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6 \section*{Homework 6} |
6 |
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7 % For Alice to cheat, she has to get her transaction into the blockchain. |
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8 % For this she has to solve proof-of-work puzzles faster than anybody |
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9 % else. Is it possible for her to precompute several blocks that would |
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10 % validate a fraudulent transaction by her? Give a short explanation |
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11 % for your reasoning. |
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12 |
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13 \section*{Homework 7} |
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14 |
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15 \HEADER |
7 |
16 |
8 \begin{enumerate} |
17 \begin{enumerate} |
9 \item What are good uses of anonymity services like Tor? |
18 \item How can the hardness of the proof-of-work puzzles in |
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19 Bitcoins be adjusted? What is parameter that determines |
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20 how the hardness is adjusted? |
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21 |
11 \item What is meant by the notion \emph{forward privacy}? |
22 \item What is the main data that is stored in Bitcoin's |
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23 blockchain? |
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24 |
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25 \item What is is the purpose of the proof-of-work puzzle in |
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26 Bitcoins? |
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27 |
13 \item What is a \emph{re-identification attack}? |
28 \item The department has large labs full of computers that are |
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29 pretty much idle over night. Why is it a bad idea to let |
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30 them mine for Bitcoins? |
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31 |
15 \item Imagine you have a completely `innocent' email message, |
32 \item Is it possible that Bitcoins can get lost (be |
16 like birthday wishes to your grandmother. Why should you |
33 irretrievable)? |
17 still encrypt this message and your grandmother take the |
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18 effort to decrypt it? |
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19 |
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20 (Hint: The answer has nothing to do with preserving the |
35 \item \POSTSCRIPT |
21 privacy of your grandmother and nothing to do with |
36 \end{enumerate} |
22 keeping her birthday wishes supersecret. Also nothing to |
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23 do with you and grandmother testing the latest |
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24 encryption technology, nor just for the sake of it.) |
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25 |
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26 \item One part of achieving privacy (but not the only one) is to |
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27 properly encrypt your conversations on the Internet. But this is |
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28 fiercely resisted by some spy agencies. These agencies (and some |
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29 politicians for that matter) argue that, for example, ISIL's |
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30 recruiters broadcast messages on, say, Twitter, and get people to |
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31 follow them. Then they move potential recruits to Twitter Direct |
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32 Messaging to evaluate if they are a legitimate recruit. If yes, they |
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33 move them to an encrypted mobile-messaging app. The spy agencies |
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34 argue that although they can follow the conversations on Twitter, |
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35 they ``go dark'' on the encrypted message app. To counter this |
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36 ``going-dark problem'', the spy agencies push for the implementation |
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37 of back-doors in iMessage and Facebook and Skype and everything else |
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38 UK or US-made, which they can use eavesdrop on conversations without |
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39 the conversants' knowledge or consent.\medskip |
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40 |
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41 What is the fallacy in the spy agencies going-dark argument? |
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42 (Hint: Think what would happen if the spy agencies and certain |
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43 politicians get their wish.) |
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44 |
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45 \item DNA data is very sensitive and can easily violate the privacy of |
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46 (living) people. To get around this, two scientists from Denmark |
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47 proposed to create a \emph{necrogenomic database} which would record |
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48 the DNA data of all Danish citizens and residents at the time of |
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49 their \emph{death}. By matching these to information about illnesses |
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50 and ailments in life, helpful evidence could be gathered about the |
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51 genetic origins of diseases. The idea is that the privacy of dead |
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52 people cannot be violated. |
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53 |
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54 What is the fallacy behind this reasoning? |
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55 |
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56 \item A few years ago a Google executive tried to allay worries about |
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57 Google pooring over all your emails on Gmail. He said something |
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58 along the lines: you are watched by an algorithm; this is like being |
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59 naked in front of your dog. What is wrong with this argument? |
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60 |
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61 \item \POSTSCRIPT |
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62 \end{enumerate} |
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63 \end{document} |
37 \end{document} |
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