slides/slides10.tex
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   491 \end{frame}
   491 \end{frame}
   492 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
   492 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%  
   493 
   493 
   494 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
   494 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
   495 \begin{frame}[c]
   495 \begin{frame}[c]
   496 \frametitle{Access Control Logic}
       
   497 
       
   498 Ross Anderson about the use of Logic:\bigskip
       
   499 
       
   500 \begin{quote}\rm
       
   501 ``Formal methods can be an excellent way of finding 
       
   502 bugs in security protocol designs as they force the designer 
       
   503 to make everything explicit and thus confront difficult design 
       
   504 choices that might otherwise be fudged.'' 
       
   505 \end{quote}
       
   506 
       
   507 \end{frame}
       
   508 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%   
       
   509 
       
   510 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   511   \begin{frame}[t]
       
   512   \frametitle{Access Control Logic}
       
   513   
       
   514   \begin{center}
       
   515   \begin{tabular}[t]{rcl@ {\hspace{10mm}}l}
       
   516    \bl{$F$} & \bl{$::=$} & \bl{$\textit{true}$}\\
       
   517             & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$\textit{false}$}\\
       
   518             & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$a(t_1,\ldots,t_n)$}\\
       
   519             & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$F_1 \wedge F_2$}\\
       
   520             & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$F_1 \vee F_2$}\\
       
   521             & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$F_1 \Rightarrow F_2$}\\
       
   522             & \bl{$|$} & \alert{$P\;\textit{says}\; F$}\\
       
   523   \end{tabular}
       
   524   \end{center}
       
   525   
       
   526   where \bl{$P = Alice, Bob, Christian$} 
       
   527   
       
   528   \begin{itemize}
       
   529   \item \bl{$HoD\;\textit{says}\;\textit{is\_staff}(Christian)$}
       
   530   \end{itemize}
       
   531   \end{frame}
       
   532 
       
   533 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   534   \begin{frame}[t]
       
   535   \frametitle{Access Control Logic}
       
   536 
       
   537 \ldots can be used for answering the following questions:
       
   538 
       
   539 \begin{itemize}
       
   540 \item To what conclusions does this protocol come?
       
   541 \item What assumptions are needed for this protocol?
       
   542 \item Does the protocol uses unnecessary actions, which can be left out?
       
   543 \item Does the protocol encrypt anything which could be sent in plain, without
       
   544 weakening the security?
       
   545 \end{itemize}
       
   546 
       
   547 \end{frame}
       
   548 
       
   549 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
       
   550 \begin{frame}[c]
       
   551 \frametitle{5th Lecture: Protocols}
   496 \frametitle{5th Lecture: Protocols}
   552 
   497 
   553 An article in The Guardian from 2013 reveals how GCHQ and the
   498 An article in The Guardian from 2013 reveals how GCHQ and the
   554 NSA at a G20 Summit in 2009 sniffed emails from Internet
   499 NSA at a G20 Summit in 2009 sniffed emails from Internet
   555 cafes, monitored phone calls from delegates and attempted to
   500 cafes, monitored phone calls from delegates and attempted to