36 |
36 |
37 \noindent In this module I like to teach you this security |
37 \noindent In this module I like to teach you this security |
38 mindset. This might be a mindset that you think is very foreign to you |
38 mindset. This might be a mindset that you think is very foreign to you |
39 (after all we are all good citizens and not ahck into things). I beg |
39 (after all we are all good citizens and not ahck into things). I beg |
40 to differ: You have this mindset already when in school you were |
40 to differ: You have this mindset already when in school you were |
41 thinking, at least hypothetically, in which ways you can cheat in an |
41 thinking, at least hypothetically, about in which ways you can cheat in an |
42 exam (whether it is about hiding notes or looking over the shoulders |
42 exam (whether it is about hiding notes or looking over the shoulders |
43 of your fellow pupils). Right? To defend a system, you need to have |
43 of your fellow pupils). Right? To defend a system, you need to have |
44 this kind mindset and be able to think like an attacker. This will |
44 this kind mindset and be able to think like an attacker. This will |
45 include understanding techniques that can be used to compromise |
45 include understanding techniques that can be used to compromise |
46 security and privacy in systems. This will many times result in |
46 security and privacy in systems. This will many times result in |
47 insights where well-intended security mechanism made a system actually |
47 insights where well-intended security mechanisms made a system actually |
48 less secure.\smallskip |
48 less secure.\smallskip |
49 |
49 |
50 {\Large\bf Warning!} However, don’t be evil! Using those |
50 {\Large\bf Warning!} However, don’t be evil! Using those |
51 techniques in the real world may violate the law or King’s |
51 techniques in the real world may violate the law or King’s |
52 rules, and it may be unethical. Under some circumstances, even |
52 rules, and it may be unethical. Under some circumstances, even |
56 responsibility. Ethics requires you to refrain from doing |
56 responsibility. Ethics requires you to refrain from doing |
57 harm. Always respect privacy and rights of others. Do not |
57 harm. Always respect privacy and rights of others. Do not |
58 tamper with any of King's systems. If you try out a technique, |
58 tamper with any of King's systems. If you try out a technique, |
59 always make doubly sure you are working in a safe environment |
59 always make doubly sure you are working in a safe environment |
60 so that you cannot cause any harm, not even accidentally. |
60 so that you cannot cause any harm, not even accidentally. |
61 Don't be evil. Be an ethical hacker. |
61 Don't be evil. Be an ethical hacker.\smallskip |
62 |
62 |
63 |
63 |
64 In this lecture I want to make you familiar with the security |
64 In this lecture I want to make you familiar with the security mindset |
65 mindset and dispel the myth that encryption is the answer to |
65 and dispel the myth that encryption is the answer to all security |
66 security (it certainly is one answer, but by no means a |
66 problems (it is certainly often part of an answer, but almost always |
67 sufficient one). This is actually an important thread going |
67 never a sufficient one). This is actually an important thread going |
68 through the whole course: We will assume that encryption works |
68 through the whole course: We will assume that encryption works |
69 perfectly, but still attack ``things''. By ``works perfectly'' |
69 perfectly, but still attack ``things''. By ``works perfectly'' we mean |
70 we mean that we will assume encryption is a black box and, for |
70 that we will assume encryption is a black box and, for example, will |
71 example, will not look at the underlying |
71 not look at the underlying mathematics and break the |
72 mathematics.\footnote{Though fascinating it might be.} |
72 algorithms.\footnote{Though fascinating it might be.} |
73 |
73 |
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74 For a secure system it seems four requirements need to come together: |
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75 First a security policy (what is supposed to be achieved?); second a |
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76 mechanism (cipher, access controls, tamper resistance etc); third the |
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77 assurance we obtain from the mechanism (the amount of reliance we can |
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78 put on the mechanism) and finally the incentives (the motive that the |
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79 people guarding and maintaining the system have to do their job |
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80 properly, and also the motive that the attackers have to try to defeat |
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81 your policy). The last point is often overlooked, but plays an |
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82 important role. Lets look at an example. The questions is whether |
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83 the Chip-and-PIN system with credit cards is more secure than the older |
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84 method of signing receipts at the till. |
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85 |
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86 |
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87 |
74 \end{document} |
88 \end{document} |
75 |
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