hws/hw07.tex
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    21       privacy of your grandmother and nothing to do with
    21       privacy of your grandmother and nothing to do with
    22       keeping her birthday wishes supersecret. Also nothing to
    22       keeping her birthday wishes supersecret. Also nothing to
    23       do with you and grandmother testing the latest
    23       do with you and grandmother testing the latest
    24       encryption technology, nor just for the sake of it.)
    24       encryption technology, nor just for the sake of it.)
    25 
    25 
    26 \item One part of achieving privacy (but not the only one) is
    26 \item One part of achieving privacy (but not the only one) is to
    27       to properly encrypt your conversations on the Internet.
    27   properly encrypt your conversations on the Internet.  But this is
    28       But this is fiercely resisted by some spy agencies.
    28   fiercely resisted by some spy agencies.  These agencies (and some
    29       These agencies (and some politicians for that
    29   politicians for that matter) argue that, for example, ISIL's
    30       matter) argue that, for example, ISIL's recruiters
    30   recruiters broadcast messages on, say, Twitter, and get people to
    31       broadcast messages on, say, Twitter, and get people to
    31   follow them. Then they move potential recruits to Twitter Direct
    32       follow them. Then they move potential recruits to
    32   Messaging to evaluate if they are a legitimate recruit. If yes, they
    33       Twitter Direct Messaging to evaluate if they are a
    33   move them to an encrypted mobile-messaging app. The spy agencies
    34       legitimate recruit. If yes, they move them to an
    34   argue that although they can follow the conversations on Twitter,
    35       encrypted mobile-messaging app. The spy agencies argue
    35   they ``go dark'' on the encrypted message app. To counter this
    36       that although they can follow the conversations on
    36   ``going-dark problem'', the spy agencies push for the implementation
    37       Twitter, they ``go dark'' on the encrypted message
    37   of back-doors in iMessage and Facebook and Skype and everything else
    38       app. To counter this ``going-dark problem'', the spy
    38   UK or US-made, which they can use eavesdrop on conversations without
    39       agencies push for the implementation of back-doors in
    39   the conversants' knowledge or consent.\medskip
    40       iMessage and Facebook and Skype and everything else UK
       
    41       or US-made, which they can use eavesdrop on
       
    42       conversations without the conversants' knowledge or
       
    43       consent.\medskip
       
    44    
    40    
    45       What is the fallacy in the spy agencies going-dark
    41       What is the fallacy in the spy agencies going-dark argument?
    46       argument? (Hint: Think what would happen if the spy
    42       (Hint: Think what would happen if the spy agencies and certain
    47       agencies and certain politicians get their wish.)
    43       politicians get their wish.)
    48        
    44        
    49 \item DNA data is very sensitive and can easily violate the
    45 \item DNA data is very sensitive and can easily violate the privacy of
    50       privacy of (living) people. To get around this, two
    46   (living) people. To get around this, two scientists from Denmark
    51       scientists from Denmark proposed to create a
    47   proposed to create a \emph{necrogenomic database} which would record
    52       \emph{necrogenomic database} which would record the DNA
    48   the DNA data of all Danish citizens and residents at the time of
    53       data of all Danish citizens and residents at the time of
    49   their \emph{death}. By matching these to information about illnesses
    54       their \emph{death}. By matching these to information
    50   and ailments in life, helpful evidence could be gathered about the
    55       about illnesses and ailments in life, helpful evidence
    51   genetic origins of diseases.  The idea is that the privacy of dead
    56       could be gathered about the genetic origins of diseases.
    52   people cannot be violated.
    57       The idea is that the privacy of dead people cannot be
       
    58       violated.
       
    59 
    53 
    60       What is the fallacy behind this reasoning?
    54       What is the fallacy behind this reasoning?
    61            
    55 
       
    56 \item A few years ago a Google executive tried to allay worries about
       
    57   Google pooring over all your emails on Gmail. He said something
       
    58   along the lines: you are watched by an algorithm; this is like being
       
    59   naked in front of your dog. What is wrong with this argument?
       
    60 
       
    61 \item \POSTSCRIPT  
    62 \end{enumerate} 
    62 \end{enumerate} 
    63 \end{document}
    63 \end{document}
    64 
    64 
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