21 privacy of your grandmother and nothing to do with |
21 privacy of your grandmother and nothing to do with |
22 keeping her birthday wishes supersecret. Also nothing to |
22 keeping her birthday wishes supersecret. Also nothing to |
23 do with you and grandmother testing the latest |
23 do with you and grandmother testing the latest |
24 encryption technology, nor just for the sake of it.) |
24 encryption technology, nor just for the sake of it.) |
25 |
25 |
26 \item One part of achieving privacy (but not the only one) is |
26 \item One part of achieving privacy (but not the only one) is to |
27 to properly encrypt your conversations on the Internet. |
27 properly encrypt your conversations on the Internet. But this is |
28 But this is fiercely resisted by some spy agencies. |
28 fiercely resisted by some spy agencies. These agencies (and some |
29 These agencies (and some politicians for that |
29 politicians for that matter) argue that, for example, ISIL's |
30 matter) argue that, for example, ISIL's recruiters |
30 recruiters broadcast messages on, say, Twitter, and get people to |
31 broadcast messages on, say, Twitter, and get people to |
31 follow them. Then they move potential recruits to Twitter Direct |
32 follow them. Then they move potential recruits to |
32 Messaging to evaluate if they are a legitimate recruit. If yes, they |
33 Twitter Direct Messaging to evaluate if they are a |
33 move them to an encrypted mobile-messaging app. The spy agencies |
34 legitimate recruit. If yes, they move them to an |
34 argue that although they can follow the conversations on Twitter, |
35 encrypted mobile-messaging app. The spy agencies argue |
35 they ``go dark'' on the encrypted message app. To counter this |
36 that although they can follow the conversations on |
36 ``going-dark problem'', the spy agencies push for the implementation |
37 Twitter, they ``go dark'' on the encrypted message |
37 of back-doors in iMessage and Facebook and Skype and everything else |
38 app. To counter this ``going-dark problem'', the spy |
38 UK or US-made, which they can use eavesdrop on conversations without |
39 agencies push for the implementation of back-doors in |
39 the conversants' knowledge or consent.\medskip |
40 iMessage and Facebook and Skype and everything else UK |
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41 or US-made, which they can use eavesdrop on |
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42 conversations without the conversants' knowledge or |
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43 consent.\medskip |
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44 |
40 |
45 What is the fallacy in the spy agencies going-dark |
41 What is the fallacy in the spy agencies going-dark argument? |
46 argument? (Hint: Think what would happen if the spy |
42 (Hint: Think what would happen if the spy agencies and certain |
47 agencies and certain politicians get their wish.) |
43 politicians get their wish.) |
48 |
44 |
49 \item DNA data is very sensitive and can easily violate the |
45 \item DNA data is very sensitive and can easily violate the privacy of |
50 privacy of (living) people. To get around this, two |
46 (living) people. To get around this, two scientists from Denmark |
51 scientists from Denmark proposed to create a |
47 proposed to create a \emph{necrogenomic database} which would record |
52 \emph{necrogenomic database} which would record the DNA |
48 the DNA data of all Danish citizens and residents at the time of |
53 data of all Danish citizens and residents at the time of |
49 their \emph{death}. By matching these to information about illnesses |
54 their \emph{death}. By matching these to information |
50 and ailments in life, helpful evidence could be gathered about the |
55 about illnesses and ailments in life, helpful evidence |
51 genetic origins of diseases. The idea is that the privacy of dead |
56 could be gathered about the genetic origins of diseases. |
52 people cannot be violated. |
57 The idea is that the privacy of dead people cannot be |
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58 violated. |
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59 |
53 |
60 What is the fallacy behind this reasoning? |
54 What is the fallacy behind this reasoning? |
61 |
55 |
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56 \item A few years ago a Google executive tried to allay worries about |
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57 Google pooring over all your emails on Gmail. He said something |
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58 along the lines: you are watched by an algorithm; this is like being |
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59 naked in front of your dog. What is wrong with this argument? |
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60 |
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61 \item \POSTSCRIPT |
62 \end{enumerate} |
62 \end{enumerate} |
63 \end{document} |
63 \end{document} |
64 |
64 |
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