A Formalisation of an Access Control Framework



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Access Control

Perhaps most known are

• Unix-style access control systems (root super-user, setuid mechanism)

```
> ls -ld . * */*
drwxr-xr-x 1 alice staff 32768 Apr 2 2010 .
-rw----r- 1 alice students 31359 Jul 24 2011 manual.txt
-rwsr--r-x 1 bob students 141359 Jun 1 2013 microedit
dr--r-xr-x 1 bob staff 32768 Jul 23 2011 src
-rw-r--r- 1 bob staff 81359 Feb 28 2012 src/code.c
```

Access Control

More fine-grained access control is provided by

SELinux

(security enhanced Linux devloped by the NSA; mandatory access control system)

 Role-Compatibility Model (developed by Amon Ott; main application in the Apache server)

Operations in the OS

using Paulson's inductive method a **state of the system** is a **trace**, a list of events (system calls):

 $[oldsymbol{e}_1,\ldots,oldsymbol{e}_2]$

e ::= CreateFile p f | ReadFile p f | Send p i | WriteFile p f | Execute p f | Recv p i | DeleteFile p f | Clone p p' | CreateIPC p i | ChangeOwner p u | ChangeRole p r | DeleteIPC p i | Kill p p'




valid []valid s admissible s e granted s e
valid (e::s)


















Design of AC-Policies


"what you specify is what you get but not necessarily what you want..."














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- our solution: take a middle ground and record precisely the information of the initial state, but be less precise about every newly created object.

Results about our Test

• we can show that the objects (files, processes, ...) we need to consider are only finite (at some point it does not matter if we create another *bin*-file)

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Thm (Completeness)

If an object is taintable and *undeletable**, then our test will find out that it is taintable.

* an object is *undeleteable* if it exists in the initial state, but there exists no valid state in which it could have been deleted

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
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Is this a serious restriction? We think not ...



Admins usually ask whether their policy is strong enough to protect their core system?



core system files are typically undeletable



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13 events, 13 rules for OS admisibility, 14 rules for RC-granting, 10 rules for tainted

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- we can scale this to SELinux more fine-grainded OS events (inodes, hard-links, shared memory, ...)
- hard sell to Ott (who designed the RC-model)
- hard sell to the community working on access control (beyond *good science*)

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