Air Gaps

Since I started working with Snowden's documents, I have been using a 

number of tools to try to stay secure from the NSA. The advice I shared 

included using Tor, preferring certain cryptography over others, and 

using public-domain encryption wherever possible.

I also recommended using an air gap, which physically isolates a 

computer or local network of computers from the Internet. (The name 

comes from the literal gap of air between the computer and the Internet; 

the word predates wireless networks.)

But this is more complicated than it sounds, and requires explanation.

Since we know that computers connected to the Internet are vulnerable to 

outside hacking, an air gap should protect against those attacks. There 

are a lot of systems that use -- or should use -- air gaps: classified 

military networks, nuclear power plant controls, medical equipment, 

avionics, and so on.

Osama Bin Laden used one. I hope human rights organizations in 

repressive countries are doing the same.

Air gaps might be conceptually simple, but they're hard to maintain in 

practice. The truth is that nobody wants a computer that never receives 

files from the Internet and never sends files out into the Internet. 

What they want is a computer that's not directly connected to the 

Internet, albeit with some secure way of moving files on and off.

But every time a file moves back or forth, there's the potential for attack.

And air gaps *have* been breached. Stuxnet was a US and Israeli 

military-grade piece of malware that attacked the Natanz nuclear plant 

in Iran. It successfully jumped the air gap and penetrated the Natanz 

network. Another piece of malware named agent.btz, probably Chinese in 

origin, successfully jumped the air gap protecting US military networks.

These attacks work by exploiting security vulnerabilities in the 

removable media used to transfer files on and off the air-gapped computers.

Since working with Snowden's NSA files, I have tried to maintain a 

single air-gapped computer. It turned out to be harder than I expected, 

and I have ten rules for anyone trying to do the same:

1. When you set up your computer, connect it to the Internet as little 

as possible. It's impossible to completely avoid connecting the computer 

to the Internet, but try to configure it all at once and as anonymously 

as possible. I purchased my computer off-the-shelf in a big box store, 

then went to a friend's network and downloaded everything I needed in a 

single session. (The ultra-paranoid way to do this is to buy two 

identical computers, configure one using the above method, upload the 

results to a cloud-based anti-virus checker, and transfer the results of 

*that* to the air gap machine using a one-way process.)

2. Install the minimum software set you need to do your job, and disable 

all operating system services that you won't need. The less software you 

install, the less an attacker has available to exploit. I downloaded and 

installed OpenOffice, a PDF reader, a text editor, TrueCrypt, and 

BleachBit. That's all. (No, I don't have any inside knowledge about 

TrueCrypt, and there's a lot about it that makes me suspicious. But for 

Windows full-disk encryption it's that, Microsoft's BitLocker, or 

Symantec's PGPDisk -- and I am more worried about large US corporations 

being pressured by the NSA than I am about TrueCrypt.)

3. Once you have your computer configured, never directly connect it to 

the Internet again. Consider physically disabling the wireless 

capability, so it doesn't get turned on by accident.

4. If you need to install new software, download it anonymously from a 

random network, put it on some removable media, and then manually 

transfer it to the air-gapped computer. This is by no means perfect, but 

it's an attempt to make it harder for the attacker to target your computer.

5. Turn off all autorun features. This should be standard practice for 

all the computers you own, but it's especially important for an 

air-gapped computer. Agent.btz used autorun to infect US military computers.

6. Minimize the amount of executable code you move onto the air-gapped 

computer. Text files are best. Microsoft Office files and PDFs are more 

dangerous, since they might have embedded macros. Turn off all macro 

capabilities you can on the air-gapped computer. Don't worry too much 

about patching your system; in general, the risk of the executable code 

is worse than the risk of not having your patches up to date. You're not 

on the Internet, after all.

7. Only use trusted media to move files on and off air-gapped computers. 

A USB stick you purchase from a store is safer than one given to you by 

someone you don't know -- or one you find in a parking lot.

8. For file transfer, a writable optical disk (CD or DVD) is safer than 

a USB stick. Malware can silently write data to a USB stick, but it 

can't spin the CD-R up to 1000 rpm without your noticing. This means 

that the malware can only write to the disk when you write to the disk. 

You can also verify how much data has been written to the CD by 

physically checking the back of it. If you've only written one file, but 

it looks like three-quarters of the CD was burned, you have a problem. 

Note: the first company to market a USB stick with a light that 

indicates a write operation -- not read *or* write; I've got one of 

those -- wins a prize.

9. When moving files on and off your air-gapped computer, use the 

absolute smallest storage device you can. And fill up the entire device 

with random files. If an air-gapped computer is compromised, the malware 

is going to try to sneak data off it using that media. While malware can 

easily hide stolen files from you, it can't break the laws of physics. 

So if you use a tiny transfer device, it can only steal a very small 

amount of data at a time. If you use a large device, it can take that 

much more. Business-card-sized mini-CDs can have capacity as low as 30 

MB. I still see 1-GB USB sticks for sale.

10. Consider encrypting everything you move on and off the air-gapped 

computer. Sometimes you'll be moving public files and it won't matter, 

but sometimes you won't be, and it will. And if you're using optical 

media, those disks will be impossible to erase. Strong encryption solves 

these problems. And don't forget to encrypt the computer as well; 

whole-disk encryption is the best.

One thing I didn't do, although it's worth considering, is use a 

stateless operating system like Tails. You can configure Tails with a 

persistent volume to save your data, but no operating system changes are 

ever saved. Booting Tails from a read-only DVD -- you can keep your data 

on an encrypted USB stick -- is even more secure. Of course, this is not 

foolproof, but it greatly reduces the potential avenues for attack.

Yes, all this is advice for the paranoid. And it's probably impossible 

to enforce for any network more complicated than a single computer with 

a single user. But if you're thinking about setting up an air-gapped 

computer, you already believe that some very powerful attackers are 

after you personally. If you're going to use an air gap, use it properly.

Of course you can take things further. I have met people who have 

physically removed the camera, microphone, and wireless capability 

altogether. But that's too much paranoia for me right now.

Yes, I am ignoring TEMPEST attacks.  I am also ignoring black bag 

attacks against my home.

My previous advice:

https://www.schneier.com/essay-450.html

Bin Laden had an air gap:

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/05/bin_laden_maint.html

agent.btz:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/cyber-intruder-sparks-response-debate/2011/12/06/gIQAxLuFgO_story.html 

or http://tinyurl.com/cjqxphd

TrueCrypt:

http://www.truecrypt.org/

BleachBit:

http://bleachbit.sourceforge.net/

People plugging in found USB drives:

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2012/07/dropped_usb_sti.html

Tails:

https://tails.boum.org/