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\documentclass[dvipsnames,14pt,t]{beamer}
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% beamer stuff
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\renewcommand{\slidecaption}{APP 04, King's College London, 16 October 2012}
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\begin{document}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}<1>[t]
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\frametitle{%
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\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}
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\\
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\LARGE Access Control and \\[-3mm]
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\LARGE Privacy Policies (4)\\[-6mm]
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\end{tabular}}\bigskip\bigskip\bigskip
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%\begin{center}
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%\includegraphics[scale=1.3]{pics/barrier.jpg}
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%\end{center}
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\normalsize
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\begin{center}
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\begin{tabular}{ll}
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Email: & christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk\\
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Of$\!$fice: & S1.27 (1st floor Strand Building)\\
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Slides: & KEATS (also homework is there)\\
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\end{tabular}
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\end{center}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[c]
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\frametitle{Unix-Style Access Control}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item Q: ``I am using Windows. Why should I care?'' \\ A: In Windows you have similar groups:
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\begin{center}
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\begin{tabular}{l}
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administrators group\\
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\hspace{5mm}(has complete control over the machine)\\
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authenticated users\\
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server operators\\
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power users\\
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network configuration operators\\
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\end{tabular}
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\end{center}\medskip
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\item Modern versions of Windows have more fine-grained AC than Unix; they do not have a setuid bit, but
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have \texttt{runas} (asks for a password).\pause
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\item OS provided access control can \alert{add} to your
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security.
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[c]
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\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{c}Network Applications:\\[-1mm] Privilege Separation\end{tabular}}
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\begin{center}
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\begin{tikzpicture}[scale=1]
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\draw[line width=1mm] (-.3, 0) rectangle (1.5,2);
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\draw (4.7,1) node {Internet};
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\draw (-2.7,1.7) node {\footnotesize Application};
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\draw (0.6,1.7) node {\footnotesize Interface};
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\draw (0.6,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}unprivileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}};
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\draw (-2.7,-0.4) node {\footnotesize \begin{tabular}{c}privileged\\[-1mm] process\end{tabular}};
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\draw[line width=1mm] (-1.8, 0) rectangle (-3.6,2);
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\draw[white] (1.7,1) node (X) {};
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\draw[white] (3.7,1) node (Y) {};
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\draw[red, <->, line width = 2mm] (X) -- (Y);
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\draw[red, <->, line width = 1mm] (-0.6,1) -- (-1.6,1);
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\end{tikzpicture}
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\end{center}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item the idea is make the attack surface smaller and
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mitigate the consequences of an attack
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[c]
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\frametitle{Shared Access Control}
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\begin{center}
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\includegraphics[scale=0.7]{pics/pointsplane.jpg}
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\end{center}
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\begin{textblock}{11}(10.5,10.5)
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\small
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To take an action you\\[-1mm]
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need at least either:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item 1 CEO\\[-5mm]
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\item 2 MDs, or\\[-5mm]
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\item 3 Ds
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\end{itemize}
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\end{textblock}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[c]
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\frametitle{Lessons from Access Control}
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Not just restricted to Unix:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item if you have too many roles (i.e.~too finegrained AC), then
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hierarchy is too complex\\
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\textcolor{gray}{you invite situations like\ldots let's be root}\bigskip
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\item you can still abuse the system\ldots
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[c]
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\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}A ``Cron''-Attack\end{tabular}}
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The idea is to trick a privileged person to do something on your behalf:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item root:\\\texttt{rm /tmp/*/*}\bigskip\bigskip\pause
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\footnotesize
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\begin{minipage}{1.1\textwidth}
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\textcolor{gray}{the shell behind the scenes:}\\
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\textcolor{gray}{\texttt{rm /tmp/dir$_1$/file$_1$ /tmp/dir$_1$/file$_2$ /tmp/dir$_2$/file$_1$ \ldots}}\bigskip\\
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\textcolor{gray}{this takes time}
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\end{minipage}
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[c]
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\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}A ``Cron''-Attack\end{tabular}}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item attacker \textcolor{gray}{(creates a fake passwd file)}\\
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\texttt{mkdir /tmp/a; cat > /tmp/a/passwd}\medskip
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\item root \textcolor{gray}{(does the daily cleaning)}\\
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\texttt{rm /tmp/*/*}\medskip\\
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\hspace{2cm}\textcolor{gray}{\small records that \texttt{/tmp/a/passwd}}\\
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\hspace{2cm}\textcolor{gray}{\small should be deleted, but does not do it yet}\medskip\\
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\item attacker \textcolor{gray}{(meanwhile deletes the fake passwd file, and establishes a link to
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the real passwd file)}\\
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\texttt{rm /tmp/a/passwd; rmdir /tmp/a;}\\\texttt{ln -s /etc /tmp/a}\\
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\item root now deletes the real passwd file
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\end{enumerate}
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\only<2>{
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\begin{textblock}{11}(2,5)
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\begin{tikzpicture}
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\draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm]
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{\normalsize\color{darkgray}
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\begin{minipage}{9cm}\raggedright
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To prevent this kind of attack, you need additional
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policies (don't do such operations as root).
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\end{minipage}};
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\end{tikzpicture}
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\end{textblock}}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[c]
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\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Schneier Analysis\end{tabular}}
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\textcolor{gray}{There is no absolutely secure system and security almost never comes for free.}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item What assets are you trying to protect?
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\item What are the risks to these assets?
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\item How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?
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\item What other risks does the security solution cause?
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\item What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
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\end{itemize}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[t]
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\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Example: Credit Cards\end{tabular}}
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You might have the policy of not typing in your credit card online. Worthwhile or not?
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\begin{itemize}
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\item<2->What assets are you trying to protect?\\
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\only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}your credit card number\end{tabular}}
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\item<3->What are the risks to these assets?\\
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\only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
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With credit cards you loose a fixed amount \pounds{50}. Amazon \pounds{50}. \end{tabular}}
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\item<4->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
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\only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
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Well, hackers steal credit cards from databases. They usually do not attack you individually.\end{tabular}}
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\item<5->What other risks does the security solution cause?
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\only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright None (?)\end{tabular}}
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\item<6->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
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\only<6>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Internet shopping is convenient and sometimes cheaper.\end{tabular}}
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\item<7>[]{\bf\large No!}
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\end{itemize}\pause\pause
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[c]
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\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Example: Firewall\end{tabular}}
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\begin{center}
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\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/firewall.png}
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\end{center}
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A firewall is a piece of software that controls incoming and outgoing traffic according to some rules.
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[t]
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\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Example: Firewall\end{tabular}}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\
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\only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Whatever is behind the firewall
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(credit cards, passwords, blueprints, \ldots)\end{tabular}}
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\item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\
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\only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
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With a small online shop you are already at risk. Pentagon, definitely.\end{tabular}}
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\item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
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\only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
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Well, at home so not much. Everywhere else, if properly configurated then it does.\end{tabular}}
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\item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
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\only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright There might be backdoors or bugs in the firewall,
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but generally they are secure. You choose to prevent certain traffic.\end{tabular}}
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\item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
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\only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
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Minimal to modest. Firewalls are part of free software. You need a knowledgeable
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person to set them up.\end{tabular}}
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\item<7>[]{\bf\large Yes!}
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\end{itemize}\pause\pause
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[t]
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\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ex: Two-Factor Authentication\end{tabular}}
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Google uses nowadays two-factor authentication. But it is an old(er)
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idea. It is used for example in Germany and Netherlands for online transactions.
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\begin{center}
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\includegraphics[scale=0.6]{pics/tan1.jpg}\hspace{5mm}
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\includegraphics[scale=0.2]{pics/tan2.jpg}
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\end{center}
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\pause
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Or nowadays by SMS (restricts the validity of the numbers) or with a secure generator
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\begin{center}
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\includegraphics[scale=0.08]{pics/pinsentry.jpg}
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\end{center}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[t]
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\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ex: Two-Factor Authentication\end{tabular}}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\
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\only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Your bank account.\end{tabular}}
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391 |
\item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\
|
|
392 |
\only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
|
|
393 |
Nowadays pretty high risk.\end{tabular}}
|
|
394 |
\item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
|
|
395 |
\only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
|
|
396 |
It prevents problems when passwords are stolen. Man-in-the-middle attacks
|
|
397 |
still possible.\end{tabular}}
|
|
398 |
\item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
|
43
|
399 |
\only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Your mobile phone or credit card/pin might
|
41
|
400 |
be stolen. SIM card become valuable.\end{tabular}}
|
|
401 |
\item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
|
|
402 |
\only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
|
|
403 |
Banks need to establish an infrastructure. For you it might be inconvenient.\end{tabular}}
|
|
404 |
\item<7>[]{\bf\large Yes!}
|
|
405 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
406 |
|
|
407 |
|
|
408 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
409 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
410 |
|
|
411 |
|
|
412 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
413 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
414 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
|
415 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Security Seals\end{tabular}}
|
|
416 |
|
|
417 |
According to Ross Anderson: ``\ldots is a tamper-indicating device
|
|
418 |
designed to leave non-erasable, unambiguous evidence of unauthorized
|
|
419 |
entry or tampering.''
|
|
420 |
|
|
421 |
\begin{center}
|
|
422 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{pics/seal.jpg}
|
|
423 |
\end{center}\mbox{}\\[-12mm]
|
|
424 |
|
|
425 |
They also need some quite sophisticated policies (seal regiment).
|
|
426 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
427 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
428 |
|
|
429 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
430 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
431 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
|
432 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Security Seals (2)\end{tabular}}
|
|
433 |
|
|
434 |
\begin{itemize}
|
45
|
435 |
\item at the Argonne National Laboratory they tested 244 different security seals
|
41
|
436 |
\begin{itemize}
|
45
|
437 |
\item meantime to break the seals for a trained person: 100 s
|
|
438 |
\item including 19\% that were used for safeguard of nuclear material
|
41
|
439 |
\end{itemize}\bigskip
|
|
440 |
|
|
441 |
\item Andrew Appel defeated all security seals which were supposed to keep
|
43
|
442 |
voting machines safe
|
41
|
443 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
444 |
|
|
445 |
|
|
446 |
\only<2>{
|
|
447 |
\begin{textblock}{11}(1,1)
|
|
448 |
\begin{tikzpicture}
|
|
449 |
\draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm]
|
|
450 |
{\normalsize
|
|
451 |
\begin{minipage}{11cm}\raggedright\small
|
|
452 |
\begin{center}
|
|
453 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.25]{pics/appelseals.jpg}
|
|
454 |
\end{center}
|
|
455 |
\begin{center}
|
|
456 |
\begin{minipage}{10.5cm}
|
|
457 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
458 |
\item The tamper-indicating tape can be lifted using a heat gun.
|
|
459 |
\item The security screw cap can be removed using a screwdriver, then the
|
|
460 |
serial-numbered top can be replaced (undamaged) onto a fresh (unnumbered) base.
|
|
461 |
\item The wire seal can be defeated using a \#4 wood screw.
|
|
462 |
\item The plastic strap seal can be picked using a jeweler's screwdriver.
|
|
463 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
464 |
\end{minipage}
|
|
465 |
\end{center}
|
|
466 |
\end{minipage}};
|
|
467 |
\end{tikzpicture}
|
|
468 |
\end{textblock}}
|
|
469 |
|
|
470 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
471 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
472 |
|
|
473 |
|
|
474 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
475 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
476 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
45
|
477 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Example: Security Seals\end{tabular}}
|
41
|
478 |
|
|
479 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
480 |
\item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\
|
|
481 |
\only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}Voting machines, doors.\end{tabular}}
|
|
482 |
\item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\
|
43
|
483 |
\only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright Casual thieves, insider attacks.\end{tabular}}
|
41
|
484 |
\item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
|
|
485 |
\only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
|
|
486 |
Needs a quite complicated security regiment.\end{tabular}}
|
|
487 |
\item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
|
|
488 |
\only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright You might not notice tampering.\end{tabular}}
|
|
489 |
\item<5->What costs and trade-offs does the security solution impose?
|
|
490 |
\only<5>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
|
|
491 |
The ``hardware'' is cheap, but indirect costs can be quite high.\end{tabular}}
|
43
|
492 |
\item<7>[]{\bf\large No!} {\textcolor{gray}{Though in some areas they work: airport, swimming pool}}
|
|
493 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
494 |
|
|
495 |
|
|
496 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
497 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
498 |
|
|
499 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
500 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
501 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
|
502 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ex: Security by Obscurity\end{tabular}}
|
|
503 |
|
|
504 |
You might think it is a good idea to keep a security relevant algorithm or
|
|
505 |
software secret.
|
|
506 |
|
|
507 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
508 |
\item<1->What assets are you trying to protect?\\
|
|
509 |
\only<1>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}source code, an algorithm\end{tabular}}
|
|
510 |
\item<2->What are the risks to these assets?\\
|
|
511 |
\only<2>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
|
|
512 |
Can be pretty high (Oystercards).\end{tabular}}
|
|
513 |
\item<3->How well does the security solution mitigate those risks?\\
|
|
514 |
\only<3>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright
|
|
515 |
Not really. The source code can be reverse engineered, stolen\ldots{}\end{tabular}}
|
|
516 |
\item<4->What other risks does the security solution cause?
|
|
517 |
\only<4>{\begin{tabular}{@{\hspace{1cm}}p{9cm}}\raggedright You prevent
|
45
|
518 |
scrutiny and independent advice. You also more likely than not
|
43
|
519 |
get it wrong.\end{tabular}}
|
|
520 |
\item<5>[]{\bf\large No!}
|
|
521 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
522 |
|
|
523 |
|
|
524 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
525 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
526 |
|
|
527 |
|
|
528 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
529 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
530 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
|
531 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Voting as Security Problem\end{tabular}}
|
|
532 |
|
|
533 |
What are the security requirements of a voting system?\bigskip
|
|
534 |
|
|
535 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
536 |
\item<2->Integrity
|
|
537 |
\item<3->Ballot Secrecy
|
|
538 |
\item<5->Voter Authentication
|
|
539 |
\item<6->Enfranchisement
|
|
540 |
\item<7->Availability
|
|
541 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
542 |
|
|
543 |
\only<2>{
|
|
544 |
\begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
|
|
545 |
\begin{tikzpicture}
|
|
546 |
\draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered]
|
|
547 |
{\small
|
|
548 |
\begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
|
|
549 |
\begin{center}
|
|
550 |
\begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
|
|
551 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
552 |
\item The outcome matches with the voter intend.
|
|
553 |
\item There might be gigantic sums at stake.
|
|
554 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
555 |
\end{minipage}
|
|
556 |
\end{center}
|
|
557 |
\end{minipage}};
|
|
558 |
\end{tikzpicture}
|
|
559 |
\end{textblock}}
|
|
560 |
|
|
561 |
\only<4>{
|
|
562 |
\begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
|
|
563 |
\begin{tikzpicture}
|
|
564 |
\draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered]
|
|
565 |
{\small
|
|
566 |
\begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
|
|
567 |
\begin{center}
|
|
568 |
\begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
|
|
569 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
570 |
\item Nobody can find out how you voted.
|
|
571 |
\item (Stronger) Even if you try, you cannot prove how you voted.
|
|
572 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
573 |
\end{minipage}
|
|
574 |
\end{center}
|
|
575 |
\end{minipage}};
|
|
576 |
\end{tikzpicture}
|
|
577 |
\end{textblock}}
|
|
578 |
|
|
579 |
\only<5>{
|
|
580 |
\begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
|
|
581 |
\begin{tikzpicture}
|
|
582 |
\draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered]
|
|
583 |
{\small
|
|
584 |
\begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
|
|
585 |
\begin{center}
|
|
586 |
\begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
|
|
587 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
588 |
\item Only authorised voters can vote up to the permitted number of votes.
|
|
589 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
590 |
\end{minipage}
|
|
591 |
\end{center}
|
|
592 |
\end{minipage}};
|
|
593 |
\end{tikzpicture}
|
|
594 |
\end{textblock}}
|
|
595 |
|
|
596 |
\only<6>{
|
|
597 |
\begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
|
|
598 |
\begin{tikzpicture}
|
|
599 |
\draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered]
|
|
600 |
{\small
|
|
601 |
\begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
|
|
602 |
\begin{center}
|
|
603 |
\begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
|
|
604 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
605 |
\item Only authorised voters should be able to vote up to the permitted number of votes.
|
|
606 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
607 |
\end{minipage}
|
|
608 |
\end{center}
|
|
609 |
\end{minipage}};
|
|
610 |
\end{tikzpicture}
|
|
611 |
\end{textblock}}
|
|
612 |
|
|
613 |
\only<7>{
|
|
614 |
\begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
|
|
615 |
\begin{tikzpicture}
|
|
616 |
\draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered]
|
|
617 |
{\small
|
|
618 |
\begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
|
|
619 |
\begin{center}
|
|
620 |
\begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
|
|
621 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
622 |
\item The voting system should accept all authorised votes and produce results in a timely manner.
|
|
623 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
624 |
\end{minipage}
|
|
625 |
\end{center}
|
|
626 |
\end{minipage}};
|
|
627 |
\end{tikzpicture}
|
|
628 |
\end{textblock}}
|
|
629 |
|
|
630 |
\only<6>{
|
|
631 |
\begin{textblock}{5.5}(8,5)
|
|
632 |
\begin{tikzpicture}
|
|
633 |
\draw (0,0) node[inner sep=2mm,fill=cream, ultra thick, draw=red, rounded corners=2mm, text centered]
|
|
634 |
{\small
|
|
635 |
\begin{minipage}{5cm}\raggedright
|
|
636 |
\begin{center}
|
|
637 |
\begin{minipage}{4.5cm}
|
|
638 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
639 |
\item Only authorised voters should be able to vote up to the permitted number of votes.
|
41
|
640 |
\end{itemize}
|
43
|
641 |
\end{minipage}
|
|
642 |
\end{center}
|
|
643 |
\end{minipage}};
|
|
644 |
\end{tikzpicture}
|
|
645 |
\end{textblock}}
|
|
646 |
|
|
647 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
648 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
649 |
|
|
650 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
651 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
652 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
|
653 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ballot Boxes\end{tabular}}
|
|
654 |
|
|
655 |
|
|
656 |
\begin{center}
|
|
657 |
\includegraphics[scale=2.5]{pics/ballotbox.jpg}
|
|
658 |
\end{center}
|
|
659 |
|
|
660 |
|
|
661 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
662 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
663 |
|
|
664 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
665 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
666 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
|
667 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Problems with Voting\end{tabular}}
|
|
668 |
|
|
669 |
|
|
670 |
\begin{center}\large
|
|
671 |
\begin{tabular}{rcl}
|
|
672 |
Integrity & vs. & Ballot Secrecy\bigskip\\
|
|
673 |
Authentication & vs. &Enfranchisement
|
|
674 |
\end{tabular}
|
|
675 |
\end{center}\bigskip\bigskip\pause
|
|
676 |
|
|
677 |
Further constraints:
|
|
678 |
|
|
679 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
680 |
\item costs
|
|
681 |
\item accessibility
|
|
682 |
\item convenience
|
|
683 |
\item intelligibility
|
|
684 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
685 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
686 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
687 |
|
|
688 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
689 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
690 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
|
691 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}}
|
|
692 |
|
|
693 |
|
|
694 |
\begin{itemize}
|
45
|
695 |
\item The Netherlands between 1997 - 2006 had electronic voting machines\\
|
|
696 |
\textcolor{gray}{(hacktivists had found that they could be hacked and emitted radio signals revealing how you voted)}
|
43
|
697 |
|
45
|
698 |
\item Germany had used them in pilot studies\\
|
43
|
699 |
\textcolor{gray}{(in 2007 a law suit has reached the highest court and it rejected electronic voting
|
|
700 |
on the grounds of not being understandable by the general public)}
|
|
701 |
|
45
|
702 |
\item UK used optical scan voting systems in a few polls
|
43
|
703 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
704 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
705 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
706 |
|
|
707 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
708 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
709 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
|
710 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting\end{tabular}}
|
|
711 |
|
|
712 |
\mbox{}\\[-12mm]
|
|
713 |
\begin{itemize}
|
45
|
714 |
\item US used mechanical machines since the 50s, later punch cards, now DREs and
|
|
715 |
optical scan voting machines \textcolor{gray}{(fantastic ``ecosystem'' for study)}
|
43
|
716 |
|
|
717 |
\item Estonia used in 2007 the world's first Internet vote in national elections (there are earlier pilot studies)
|
|
718 |
|
45
|
719 |
\item India uses e-voting devices since at least 2003\\
|
|
720 |
\textcolor{gray}{(``keep-it-simple'' machines produced by a government owned company)}
|
43
|
721 |
|
45
|
722 |
\item South Africa used software for its tallying in the 1993 elections (when Nelson Mandela was elected)
|
|
723 |
\textcolor{gray}{(they found the tallying software was rigged, but they were able to tally manually)}
|
43
|
724 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
725 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
726 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
727 |
|
|
728 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
729 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
730 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
|
731 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}A Brief History of Voting\end{tabular}}
|
|
732 |
|
|
733 |
|
|
734 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
735 |
\item Athenians
|
|
736 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
737 |
\item show of hands
|
|
738 |
\item ballots on pieces of pottery
|
|
739 |
\item different colours of stones
|
45
|
740 |
\item ``facebook''-like authorisation
|
43
|
741 |
\end{itemize}\bigskip
|
|
742 |
|
45
|
743 |
\textcolor{gray}{problems with vote buying / no ballot privacy}\bigskip
|
|
744 |
|
|
745 |
|
43
|
746 |
\item French Revolution and the US Constitution got things ``started'' with
|
|
747 |
paper ballots (you first had to bring your own, or later were pre-printed by the parties)
|
|
748 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
749 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
750 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
751 |
|
|
752 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
753 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
754 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
45
|
755 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Ballot Boxes\end{tabular}}
|
|
756 |
|
|
757 |
Security policies involved with paper ballots:
|
|
758 |
|
|
759 |
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
760 |
\item you need to check that the ballot box is empty at the start of the poll / no false bottom (ballot stuffing)
|
|
761 |
\item you need guard the ballot box during the poll
|
|
762 |
\item tallied by a team at the end of the poll (you can have observers)
|
|
763 |
\end{enumerate}
|
|
764 |
|
|
765 |
\begin{center}
|
|
766 |
\includegraphics[scale=1.5]{pics/ballotbox.jpg}
|
|
767 |
\end{center}
|
|
768 |
|
|
769 |
|
|
770 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
771 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
772 |
|
|
773 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
774 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
775 |
\begin{frame}[t]
|
43
|
776 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Paper Ballots\end{tabular}}
|
|
777 |
|
|
778 |
What can go wrong with paper ballots?
|
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\only<2>{
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\begin{center}
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\includegraphics[scale=0.8]{pics/tweet.jpg}\\
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\footnotesize William M.~Tweed, US Politician in 1860's\\
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``As long as I count the votes, what are you going to do about it?''
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\end{center}}
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\only<3>{
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\medskip
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789 |
\begin{center}
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790 |
\begin{minipage}{10cm}
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791 |
{\bf Chain Voting Attack}
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\begin{enumerate}
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793 |
\item you obtain a blank ballot and fill it out as you want
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794 |
\item you give it to a voter outside the polling station
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795 |
\item voter receives a new blank ballot
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796 |
\item voter submits prefilled ballot
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\item voter gives blank ballot to you, you give money
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798 |
\item goto 1
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\end{enumerate}
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\end{minipage}
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\end{center}
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}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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\begin{frame}[t]
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810 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Mechanical Voting Machines\end{tabular}}
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811 |
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812 |
\begin{itemize}
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813 |
\item<1-> Lever Voting Machines (ca.~1930 - 1990)
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814 |
\only<1>{
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815 |
\begin{center}
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|
816 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/leavermachine.jpg}
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817 |
\end{center}
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818 |
}
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819 |
\item<2->Punch Cards (ca.~1950 - 2000)
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\only<2>{
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821 |
\begin{center}
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822 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/punchcard1.jpg}\;\;
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823 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.46]{pics/punchcard2.jpg}
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\end{center}
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}
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826 |
\end{itemize}
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827 |
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45
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828 |
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43
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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44
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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834 |
\mode<presentation>{
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835 |
\begin{frame}[t]
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836 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Electronic Voting Machines\end{tabular}}
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837 |
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838 |
\begin{center}
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|
839 |
\begin{tabular}{c}
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840 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{pics/dre1.jpg}\;
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\includegraphics[scale=0.40]{pics/dre2.jpg}\\\hline\\
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\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/opticalscan.jpg}
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\end{tabular}
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844 |
\end{center}
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845 |
|
45
|
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\only<1->{
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|
847 |
\begin{textblock}{5.5}(1,4)
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|
848 |
DREs
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849 |
\end{textblock}}
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\only<1->{
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851 |
\begin{textblock}{5.5}(1,11)
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852 |
Optical Scan
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853 |
\end{textblock}}
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854 |
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855 |
\only<2>{
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\begin{textblock}{5.5}(0.5,14.5)
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all are computers
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\end{textblock}}
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\mode<presentation>{
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|
865 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
|
866 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}DREs\end{tabular}}
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|
867 |
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868 |
Direct-recording electronic voting machines\\
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|
869 |
(votes are recorded for example memory cards)
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|
870 |
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|
871 |
typically touchscreen machines
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|
872 |
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|
873 |
usually no papertrail (hard to add: ballot secrecy)
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|
874 |
|
|
875 |
\begin{center}
|
|
876 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/dre1.jpg}
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|
877 |
\end{center}
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|
878 |
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|
879 |
|
|
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\end{frame}}
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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|
883 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
884 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
885 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
|
886 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Diebold Machines\end{tabular}}
|
|
887 |
|
|
888 |
The work by J.~Alex Halderman:
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|
889 |
|
|
890 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
891 |
\item acquired a machine from an anonymous source\medskip
|
|
892 |
\item the source code running the machine was tried to keep secret\medskip\pause
|
|
893 |
|
|
894 |
\item first reversed-engineered the machine (extremely tedious)
|
|
895 |
\item could completely reboot the machine and even install a virus that infects other Diebold machines
|
|
896 |
\item obtained also the source code for other machines
|
|
897 |
\end{itemize}
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|
898 |
|
|
899 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
900 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
901 |
|
|
902 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
903 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
904 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
|
905 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Diebold Machines\end{tabular}}
|
|
906 |
|
47
|
907 |
What could go wrong?\pause \;\;Failure-in-depth.\bigskip\pause
|
|
908 |
|
|
909 |
A non-obvious problem:
|
45
|
910 |
|
|
911 |
\begin{itemize}
|
47
|
912 |
\item you can nowadays get old machines, which still store old polls
|
45
|
913 |
|
47
|
914 |
\item the paper ballot box needed to be secured during the voting until counting;
|
|
915 |
e-voting machines need to be secured during the entire life-time
|
45
|
916 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
917 |
|
46
|
918 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
919 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
920 |
|
|
921 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
922 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
923 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
47
|
924 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Paper Trail\end{tabular}}
|
|
925 |
|
|
926 |
Conclusion:\\ Any electronic solution should have a paper trail.
|
46
|
927 |
|
47
|
928 |
\begin{center}
|
|
929 |
\begin{tabular}{c}
|
|
930 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{pics/opticalscan.jpg}
|
|
931 |
\end{tabular}
|
|
932 |
\end{center}\pause
|
|
933 |
|
|
934 |
You still have to solve problems about
|
|
935 |
Voter registration, voter authentification, guarding against tampering
|
|
936 |
|
|
937 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
938 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
46
|
939 |
|
47
|
940 |
|
|
941 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
942 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
943 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
48
|
944 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}E-Voting in India\end{tabular}}
|
47
|
945 |
|
|
946 |
Their underlying engineering principle is ``keep-it-simple'':
|
46
|
947 |
|
47
|
948 |
\begin{center}
|
|
949 |
\begin{tabular}{c}
|
|
950 |
\includegraphics[scale=1.05]{pics/indiaellection.jpg}\;\;
|
|
951 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.40]{pics/india1.jpg}
|
|
952 |
\end{tabular}
|
|
953 |
\end{center}\medskip\pause
|
45
|
954 |
|
47
|
955 |
Official claims: ``perfect'', ``tamperproof'', ``no need for technical improvements'' , ``infallible''
|
44
|
956 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
957 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
958 |
|
43
|
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|
48
|
960 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
961 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
962 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
|
963 |
\frametitle{\begin{tabular}{@ {}c@ {}}Lessons to be Learned\end{tabular}}
|
|
964 |
|
|
965 |
\begin{itemize}
|
|
966 |
\item keep a paper trail and try to keep this secure
|
|
967 |
\item make the software open source
|
|
968 |
\item have a simple design in order to minimise the attack surface
|
|
969 |
\end{itemize}
|
|
970 |
|
|
971 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
972 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
973 |
|
46
|
974 |
|
43
|
975 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
976 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
977 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
|
978 |
|
|
979 |
\begin{center}
|
|
980 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting1.png}
|
|
981 |
\end{center}
|
|
982 |
|
|
983 |
|
|
984 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
985 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
986 |
|
|
987 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
988 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
989 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
|
990 |
|
|
991 |
\begin{center}
|
|
992 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting2.png}
|
|
993 |
\end{center}
|
|
994 |
|
|
995 |
|
|
996 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
997 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
998 |
|
|
999 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
1000 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
1001 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
|
1002 |
|
|
1003 |
\begin{center}
|
|
1004 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting3.png}
|
|
1005 |
\end{center}
|
|
1006 |
|
|
1007 |
|
|
1008 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
1009 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
1010 |
|
|
1011 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
1012 |
\mode<presentation>{
|
|
1013 |
\begin{frame}[c]
|
|
1014 |
|
|
1015 |
\begin{center}
|
|
1016 |
\includegraphics[scale=0.56]{pics/Voting4.png}
|
|
1017 |
\end{center}
|
41
|
1018 |
|
|
1019 |
|
|
1020 |
\end{frame}}
|
|
1021 |
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
1022 |
|
|
1023 |
|
|
1024 |
\end{document}
|
|
1025 |
|
|
1026 |
%%% Local Variables:
|
|
1027 |
%%% mode: latex
|
|
1028 |
%%% TeX-master: t
|
|
1029 |
%%% End:
|
|
1030 |
|