238 |
238 |
239 \begin{itemize} |
239 \begin{itemize} |
240 \item Apple takes note of every dictation (send over the Internet to Apple) |
240 \item Apple takes note of every dictation (send over the Internet to Apple) |
241 \item markets often only work, if data is restricted (to build trust) |
241 \item markets often only work, if data is restricted (to build trust) |
242 \item Social network can reveal data about you |
242 \item Social network can reveal data about you |
243 \item have you tried the collusion extension for FireFox? |
243 \item have you tried the collusion (lightbeam?) extension for FireFox? |
244 \item I do use Dropbox, store cards |
244 \item I do use Dropbox, store cards |
245 \end{itemize} |
245 \end{itemize} |
246 |
246 |
247 \begin{textblock}{5}(12,9.9) |
247 \begin{textblock}{5}(12,9.9) |
248 \includegraphics[scale=0.2]{pics/gattaca.jpg}\\ |
248 \includegraphics[scale=0.2]{pics/gattaca.jpg}\\ |
455 to identify whether an individual was part of the study --- DB closed in 2008) |
455 to identify whether an individual was part of the study --- DB closed in 2008) |
456 \end{itemize}} |
456 \end{itemize}} |
457 |
457 |
458 \end{frame}} |
458 \end{frame}} |
459 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
459 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
460 |
|
461 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
462 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
463 \begin{frame}<2>[c] |
|
464 \frametitle{We cannot exclude all Harm} |
|
465 |
|
466 \begin{itemize} |
|
467 \item Analysis of a given data set teaches us that smoking causes cancer. |
|
468 Mary, a smoker, is harmed by this analysis: her insurance premiums rise. |
|
469 Mary’s premiums rise whether or not her data are in the data set. In other words, |
|
470 Mary is harmed by the finding “smoking causes cancer.\bigskip |
|
471 |
|
472 \item \ldots of course she is also helped, she might quit smoking |
|
473 \end{itemize} |
|
474 |
|
475 \end{frame}} |
|
476 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
460 |
477 |
461 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
478 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
462 \mode<presentation>{ |
479 \mode<presentation>{ |
463 \begin{frame}<2>[c] |
480 \begin{frame}<2>[c] |
464 \frametitle{Differential Privacy} |
481 \frametitle{Differential Privacy} |
465 |
482 |
466 \begin{itemize} |
483 \begin{itemize} |
467 \item Goal: Nothing about an individual should be learnable from the database that |
484 \item Goal: Nothing about an individual should be learnable from the database that |
468 cannot be learned without access to the database.\pause\bigskip |
485 cannot be learned without access to the database.\pause\bigskip |
469 |
486 |
470 \item Differential privacy is a protocol which you run on some dataset \bl{$X$} producing |
487 \item Differential privacy is a ``protocol'' which you run on some dataset \bl{$X$} producing |
471 some output \bl{$O(X)$}. |
488 some output \bl{$O(X)$}.\bigskip |
|
489 |
|
490 \item You want to achieve \alert{forward privacy} |
472 \end{itemize} |
491 \end{itemize} |
473 |
492 |
474 \end{frame}} |
493 \end{frame}} |
475 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
494 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
476 |
495 |
559 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
578 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
560 |
579 |
561 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
580 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
562 \mode<presentation>{ |
581 \mode<presentation>{ |
563 \begin{frame}[t] |
582 \begin{frame}[t] |
564 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@{}c@{}}Tor\end{tabular}} |
583 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@{}c@{}}Tor (private web browsing)\end{tabular}} |
565 |
584 |
566 \begin{itemize} |
585 \begin{itemize} |
567 \item initially developed by US Navy Labs, but then opened up to the world |
586 \item initially developed by US Navy Labs, but then opened up to the world |
568 \item network of proxy nodes |
587 \item network of proxy nodes |
569 \item a Tor client establishes a ``random'' path to the destination server (you cannot trace back where the information came from)\bigskip\pause |
588 \item a Tor client establishes a ``random'' path to the destination server (you cannot trace back where the information came from)\bigskip\pause |
586 \end{itemize}} |
605 \end{itemize}} |
587 |
606 |
588 |
607 |
589 \end{frame}} |
608 \end{frame}} |
590 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
609 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
610 |
|
611 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
612 \mode<presentation>{ |
|
613 \begin{frame}[c] |
|
614 \frametitle{Tor Nodes} |
|
615 |
|
616 Dan Egerstad wrote:\bigskip |
|
617 |
|
618 \it ``If you actually look in to where these Tor nodes are hosted and how big they are, some of these nodes cost thousands of dollars each month just to host because they're using lots of bandwidth, they're heavy-duty servers and so on. Who would pay for this and be anonymous?" |
|
619 |
|
620 |
|
621 \end{frame}} |
|
622 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
|
623 |
|
624 |
|
625 |
|
626 |
591 |
627 |
592 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
628 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
593 \mode<presentation>{ |
629 \mode<presentation>{ |
594 \begin{frame}[t] |
630 \begin{frame}[t] |
595 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@{}c@{}}Skype\end{tabular}} |
631 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@{}c@{}}Skype\end{tabular}} |
615 \begin{frame}[c] |
651 \begin{frame}[c] |
616 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@{}c@{}}Take Home Point\end{tabular}} |
652 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@{}c@{}}Take Home Point\end{tabular}} |
617 |
653 |
618 According to Ross Anderson: \bigskip |
654 According to Ross Anderson: \bigskip |
619 \begin{itemize} |
655 \begin{itemize} |
|
656 \item Creating large databases of sensitive personal information is intrinsically |
|
657 hazardous (NHS)\bigskip |
|
658 |
|
659 |
620 \item Privacy in a big hospital is just about doable.\medskip |
660 \item Privacy in a big hospital is just about doable.\medskip |
621 \item How do you enforce privacy in something as big as Google |
661 \item How do you enforce privacy in something as big as Google |
622 or complex as Facebook? No body knows.\bigskip |
662 or complex as Facebook? No body knows.\bigskip |
623 |
663 |
624 Similarly, big databases imposed by government |
664 Similarly, big databases imposed by government |