
Compilers and Formal Languages (9)

Email: christian.urban at kcl.ac.uk Office: N7.07 (North Wing, Bush House) Slides: KEATS (also home work is there)



Old-Fashioned Eng. vs. CS



bridges:

engineers can "look" at a bridge and have a pretty good intuition about whether it will hold up or not (redundancy; predictive theory)



code:

programmers have very little intuition about their code; often it is too expensive to have redundancy; not "continuous"

Dijkstra on Testing

"Program testing can be a very effective way to show the presence of bugs, but it is hopelessly inadequate for showing their absence."

Proving Programs to be Correct

Theorem: There are infinitely many prime numbers. **Proof** ...

similarly

Theorem: The program is doing what it is supposed to be doing.

Long, long proof ...


This can be a gigantic proof. The only hope is to have help from the computer. 'Program' is here to be understood to be quite general (protocols, OS, ...).


Mars Pathfinder Mission 1997




- despite NASA's famous testing procedures, the lander crashed frequently on Mars
- a scheduling algorithm was not used in the OS









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


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





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


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



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


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



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


medium pr.





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
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
Priority Inheritance Scheduling


- Let a low priority process L temporarily inherit the high priority of H until L leaves the critical section unlocking the resource.
- Once the resource is unlocked *L* returns to its original priority level.




high priority











0

















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
Priority Inheritance Scheduling

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Priority Inheritance Scheduling

- Let a low priority process L temporarily inherit the high priority of H until L leaves the critical section unlocking the resource.
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- ...*L* needs to switch to the highest remaining priority of the threads that it blocks.

this error is already known since around 1999




- by Rajkumar, 1991
- *"it resumes the priority it had at the point of entry into the critical section"*



- by Jane Liu, 2000
- "The job \mathcal{J}_l executes at its inherited priority until it releases R; at that time, the priority of \mathcal{J}_l returns to its priority at the time when it acquires the resource R."
- gives pseudo code and totally bogus data structures
- interesting part "left as an exercise"



- by Laplante and Ovaska, 2011 (\$113.76)
- "when [the task] exits the critical section that caused the block, it reverts to the priority it had when it entered that section"



- by Silberschatz, Galvin, and Gagne, 2013 (OS-bible)
- "Upon releasing the lock, the [low-priority] thread will revert to its original priority."

Priority Scheduling

- a scheduling algorithm that is widely used in real-time operating systems
- has been "proved" correct by hand in a paper in 1983
- but this algorithm turned out to be incorrect, despite its "proof"

Priority Scheduling

- a scheduling algorithm that is widely used in real-time operating systems
- has been "proved" correct by hand in a paper in 1983
- but this algorithm turned out to be incorrect, despite its "proof"
- we used the corrected algorithm and then **really** proved that it is correct
- we implemented this algorithm in a small OS called PINTOS (used for teaching at Stanford)
- our implementation was much more efficient than their reference implementation

Big Proofs in CS (1)

Formal proofs in CS sound like science fiction?

- in 2008, verification of a C-compiler
 - "if my input program has a certain behaviour, then the compiled machine code has the same behaviour"
 - is as good as gcc -01, but much less buggy



Big Proofs in CS (2)

- in 2010, verification of a micro-kernel operating system (approximately 8700 loc)
 - used in helicopters and mobile phones
 - 200k loc of proof
 - 25 30 person years
 - found 160 bugs in the C code (144 by the proof)

"Real-world operating-system kernel with an end-to-end proof of implementation correctness and security enforcement"

Big Proofs in CS (2)

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"Real-world operating-system kernel with an end-to-end proof of implementation correctness and security enforcement"

unhackable kernel (New Scientists, September 2015)

Big Proofs in CS (3)

- verified TLS implementation
- verified compilers (CompCert, CakeML)
- verified distributed systems (Verdi)
- verified OSes or OS components (seL4, CertiKOS, ...)

Big Proofs in CS (3)

- verified TLS implementation
- verified compilers (CompCert, CakeML)
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- verified OSes or OS components (seL4, CertiKOS, ...)
- Infer static analyser developed by Facebook

How Did This Happen?

Lots of ways!

- better programming languages
 - basic safety guarantees built in
 - powerful mechanisms for abstraction and modularity
- better software development methodology
- stable platforms and frameworks
- better use of specifications

If you want to build software that works or is secure, it is helpful to know what you mean by "works" and by "is secure"!



Remember the Bridges example?

• Can we look at our programs and somehow ensure they are bug free/correct?




Remember the Bridges example?

- Can we look at our programs and somehow ensure they are bug free/correct?
- Very hard: Anything interesting about programs is equivalent to the Halting Problem, which is undecidable.




Remember the Bridges example?


- Can we look at our programs and somehow ensure they are bug free/correct?
- Very hard: Anything interesting about programs is equivalent to the Halting Problem, which is undecidable.
- Solution: We avoid this "minor" obstacle by being as close as possible of deciding the halting problem, without actually deciding the halting problem. ⇒ yes, no, don't know (static analysis)




• depending on some initial input, a program (behaviour) will "develop" over time.



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


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
• to be avoided

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• this needs more work

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Concrete Example: Are Vars Definitely Initialised?

Assuming x is initialised, what about y?

Prog. 1:

if x < 1 then y := x else y := x + 1; y := y + 1

Prog. 2:

if x < x then y := y + 1 else y := x; y := y + 1

Concrete Example: Are Vars Definitely Initialised?

What should the rules be for deciding when a variable is initialised?

Concrete Example: Are Vars Definitely Initialised?

What should the rules be for deciding when a variable is initialised?

• variable x is definitely initialized after skip iff x is definitely initialized before skip.

$$\frac{vars(a) \subseteq A}{A \text{ skip } A} \qquad \frac{vars(a) \subseteq A}{A (x := a) \{x\} \cup A}$$

$$\frac{vars(a) \subseteq A}{A \text{ skip } A} \qquad \frac{vars(a) \subseteq A}{A (x := a) \{x\} \cup A} \\
\frac{A_{I} s_{I} A_{2} \quad A_{2} s_{2} A_{3}}{A_{I} (s_{I}; s_{2}) A_{3}}$$

 $\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} vars(a) \subseteq A \\ \hline A \hspace{0.5mm} skip \hspace{0.5mm} A \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \hline A \\ \hline A \hspace{0.5mm} (x:=a) \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} \{x\} \cup A \end{array} \\ \\ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} A_{1} \hspace{0.5mm} s_{1} \hspace{0.5mm} A_{2} \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} A_{2} \hspace{0.5mm} s_{2} \hspace{0.5mm} A_{3} \end{array} \\ \\ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} A_{1} \hspace{0.5mm} s_{1} \hspace{0.5mm} A_{2} \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} A_{2} \hspace{0.5mm} s_{2} \hspace{0.5mm} A_{3} \end{array} \\ \\ \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} vars(b) \subseteq A \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} A \hspace{0.5mm} s_{1} \hspace{0.5mm} A_{1} \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} A \hspace{0.5mm} s_{2} \hspace{0.5mm} A_{2} \end{array} \\ \\ \hline \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} A \end{array} & \begin{array}{c} s_{1} \hspace{0.5mm} s_{2} \hspace{0.5mm} A_{2} \end{array} \\ \\ \hline A \hspace{0.5mm} (if \hspace{0.5mm} b \hspace{0.5mm} then \hspace{0.5mm} s_{1} \hspace{0.5mm} else \hspace{0.5mm} s_{2} \end{array}) \hspace{0.5mm} A_{1} \hspace{0.5mm} \cap A_{2} \end{array} \end{array} \end{array} \end{array}$

 $vars(a) \subset A$ A skip A A $(x := a) \{x\} \cup A$ $A_{\mathrm{I}} s_{\mathrm{I}} A_{2} \quad A_{2} s_{2} A_{3}$ $A_{\rm I}(s_{\rm I};s_2) A_{\rm I}$ $vars(b) \subseteq A \quad A s_{I} A_{I} \quad A s_{2} A_{2}$ A (if *b* then s_1 else s_2) $A_1 \cap A_2$ $vars(b) \subseteq A \quad A \ s \ A'$ A (while b do s) A

 $vars(a) \subset A$ A skip A A $(x := a) \{x\} \cup A$ $A_{\mathrm{I}} s_{\mathrm{I}} A_{2} \quad A_{2} s_{2} A_{3}$ $A_{\rm I}(s_{\rm I};s_{\rm 2})A_{\rm 3}$ $vars(b) \subseteq A \quad A s_{I} A_{I} \quad A s_{2} A_{2}$ A (if *b* then s_1 else s_2) $A_1 \cap A_2$ $vars(b) \subseteq A \quad A \ s \ A'$ A (while b do s) A

we start with $A = \{\}$

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Concrete Example: Sign-Analysis Exp ::= Exp + Expa := 1 Exp * Exp n := 5Exp = Exptop: jmp? n = 0 done a := a * n num n := n + -1 goto top var done: Stmt ::= label : var := Exp jmp? **Exp label** goto *label* **Prog** ::= Stmt ... Stmt

Concrete Example: Sign-Analysis					
Exp ::=	Exp + Exp				
	Exp * Exp				
	Exp = Exp		n := 6 m1 := 0		
1	num		m2 := 1		
		top:	jmp? n = 0 done		
	var		tmp := m2		
Stant	label :		m2 := m1 + m2		
51111			m1 := tmp		
	<i>var</i> := E xp		n := n + -1		
 	jmp? Exp lab		goto top		
		done:			
	goto <i>label</i>				
Prog ::=	Stmt Stmt				


Concrete Example: Sign-Analysis Exp ::= Exp + ExpExp * Exp | **Exp** = **Exp** num var Stmt ::= label : var := Exp jmp? **Exp label** goto *label* **Prog** ::= Stmt ... Stmt

Eval: An Interpreter

```
[n]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} n
[x]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} env(x)
[e_1 + e_2]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [e_1]_{env} + [e_2]_{env}
[e_1 * e_2]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [e_1]_{env} * [e_2]_{env}
[e_1 = e_2]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} I & \text{if } [e_1]_{env} = [e_2]_{env} \\ \circ & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
```

```
def eval_exp(e: Exp, env: Env) : Int = e match {
  case Num(n) => n
  case Var(x) => env(x)
  case Plus(e1, e2) => eval_exp(e1, env) + eval_exp(e2, env)
  case Times(e1, e2) => eval_exp(e1, env) * eval_exp(e2, env)
  case Equ(e1, e2) =>
    if (eval_exp(e1, env) == eval_exp(e2, env)) 1 else 0
}
```

A program



The *snippets* of the program:

	а	:=	1				
	n	:=	5				
top:	jn	ıp?	n	=	0	done	
	а	:=	а	*	n		
	n	:=	n	+	- 1	L	
	go	oto	to	эр			
done:							

top:	jmp? n = 0 done	done
	a := a * n	
	n := n + -1	
	goto top	
done:		

:

Eval for Stmts Let *sn* be the snippets of a program

$$[nil]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} env$$

$$[Label(l:)::rest]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [rest]_{env}$$

$$[x:=a::rest]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [rest]_{(env[x:=[a]_{env}])}$$

$$[jmp? b l::rest]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ \begin{bmatrix} sn(l) \end{bmatrix}_{env} \text{ if } [b]_{env} = true \\ [rest]_{env} \text{ otherwise} \\ \end{bmatrix}$$

$$[goto l::rest]_{env} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [sn(l)]_{env}$$

Start with $[sn("")]_{\varnothing}$

Eval in Code

def eval(sn: Snips) : Env = {
 def eval_stmts(sts: Stmts, env: Env) : Env = sts match {
 case Nil => env

case Label(1)::rest => eval_stmts(rest, env)

```
case Assign(x, e)::rest =>
  eval_stmts(rest, env + (x -> eval_exp(e, env)))
```


```
case Jmp(b, l)::rest =>
  if (eval_exp(b, env) == 1) eval_stmts(sn(l), env)
  else eval_stmts(rest, env)
```

```
case Goto(1)::rest => eval_stmts(sn(1), env)
}
```

```
eval_stmts(sn(""), Map())
```

}

The Idea of Static Analysis



Replace all constants and variables by either +, - or 0. What we want to find out is what the sign of a and n is (they should always positive).

Sign Analysis?

e_{I}	e_2	$e_{I} + e_{2}$	e_{I}	e_2	$e_1 * e_2$
-	-	-	-	-	+
-	0	- -, 0, +	-	0	0
-	+	-, O, +	-	+ x -	-
0	x	x	0	x	0
+	-	-, O, +	+	-	-
+	0	+ +	+	0 +	0
+	+	+	+	+	+

$$[n]_{aenv} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \{+\} & \text{if } n > 0 \\ \{-\} & \text{if } n < 0 \\ \{0\} & \text{if } n = 0 \end{cases}$$
$$[x]_{aenv} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} aenv(x)$$
$$[e_1 + e_2]_{aenv} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [e_1]_{aenv} \oplus [e_2]_{aenv}$$
$$[e_1 * e_2]_{aenv} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [e_1]_{aenv} \otimes [e_2]_{aenv}$$
$$[e_1 = e_2]_{aenv} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{0, +\}$$

```
def aeval_exp(e: Exp, aenv: AEnv) : Set[Abst] = e match {
  case Num(0) => Set(Zero)
  case Num(n) if (n < 0) => Set(Neg)
  case Num(n) if (n > 0) => Set(Pos)
  case Var(x) => aenv(x)
  case Plus(e1, e2) =>
    aplus(aeval_exp(e1, aenv), aeval_exp(e2, aenv))
  case Times(aeval_exp(e1, aenv), aeval_exp(e2, aenv))
  case Equ(e1, e2) => Set(Zero, Pos)
}
```

AEval for Stmts

Let *sn* be the snippets of a program

Start with $[sn("")]_{\varnothing}$, try to reach all *states* you can find (until a fix point is reached). Check whether there are only *aenv* in the final states that

have your property.



- We want to find out whether a and n are always positive?
- After a few optimisations, we can indeed find this out.
 - equal signs return only + or 0
 - branch into only one direction if you know
 - if x is +, then x + -1 cannot be negative
- What is this good for? Well, you do not need underflow checks (in order to prevent buffer-overflow attacks). In general this technique is used to make sure keys stay secret.

Take Home Points

- While testing is important, it does not show the absence of bugs/vulnerabilities.
- More and more we need (formal) proofs that show a program is bug free.
- Static analysis is more and more employed nowadays in order to automatically hunt for bugs.