491 \end{frame} |
491 \end{frame} |
492 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
492 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
493 |
493 |
494 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
494 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
495 \begin{frame}[c] |
495 \begin{frame}[c] |
496 \frametitle{Access Control Logic} |
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497 |
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498 Ross Anderson about the use of Logic:\bigskip |
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499 |
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500 \begin{quote}\rm |
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501 ``Formal methods can be an excellent way of finding |
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502 bugs in security protocol designs as they force the designer |
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503 to make everything explicit and thus confront difficult design |
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504 choices that might otherwise be fudged.'' |
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505 \end{quote} |
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506 |
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507 \end{frame} |
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508 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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509 |
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510 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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511 \begin{frame}[t] |
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512 \frametitle{Access Control Logic} |
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513 |
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514 \begin{center} |
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515 \begin{tabular}[t]{rcl@ {\hspace{10mm}}l} |
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516 \bl{$F$} & \bl{$::=$} & \bl{$\textit{true}$}\\ |
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517 & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$\textit{false}$}\\ |
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518 & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$a(t_1,\ldots,t_n)$}\\ |
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519 & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$F_1 \wedge F_2$}\\ |
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520 & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$F_1 \vee F_2$}\\ |
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521 & \bl{$|$} & \bl{$F_1 \Rightarrow F_2$}\\ |
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522 & \bl{$|$} & \alert{$P\;\textit{says}\; F$}\\ |
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523 \end{tabular} |
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524 \end{center} |
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525 |
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526 where \bl{$P = Alice, Bob, Christian$} |
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527 |
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528 \begin{itemize} |
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529 \item \bl{$HoD\;\textit{says}\;\textit{is\_staff}(Christian)$} |
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530 \end{itemize} |
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531 \end{frame} |
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532 |
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533 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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534 \begin{frame}[t] |
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535 \frametitle{Access Control Logic} |
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536 |
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537 \ldots can be used for answering the following questions: |
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538 |
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539 \begin{itemize} |
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540 \item To what conclusions does this protocol come? |
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541 \item What assumptions are needed for this protocol? |
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542 \item Does the protocol uses unnecessary actions, which can be left out? |
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543 \item Does the protocol encrypt anything which could be sent in plain, without |
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544 weakening the security? |
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545 \end{itemize} |
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546 |
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547 \end{frame} |
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548 |
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549 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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550 \begin{frame}[c] |
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551 \frametitle{5th Lecture: Protocols} |
496 \frametitle{5th Lecture: Protocols} |
552 |
497 |
553 An article in The Guardian from 2013 reveals how GCHQ and the |
498 An article in The Guardian from 2013 reveals how GCHQ and the |
554 NSA at a G20 Summit in 2009 sniffed emails from Internet |
499 NSA at a G20 Summit in 2009 sniffed emails from Internet |
555 cafes, monitored phone calls from delegates and attempted to |
500 cafes, monitored phone calls from delegates and attempted to |