769 \item $T \to C$: $N, G'$ |
769 \item $T \to C$: $N, G'$ |
770 \item $C$ checks that $G = G'$ |
770 \item $C$ checks that $G = G'$ |
771 \end{enumerate} |
771 \end{enumerate} |
772 |
772 |
773 \noindent The assumption is that the key $K$ is only known to |
773 \noindent The assumption is that the key $K$ is only known to |
774 the car and the transponder. Again, I leave it to you to find |
774 the car and the transponder. The claim is that $C$ and $T$ can |
|
775 authenticate to each other. Again, I leave it to you to find |
775 out the magic why this protocol is immune from |
776 out the magic why this protocol is immune from |
776 person-in-the-middle attacks. |
777 person-in-the-middle attacks. |
777 |
778 |
778 |
779 |
779 \subsubsection*{Further Reading} |
780 \subsubsection*{Further Reading} |
780 |
781 |
781 {\small |
782 If you want to know more about how cars can be hijacked, |
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783 the paper |
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784 |
|
785 \begin{center} |
782 \url{http://www.cs.ru.nl/~rverdult/Gone_in_360_Seconds_Hijacking_with_Hitag2-USENIX_2012.pdf}} |
786 \url{http://www.cs.ru.nl/~rverdult/Gone_in_360_Seconds_Hijacking_with_Hitag2-USENIX_2012.pdf}} |
|
787 \end{center} |
|
788 |
|
789 \noindent is quite amusing to read. Obviously an even more |
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790 amusing paper would be ``Dismantling Megamos Crypto: |
|
791 Wirelessly Lockpicking a Vehicle Immobilizer'' but because |
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792 of the court injuction by VW we are denied this entertainment. |
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793 |
|
794 Person-in-the-middle-attacks in the ``wild'' are described |
|
795 with real data in the blog post |
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796 |
|
797 \begin{center} |
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798 \url{http://www.renesys.com/2013/11/mitm-internet-hijacking} |
|
799 \end{center} |
|
800 |
|
801 \noindent The conclusion in this post is that person-in-the-middle-attacks |
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802 can be launched from any place on Earth---it is not required |
|
803 to sit in the ``middle'' of the communication of two people. |
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804 You just have to route their traffic through a node you own. |
783 |
805 |
784 \end{document} |
806 \end{document} |
785 |
807 |
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