74 |
74 |
75 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
75 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
76 \begin{frame}[c] |
76 \begin{frame}[c] |
77 \frametitle{Defence in Depth} |
77 \frametitle{Defence in Depth} |
78 |
78 |
79 \bgein{center} |
79 \begin{center}\small |
80 \pcode{urbanc:$6$3WWbKfr1$4vblknvGr6FcDeF92R5xFn3mskfdnEn...:...} |
80 \pcode{urbanc:$6$3WWbKfr1$4vblknvGr6FcDeF92R5xFn3mskfdnEn...:...} |
81 \end{center} |
81 \end{center} |
82 |
82 |
83 \begin{itemize} |
83 \begin{itemize} |
84 \item hashes help when password databases are leaked |
84 \item hashes help when password databases are leaked |
85 \item salts help with protecting against dictionary attacks |
85 \item salts help with protecting against dictionary attacks |
86 |
86 and help people who have the same password on different sites\medskip |
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87 |
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88 \item but they do not protect against a focused attack against a single |
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89 password and also do not make poorly chosen passwords any better |
87 \end{itemize} |
90 \end{itemize} |
88 |
91 |
89 \end{frame} |
92 \end{frame} |
90 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
93 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
91 |
94 |
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95 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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96 \begin{frame}[c] |
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97 \frametitle{Subtle Points} |
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98 |
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99 \begin{itemize} |
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100 \item in our web-application the salt needed to remain secret; |
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101 in password files the salt is public\bigskip |
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102 |
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103 \item the NYT has the ``resource'' unlocked at first |
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104 and locks it depending on the cookie data |
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105 \item our ``web-application'' has the resource locked at first, |
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106 and unlocks it depending on the cookie data |
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107 |
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108 \end{itemize} |
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109 |
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110 \end{frame} |
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111 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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112 |
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113 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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114 \begin{frame}[t] |
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115 \frametitle{How to Salt?} |
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116 |
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117 \begin{center}\tt\small |
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118 \begin{tabular}{lcl} |
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119 1salt & $\Rightarrow$ & 8189effef4d4f7411f4153b13ff72546dd682c69\\ |
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120 2salt & $\Rightarrow$ & 1528375d5ceb7d71597053e6877cc570067a738f\\ |
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121 3salt & $\Rightarrow$ & d646e213d4f87e3971d9dd6d9f435840eb6a1c06\\ |
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122 4salt & $\Rightarrow$ & 5b9e85269e4461de0238a6bf463ed3f25778cbba\\ |
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123 \end{tabular} |
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124 \end{center} |
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125 |
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126 \begin{itemize} |
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127 \item in Unix systems: \texttt{hash(salt + password)}, or even |
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128 \texttt{hash$^{\texttt{1500}}$(salt + password)} |
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129 |
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130 \end{itemize} |
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131 \end{frame} |
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132 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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133 |
92 |
134 |
93 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
135 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
94 \begin{frame}[c] |
136 \begin{frame}[c] |
95 \frametitle{Today's Lecture} |
137 \frametitle{Today's Lecture} |
96 \begin{center} |
138 \begin{center} |
97 \begin{tabular}{cc} |
139 \begin{tabular}{ccc} |
98 \large online banking & \hspace{6mm}\large e-voting\\ |
140 \large online banking & \hspace{3mm}\large{}vs\hspace{3mm} & \large e-voting\\ |
99 \textcolor{gray}{solved} & \hspace{6mm}\textcolor{gray}{unsolved}\\ |
141 \textcolor{gray}{solved} & & \textcolor{gray}{unsolved}\\ |
100 \end{tabular} |
142 \end{tabular} |
101 \end{center} |
143 \end{center} |
102 |
144 |
103 \end{frame} |
145 \end{frame} |
104 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
146 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
119 \item<7->Availability |
161 \item<7->Availability |
120 \end{itemize} |
162 \end{itemize} |
121 |
163 |
122 \only<2>{ |
164 \only<2>{ |
123 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
165 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
124 \begin{tikzpicture} |
166 \begin{bubble}[5cm]\small |
125 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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126 {\small |
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127 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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128 \begin{center} |
167 \begin{center} |
129 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
168 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
130 \begin{itemize} |
169 \begin{itemize} |
131 \item The outcome matches with the voters' intend. |
170 \item The outcome matches with the voters' intend. |
132 \item There might be gigantic sums at stake and need to be defended against. |
171 \item There might be gigantic sums at stake and need to be defended against. |
133 \end{itemize} |
172 \end{itemize} |
134 \end{minipage} |
173 \end{minipage} |
135 \end{center} |
174 \end{center} |
136 \end{minipage}}; |
175 \end{bubble} |
137 \end{tikzpicture} |
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138 \end{textblock}} |
176 \end{textblock}} |
139 |
177 |
140 \only<4>{ |
178 \only<4>{ |
141 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
179 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
142 \begin{tikzpicture} |
180 \begin{bubble}[5cm]\small |
143 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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144 {\small |
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145 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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146 \begin{center} |
181 \begin{center} |
147 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
182 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
148 \begin{itemize} |
183 \begin{itemize} |
149 \item Nobody can find out how you voted. |
184 \item Nobody can find out how you voted. |
150 \item (Stronger) Even if you try, you cannot prove how you voted. |
185 \item (Stronger) Even if you try, you cannot prove how you voted. |
151 \end{itemize} |
186 \end{itemize} |
152 \end{minipage} |
187 \end{minipage} |
153 \end{center} |
188 \end{center} |
154 \end{minipage}}; |
189 \end{bubble} |
155 \end{tikzpicture} |
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156 \end{textblock}} |
190 \end{textblock}} |
157 |
191 |
158 \only<5>{ |
192 \only<5>{ |
159 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
193 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
160 \begin{tikzpicture} |
194 \begin{bubble}[5cm]\small |
161 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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162 {\small |
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163 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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164 \begin{center} |
195 \begin{center} |
165 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
196 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
166 \begin{itemize} |
197 \begin{itemize} |
167 \item Only authorised voters can vote up to the permitted number of votes. |
198 \item Only authorised voters can vote up to the permitted number of votes. |
168 \end{itemize} |
199 \end{itemize} |
169 \end{minipage} |
200 \end{minipage} |
170 \end{center} |
201 \end{center} |
171 \end{minipage}}; |
202 \end{bubble} |
172 \end{tikzpicture} |
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173 \end{textblock}} |
203 \end{textblock}} |
174 |
204 |
175 \only<6>{ |
205 \only<6>{ |
176 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
206 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
177 \begin{tikzpicture} |
207 \begin{bubble}[5cm]\small |
178 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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179 {\small |
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180 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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181 \begin{center} |
208 \begin{center} |
182 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
209 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
183 \begin{itemize} |
210 \begin{itemize} |
184 \item Authorised voters should have the opportunity to vote. |
211 \item Authorised voters should have the opportunity to vote. |
185 \end{itemize} |
212 \end{itemize} |
186 \end{minipage} |
213 \end{minipage} |
187 \end{center} |
214 \end{center} |
188 \end{minipage}}; |
215 \end{bubble} |
189 \end{tikzpicture} |
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190 \end{textblock}} |
216 \end{textblock}} |
191 |
217 |
192 \only<7>{ |
218 \only<7>{ |
193 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
219 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5) |
194 \begin{tikzpicture} |
220 \begin{bubble}[5cm]\small |
195 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered] |
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196 {\small |
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197 \begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright |
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198 \begin{center} |
221 \begin{center} |
199 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
222 \begin{minipage}{4.5cm} |
200 \begin{itemize} |
223 \begin{itemize} |
201 \item The voting system should accept all authorised votes and produce results in a timely manner. |
224 \item The voting system should accept all authorised votes and produce results in a timely manner. |
202 \end{itemize} |
225 \end{itemize} |
203 \end{minipage} |
226 \end{minipage} |
204 \end{center} |
227 \end{center} |
205 \end{minipage}}; |
228 \end{bubble} |
206 \end{tikzpicture} |
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207 \end{textblock}} |
229 \end{textblock}} |
208 |
230 |
209 \end{frame}} |
231 \end{frame}} |
210 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
232 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
211 |
233 |
212 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
234 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
213 \mode<presentation>{ |
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214 \begin{frame}[t] |
235 \begin{frame}[t] |
215 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Problems with Voting\end{tabular}} |
236 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Problems with Voting\end{tabular}} |
216 |
237 |
217 |
238 |
218 \begin{center}\large |
239 \begin{center}\large |
228 \item costs |
249 \item costs |
229 \item accessibility |
250 \item accessibility |
230 \item convenience |
251 \item convenience |
231 \item intelligibility |
252 \item intelligibility |
232 \end{itemize} |
253 \end{itemize} |
233 \end{frame}} |
254 \end{frame} |
234 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
255 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
235 |
256 |
236 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
257 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
237 \mode<presentation>{ |
258 \begin{frame}[t] |
238 \begin{frame}[t] |
259 \frametitle{Traditional Ballot Boxes} |
239 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Traditional Ballot Boxes\end{tabular}} |
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240 |
|
241 |
260 |
242 \begin{center} |
261 \begin{center} |
243 \includegraphics[scale=2.5]{pics/ballotbox.jpg} |
262 \includegraphics[scale=2.5]{pics/ballotbox.jpg} |
244 \end{center}\pause\bigskip |
263 \end{center}\pause\bigskip |
245 |
264 |
246 they need a ``protocol'' |
265 mechanical, but they need a ``protocol'' |
247 |
266 |
248 |
267 \end{frame} |
249 \end{frame}} |
268 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
250 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
269 |
251 |
270 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
252 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
271 \begin{frame} |
253 \mode<presentation>{ |
272 \frametitle{Motives for E-Voting} |
254 \begin{frame}[t] |
273 |
255 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}} |
274 \begin{itemize} |
256 |
275 \item 76\% of pensioners in the UK vote, but only 44\% of the under-25s\bigskip |
257 |
276 \item convenience\bigskip |
258 \begin{itemize} |
277 \item speed |
259 \item The Netherlands between 1997 - 2006 had electronic voting machines\\ |
278 \end{itemize} |
260 \textcolor{gray}{(hacktivists had found: they can be hacked and also emitted radio signals revealing how you voted)} |
279 |
261 |
280 \end{frame} |
262 \item Germany had used them in pilot studies\\ |
281 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
263 \textcolor{gray}{(in 2007 a law suit has reached the highest court and it rejected electronic voting |
282 |
264 on the grounds of not being understandable by the general public)} |
283 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
265 |
284 \begin{frame}[t] |
266 \item UK used optical scan voting systems in a few polls |
285 \frametitle{E-Voting} |
267 \end{itemize} |
286 |
268 \end{frame}} |
287 \begin{itemize} |
269 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
288 \item The Netherlands between 1997 - 2006 had electronic voting |
270 |
289 machines\\ \textcolor{gray}{(hacktivists had found: they can be |
271 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
290 hacked and also emitted radio signals revealing how you voted)} |
272 \mode<presentation>{ |
291 |
273 \begin{frame}[t] |
292 \item Germany had used them in pilot studies\\ \textcolor{gray}{(in |
274 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}} |
293 2007 a law suit has reached the highest court and it rejected |
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294 electronic voting on the grounds of not being understandable by the |
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295 general public)} |
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296 |
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297 \item UK used optical scan voting systems in a few test polls, but |
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298 abandoned any wide deployment |
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299 \end{itemize} |
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300 \end{frame} |
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301 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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302 |
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303 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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304 \begin{frame}[t] |
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305 \frametitle{E-Voting} |
275 |
306 |
276 \mbox{}\\[-12mm] |
307 \mbox{}\\[-12mm] |
277 \begin{itemize} |
308 \begin{itemize} |
278 \item US used mechanical machines since the 30s, later punch cards, now DREs and |
309 \item US used mechanical machines since the 30s, later punch cards, |
279 optical scan voting machines |
310 now DREs and optical scan voting machines |
280 |
311 |
281 \item Estonia used in 2007 the Internet for national elections |
312 \item Estonia used in 2007 the Internet for national elections |
282 \textcolor{gray}{(there were earlier pilot studies in other countries)} |
313 \textcolor{gray}{(there were earlier pilot studies in other |
283 |
314 countries)} |
284 \item India uses e-voting devices since at least 2003\\ |
315 |
285 \textcolor{gray}{(``keep-it-simple'' machines produced by a government owned company)} |
316 \item India uses e-voting devices since at least |
286 |
317 2003\\ \textcolor{gray}{(``keep-it-simple'' machines produced by a |
287 \item South Africa used software for its tallying in the 1993 elections (when Nelson Mandela was elected) |
318 government owned company)} |
288 \textcolor{gray}{(they found the tallying software was rigged, but they were able to tally manually)} |
319 |
289 \end{itemize} |
320 \item South Africa used software for its tallying in the 1993 |
290 \end{frame}} |
321 elections (when Nelson Mandela was elected) \textcolor{gray}{(they |
291 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
322 found the tallying software was rigged, but they were able to |
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323 tally manually)} |
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324 \end{itemize} |
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325 \end{frame} |
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326 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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327 |
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328 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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329 \begin{frame}[t] |
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330 \frametitle{E-Voting in Estonia} |
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331 |
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332 \begin{itemize} |
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333 \item worlds first general election that used internet voting (2007) |
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334 \item builds on the Estonian ID card (a smartcard like CC) |
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335 \item Internet voting can be used before the election (votes can be changed an |
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336 unlimited amount of times, last vote is tabulated, you can even change your |
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337 vote on the polling day in person) |
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338 \item in the 2011 parliamentary election 24\% voted via Internet\bigskip\pause |
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339 |
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340 \item needs to trust the integrity of voters' computers, |
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341 central server components and the election staff |
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342 \end{itemize} |
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343 |
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344 \end{frame} |
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345 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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346 |
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347 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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348 \begin{frame}[t] |
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349 |
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350 \footnotesize |
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351 \lstinputlisting[language=Python,xleftmargin=0mm]{../progs/estonia.py} |
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352 |
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353 \begin{textblock}{5.5}(7.8,0.5) |
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354 \begin{bubble}[5cm]\small |
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355 from \url{https://github.com/vvk-ehk/evalimine/} |
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356 \end{bubble} |
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357 \end{textblock} |
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358 |
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359 \end{frame} |
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360 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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361 |
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362 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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363 \begin{frame}[t] |
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364 E-Voting in \textbf{Theory} |
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365 \small |
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366 \begin{itemize} |
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367 \item Alice prepares and audits a ballot, then casts an encrypted |
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368 ballot, which requires her to authenticate to a server. |
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369 |
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370 \item A bulletin board posts Alice's name and encrypted ballot. |
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371 Anyone, including Alice, can check the bulletin board and find her |
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372 encrypted vote posted. |
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373 |
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374 \item When the election closes, all votes are shuffled and the system produces |
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375 a non-interactive proof of a correct shuffling. (zero-knowledge-proofs) |
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376 |
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377 \item After a reasonable complaint period to let auditors check the |
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378 shuffling, all shuffled ballots are decrypted, and the system provides |
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379 a decryption proof for each decrypted ballot. (zero-knowledge-proofs) |
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380 |
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381 \item Perform a tally of the decrypted votes. |
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382 |
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383 \item An auditor can download the entire election data and verify the |
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384 shuffle, decryptions and tally. |
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385 \end{itemize} |
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386 |
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387 \end{frame} |
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388 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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389 |
292 |
390 |
293 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
391 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
294 \mode<presentation>{ |
392 \mode<presentation>{ |
295 \begin{frame}[t] |
393 \begin{frame}[t] |
296 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}A Brief History of Voting\end{tabular}} |
394 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}A Brief History of Voting\end{tabular}} |
540 \end{frame}} |
633 \end{frame}} |
541 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
634 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
542 |
635 |
543 |
636 |
544 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
637 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
545 \mode<presentation>{ |
638 \begin{frame}[c] |
546 \begin{frame}<1-3>[c] |
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547 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Lessons Learned\end{tabular}} |
639 \frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Lessons Learned\end{tabular}} |
548 |
640 |
549 \begin{itemize} |
641 \begin{itemize} |
550 \item keep a paper trail and design your system to keep this secure\medskip |
642 \item keep a paper trail and design your system to keep this secure\medskip |
551 \item make the software open source (avoid security-by-obscurity)\\ |
643 \item make the software open source (avoid security-by-obscurity)\medskip |
552 {\small\mbox{}\hfill source code for Estonian e-vote included\\ |
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553 \mbox{}\hfill\textcolor{blue}{\url{http://goo.gl/oRMHAI}}}\medskip |
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554 \item have a simple design in order to minimise the attack surface |
644 \item have a simple design in order to minimise the attack surface |
555 \end{itemize} |
645 \end{itemize}\pause |
556 |
646 |
557 \only<2>{ |
647 But overall in times of NSA/state sponsered cyber-crime, e-voting is too |
558 \begin{textblock}{9}(3.4,7) |
648 hard with current technology. |
559 \begin{tikzpicture} |
649 |
560 \draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm] |
650 \end{frame} |
561 {\normalsize\color{darkgray} |
651 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
562 \begin{minipage}{9cm}\consolas\small |
652 |
563 def analyze(ik, vote, votebox):\\ |
653 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
564 \\ |
654 \begin{frame}[c] |
565 \# TODO: implement security checks\\ |
655 \frametitle{\Large Online Banking vs.~E-Voting} |
566 \# such as verifying the correct size\\ |
656 |
567 \# of the encrypted vote\\ |
657 \begin{itemize} |
568 \\ |
658 \item online banking: if fraud occurred you try to identify who did |
569 return [] |
659 what (somebody's account got zero)\bigskip |
570 \end{minipage}}; |
660 \item e-voting: some parts can be done electronically, but not the |
571 \end{tikzpicture} |
661 actual voting |
572 \end{textblock}} |
662 \end{itemize} |
573 |
663 |
574 \end{frame}} |
664 \end{frame} |
575 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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576 |
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577 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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578 \mode<presentation>{ |
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579 \begin{frame}[c] |
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580 \frametitle{Online Banking vs.~E-Voting} |
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581 |
|
582 \begin{itemize} |
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583 \item online banking: if fraud occurred you try to identify who did what (somebody's account got zero)\bigskip |
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584 \item e-voting: some parts can be done electronically, but not the actual voting (final year project: online voting) |
|
585 \end{itemize} |
|
586 |
|
587 |
|
588 \end{frame}} |
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589 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
665 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
590 |
666 |
591 |
667 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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668 \begin{frame}[c] |
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669 \frametitle{Student In-Lecture Polling} |
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670 |
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671 \begin{center} |
|
672 \includegraphics[scale=0.3]{pics/clicker.png} |
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673 \end{center} |
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674 |
|
675 \begin{itemize} |
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676 \item guaranties anonymity |
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677 \item integrity by electronic means\bigskip |
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678 |
|
679 \item how to achieve the same in ``software''? |
|
680 \end{itemize} |
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681 |
|
682 |
|
683 \end{frame} |
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684 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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685 |
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686 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
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687 \begin{frame}[c] |
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688 \frametitle{Anonymity} |
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689 |
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690 \begin{itemize} |
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691 \item anonymity through one-time pads |
|
692 \begin{center} |
|
693 \includegraphics[scale=0.3]{pics/tan.jpg} |
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694 \end{center}\bigskip\pause |
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695 |
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696 \item solving the problem of distribution |
|
697 \begin{center} |
|
698 \includegraphics[scale=0.3]{pics/bulletin.jpg} |
|
699 \end{center} |
|
700 |
|
701 \end{itemize} |
|
702 |
|
703 \end{frame} |
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704 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
592 |
705 |
593 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
706 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% |
594 \mode<presentation>{ |
707 \mode<presentation>{ |
595 \begin{frame}[c] |
708 \begin{frame}[c] |
596 |
709 |