 98 \% of the entries |
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155 could be re-identified: either by their ratings or by |
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156 the dates the ratings were uploaded. |
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157 |
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158 \item In the 1990, medical databases were routinely made |
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159 publicised for research purposes. This was done in |
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160 anonymised form with names removed, but birth dates, |
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161 gender, ZIP-code were retained. |
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162 |
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163 \end{itemize} |
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164 |
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165 |
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166 \end{document} |
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167 |
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168 http://randomwalker.info/teaching/fall-2012-privacy-technologies/? |
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169 http://chronicle.com/article/Why-Privacy-Matters-Even-if/127461/ |
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170 http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1077&context=hcii |
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171 https://josephhall.org/papers/NYU-MCC-1303-S2012_privacy_syllabus.pdf |
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