handouts/ho02.tex
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    56       
    56       
    57 \item The US used mechanical machines since the 1930s, later
    57 \item The US used mechanical machines since the 1930s, later
    58       punch cards, now DREs and optical scan voting machines.
    58       punch cards, now DREs and optical scan voting machines.
    59       But there is a lot of evidence that DREs and optical 
    59       But there is a lot of evidence that DREs and optical 
    60       scan voting machines are not as secure as they should
    60       scan voting machines are not as secure as they should
    61       be.
    61       be. Some states experiment with Internet voting, but
       
    62       all experiments have been security failures.
    62 
    63 
    63 \item Estonia used since 2007 the Internet for national
    64 \item Estonia used since 2007 the Internet for national
    64       elections. There were earlier pilot studies for voting
    65       elections. There were earlier pilot studies for voting
    65       via Internet in other countries.
    66       via Internet in other countries.
       
    67 
       
    68 \item The Australian parliament ruled in 2014 that e-voting is
       
    69       highly vulnerable to hacking and will not use it any time
       
    70       soon. That is because it is still not as secret and 
       
    71       secure as paper ballots, the parliamentary committee 
       
    72       in charge concluded.
    66 
    73 
    67 \item India uses e-voting devices since at least 2003. They
    74 \item India uses e-voting devices since at least 2003. They
    68       use ``keep-it-simple'' machines produced by a
    75       use ``keep-it-simple'' machines produced by a
    69       government owned company.
    76       government owned company.
    70 
    77 
   468 \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wv3VuGZzdK8}
   475 \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wv3VuGZzdK8}
   469 \end{center}
   476 \end{center}
   470 
   477 
   471 \noindent At the beginning she describes the complete break-in
   478 \noindent At the beginning she describes the complete break-in
   472 by the group of Alex Halderman at the try-out voting at
   479 by the group of Alex Halderman at the try-out voting at
   473 Washington D.C. Halderman's amusing paper including pictures
   480 Washington D.C. Halderman's amusing paper about this break in 
   474 is at
   481 including pictures is at
   475 
   482 
   476 \begin{center}
   483 \begin{center}
   477 \url{https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/dcvoting-fc12.pdf}
   484 \url{https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/dcvoting-fc12.pdf}
       
   485 \end{center}
       
   486 
       
   487 \noindent
       
   488 Two researchers from Galois, Inc., present an interesting 
       
   489 attack against home routers which silently alters pdf-based
       
   490 voting ballots. This shows that the vote submission via
       
   491 an unencrypted pdf-file is highly unsafe.
       
   492 
       
   493 \begin{center}
       
   494 \url{http://galois.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/technical-hack-a-pdf.pdf}
   478 \end{center}
   495 \end{center}
   479 
   496 
   480 \end{document}
   497 \end{document}
   481 
   498 
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