sen-material: comparison slides04.tex

equal deleted inserted replaced

-:1dcd758265f1
+:24d08d7c582f
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[c]
 \frametitle{Unix-Style Access Control}
 \begin{itemize}
-\item Q: ``I am using Windows. Why should I care?'' \\ A: In Windows you have:
+\item Q: ``I am using Windows. Why should I care?'' \\ A: In Windows you have similar groups:
 \begin{center}
 \begin{tabular}{l}
 administrators group\\
 \hspace{5mm}(has complete control over the machine)\\
 power users\\
 network configuration operators\\
 \end{tabular}
 \end{center}\medskip
-\item Modern versions of Windows have more fine-grained AC; they do not have a setuid bit, but
+\item Modern versions of Windows have more fine-grained AC than Unix; they do not have a setuid bit, but
 have \texttt{runas} (asks for a password).\pause
 \item OS provided access control can \alert{add} to your
 security.
 \end{itemize}
 \begin{center}
 \begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]
 \draw[line width=1mm] (-.3, 0) rectangle (1.5,2);
 \draw (4.7,1) node {Internet};
+\draw (-2.7,1.7) node {\footnotesize Application};
 \draw (0.6,1.7) node {\footnotesize Interface};
 \draw (0.6,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}unprivileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}};
 \draw (-2.7,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}privileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}};
 \draw[line width=1mm] (-1.8, 0) rectangle (-3.6,2);
 \end{center}
 \begin{textblock}{11}(10.5,10.5)
 \small
 To take an action you\\[-1mm]
-need either:
+need at least either:
 \begin{itemize}
 \item 1 CEO\\[-5mm]
-\item 2 MDs\\[-5mm]
+\item 2 MDs, or\\[-5mm]
 \item 3 Ds
 \end{itemize}
 \end{textblock}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[c]
 \frametitle{Lessons from Access Control}
+Not just restricted to Unix:
 \begin{itemize}
 \item if you have too many roles (i.e.~too finegrained AC), then
 	hierarchy is too complex\\
 	\textcolor{gray}{you invite situations like\ldots let's be root}\bigskip
 \begin{tikzpicture}
 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm]
 {\normalsize\color{darkgray}
 \begin{minipage}{9cm}\raggedright
 To prevent this kind of attack, you need additional
-policies.
+policies (don't do such operations as root).
 \end{minipage}};
 \end{tikzpicture}
 \end{textblock}}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[c]
 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier Analysis\end{tabular}}
+\textcolor{gray}{There is no absolutely secure system and security almost never comes for free.}
 \begin{itemize}
 \item What assets are you trying to protect?
 \item What are the risks to these assets?
 \item How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?
 \item What other risks does the security solution cause?
 \item What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
 \end{itemize}
-\textcolor{gray}{There is no absolutely secure system and security almost never comes for free.}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[t]
 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Security Seals (2)\end{tabular}}
 \begin{itemize}
-\item at the Argonne National Laboratory they tested 244 different security seals (including 19\%
+\item at the Argonne National Laboratory they tested 244 different security seals
-that were used for safeguard of nuclear material)
+\begin{itemize}
-\begin{itemize}
+\item meantime to break the seals for a trained person: 100 s
-\item mean time to break the seals for a trained person: 100 s
+\item including 19\% that were used for safeguard of nuclear material
 \end{itemize}\bigskip
 \item Andrew Appel defeated all security seals which were supposed to keep
 voting machines safe
 \end{itemize}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[t]
-\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ex: Security Seals\end{tabular}}
+\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Example: Security Seals\end{tabular}}
 \begin{itemize}
 \item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\
 \only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Voting machines, doors.\end{tabular}}
 \item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\
 \item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
 \only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
 Not really. The source code can be reverse engineered, stolen\ldots{}\end{tabular}}
 \item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
 \only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright You prevent
-scrutiny and independent advice. You also more likely than not,
+scrutiny and independent advice. You also more likely than not
 get it wrong.\end{tabular}}
 \item<5>[]{\bf\large No!}
 \end{itemize}
 \end{textblock}}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \begin{frame}[t]
 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ballot Boxes\end{tabular}}
 \begin{frame}[t]
 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}}
 \begin{itemize}
-\item The Netherlands, between 1997 - 2006 had electronic voting machines\\
+\item The Netherlands between 1997 - 2006 had electronic voting machines\\
-\textcolor{gray}{(it has been found that they could be hacked and emitted radio signals)}
+\textcolor{gray}{(hacktivists had found that they could be hacked and emitted radio signals revealing how you voted)}
-\item Germany, had been used in pilot studies\\
+\item Germany had used them in pilot studies\\
 \textcolor{gray}{(in 2007 a law suit has reached the highest court and it rejected electronic voting
 on the grounds of not being understandable by the general public)}
-\item UK, used optical scan voting systems in a few polls
+\item UK used optical scan voting systems in a few polls
 \end{itemize}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \begin{frame}[t]
 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}}
 \mbox{}\\[-12mm]
 \begin{itemize}
-\item US, used mechanical machines since the 50s, later punch cards, DREs and
+\item US used mechanical machines since the 50s, later punch cards, now DREs and
-optical scan voting machines \textcolor{gray}{(fantastic ``ecosystem'' for research)}
+optical scan voting machines \textcolor{gray}{(fantastic ``ecosystem'' for study)}
 \item Estonia used in 2007 the world's first Internet vote in national elections (there are earlier pilot studies)
-\item India, the biggest democracy uses e-voting devices  since at least 2003\\
+\item India uses e-voting devices  since at least 2003\\
-\textcolor{gray}{(keep-it-simple machines produced by a government owned company)}
+\textcolor{gray}{(``keep-it-simple'' machines produced by a government owned company)}
-\item South Africa used software for its tallying in the 1993 elections (Nelson Mandela)
+\item South Africa used software for its tallying in the 1993 elections (when Nelson Mandela was elected)
-\textcolor{gray}{(they found the software was rigged, but they were able to manually tally)}
+\textcolor{gray}{(they found the tallying software was rigged, but they were able to tally manually)}
 \end{itemize}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \item Athenians
 \begin{itemize}
 \item show of hands
 \item ballots on pieces of pottery
 \item different colours of stones
-\item ``facebook''-like autorisation
+\item ``facebook''-like authorisation
 \end{itemize}\bigskip
+\textcolor{gray}{problems with vote buying / no ballot privacy}\bigskip
 \item French Revolution and the US Constitution got things ``started'' with
 paper ballots (you first had to bring your own, or later were pre-printed by the parties)
 \end{itemize}
+\end{frame}}
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+\mode<presentation>{
+\begin{frame}[t]
+\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ballot Boxes\end{tabular}}
+Security policies involved with paper ballots:
+\begin{enumerate}
+\item you need to check that the ballot box is empty at the start of the poll / no false bottom (ballot stuffing)
+\item you need guard the ballot box during the poll
+\item tallied by a team at the end of the poll (you can have observers)
+\end{enumerate}
+\begin{center}
+\includegraphics[scale=1.5]{pics/ballotbox.jpg}
+\end{center}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \includegraphics[scale=0.46]{pics/punchcard2.jpg}
 \end{center}
 }
 \end{itemize}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 \mode<presentation>{
 \includegraphics[scale=0.40]{pics/dre2.jpg}\\\hline\\
 \includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/opticalscan.jpg}
 \end{tabular}
 \end{center}
+\only<1->{
+\begin{textblock}{5.5}(1,4)
+DREs
+\end{textblock}}
+\only<1->{
+\begin{textblock}{5.5}(1,11)
+Optical Scan
+\end{textblock}}
+\only<2>{
+\begin{textblock}{5.5}(0.5,14.5)
+all are computers
+\end{textblock}}
+\end{frame}}
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+\mode<presentation>{
+\begin{frame}[c]
+\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}DREs\end{tabular}}
+Direct-recording electronic voting machines\\
+(votes are recorded for example memory cards)
+typically touchscreen machines
+usually no papertrail (hard to add: ballot secrecy)
+\begin{center}
+\includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/dre1.jpg}
+\end{center}
+\end{frame}}
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+\mode<presentation>{
+\begin{frame}[c]
+\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Diebold Machines\end{tabular}}
+The work by J.~Alex Halderman:
+\begin{itemize}
+\item acquired a machine from an anonymous source\medskip
+\item the source code running the machine was tried to keep secret\medskip\pause
+\item first reversed-engineered the machine (extremely tedious)
+\item could completely reboot the machine and even install a virus that infects other Diebold machines
+\item obtained also the source code for other machines
+\end{itemize}
+\end{frame}}
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
+\mode<presentation>{
+\begin{frame}[c]
+\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Diebold Machines\end{tabular}}
+The work by J.~Alex Halderman:
+\begin{itemize}
+\item acquired a machine from an anonymous source\medskip
+\item the source code running the machine was tried to keep secret\medskip\pause
+\item first reversed-engineered the machine (extremely tedious)
+\item could completely reboot the machine and even install a virus that infects other Diebold machines
+\item obtained also the source code for other machines
+\end{itemize}
 \end{frame}}
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

changeset 45	24d08d7c582f
parent 44	1dcd758265f1
child 46	5b772ec2ec39