Compilers and Formal Languages

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The Fun Language

```
def fact(n) = if n == 0 then 1 else n * fact(n - 1);
```

def gcd(a, b) = if b == 0 then a else gcd(b, a % b);

```
.method public static facT(II)I Factorial
limit locals 2
.limit stack 6
 iload 0
 1dc 0
 if_icmpne If_else 2
 iload 1
 goto If end 3
If else 2:
                            def facT(n, acc) =
 iload 0
                               if n == 0 then acc
 ldc 1
                               else facT(n - 1, n * acc);
 isub
 iload 0
 iload 1
 imul
 invokestatic fact/fact/facT(II)I
If end 3:
 ireturn
.end method
```

```
.method public static facT(II)I
.limit locals 2
.limit stack 6
facT_Start:
  iload 0
 1dc 0
  if icmpne If else 2
  iload 1
  goto If end 3
If else 2:
  iload 0
                        def facT(n, acc) =
  ldc 1
                           if n == 0 then acc
  isub
                           else facT(n - 1, n * acc);
  iload 0
  iload 1
  imul
  istore 1
  istore 0
  goto facT Start
If end 3:
  ireturn
```

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Tail Recursion

A call to f(args) is usually compiled as

```
args onto stack invokestatic .../f
```

Tail Recursion

A call to f(args) is usually compiled as

args onto stack invokestatic .../f

A call is in tail position provided:

- if Bexp then Exp else Exp
- Exp ; Exp
- Ехр ор Ехр

then a call f(args) can be compiled as

prepare environment jump to start of function

Tail Recursive Call

```
def compile expT(a: Exp, env: Mem, name: String): Instrs =
  . . .
  case Call(n, args) => if (name == n)
    val stores =
      args.zipWithIndex.map { case (x, y) => i"istore $y" }
    args.map(a => compile expT(a, env, "")).mkString ++
    stores.reverse.mkString ++
    i"goto ${n} Start"
  } else {
    val is = "I" * args.length
    args.map(a => compile_expT(a, env, "")).mkString ++
    i"invokestatic XXX/XXX/${n}(${is})I"
```

Factorial Funct. on the JVM


```
.method public static facT(II)I
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                           else facT(n - 1, n * acc);
 ldc 1
  isub
  iload 0
  iload 1
  imul
  invokestatic fact/fact/facT(II)I
If end 3:
  ireturn
المصاطر منتخل المصر
```

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- Chris Lattner, Vikram Adve (started in 2000)
- Apple hired Lattner in 2006
- modular architecture, LLVM-IR
- lli and llc

LLVM: Overview



LLVM-IR

```
define i32 @fact (i32 %n) {
   %tmp 19 = icmp eq i32 %n, 0
   br i1 %tmp 19, label %if br 23, label %else br 24
if br 23:
   ret i32 1
else br 24:
   %tmp 21 = sub i32 %n, 1
   %tmp 22 = call i32 @fact (i32 %tmp 21)
   %tmp 20 = mul i32 %n, %tmp 22
   ret i32 %tmp 20
                                    def fact(n) = 
                                      if n == 0 then 1
                                      else n * fact(n - 1)
```

LLVM Types

boolean	i1
byte	18
short	i16
char	i16
integer	i32
long	i64
float	float
double	double
*	pointer to
**	pointer to a pointer to
[_]	arrays of

LLVM-IR Instructions

br i1 %var, label %if_br, label %else_br

icmp eq i32 %x, %y ; for equal icmp sle i32 %x, %y ; signed less or equal icmp slt i32 %x, %y ; signed less than icmp ult i32 %x, %y ; unsigned less than

%var = call i32 @foo(...args...)

SSA Format

(1+a) + (3 + (b * 5))

tmp0 = <mark>add</mark>	1 a
tmp1 = mul	b 5
tmp2 = add	3 tmp1
tmp3 = add	tmp0 tmp2

Static Single Assignment

Abstract Syntax Trees

// Fun language (expressions)
abstract class Exp
abstract class BExp

case class Call(name: String, args: List[Exp]) extends Exp case class If(a: BExp, e1: Exp, e2: Exp) extends Exp case class Write(e: Exp) extends Exp case class Var(s: String) extends Exp case class Num(i: Int) extends Exp case class Aop(o: String, a1: Exp, a2: Exp) extends Exp case class Sequence(e1: Exp, e2: Exp) extends Exp case class Bop(o: String, a1: Exp, a2: Exp) extends BExp

K-(Intermediate)Language

abstract class KExp abstract class KVal

// K-Values
case class KVar(s: String) extends KVal
case class KNum(i: Int) extends KVal
case class Kop(o: String, v1: KVal, v2: KVal) extends KVal
case class KCall(o: String, vrs: List[KVal]) extends KVal
case class KWrite(v: KVal) extends KVal

// K-Expressions

case class KIf(x1: String, e1: KExp, e2: KExp) extends KExp
case class KLet(x: String, v: KVal, e: KExp) extends KExp
case class KReturn(v: KVal) extends KExp

KLet

```
tmp0 = add 1 a
tmp1 = mul b 5
tmp2 = add 3 tmp1
tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2
 KLet tmp0 , add 1 a in
  KLet tmp1 , mul b 5 in
   KLet tmp2 , add 3 tmp1 in
     KLet tmp3 , add tmp0 tmp2 in
```

• • •

case class KLet(x: String, e1: KVal, e2: KExp)

KLet

tmp0	=	add	1	а	
tmp1	=	mul	b	5	
tmp2	=	add	3	tmp1	
tmp3	=	add	tn	np0 tmp2	
1.44				add 1 a fu	
let tmp0 = add 1 a in					
<pre>let tmp1 = mul b 5 in</pre>					
]	Let	t mp	52	<pre>= add 3 tmp1 in</pre>	

let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in

• • •

case class KLet(x: String, e1: KVal, e2: KExp)

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp =
  e match { ... }
```

the continuation k can be thought of:

```
let tmp0 = add 1 a in
let tmp1 = mul 
    5 in
let tmp2 = add 3 tmp1 in
let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in
    KReturn tmp3
```

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp =
    e match {
        case Var(s) => k(KVar(s))
        case Num(i) => k(KNum(i))
        ...
    }
```

```
let tmp0 = add 1 a in
let tmp1 = mul 
    5 in
let tmp2 = add 3 tmp1 in
let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in
    KReturn tmp3
```

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp = e match {
  case Aop(o, e1, e2) => {
    val z = Fresh("tmp")
    CPS(e1)(y1 =>
      CPS(e2)(y2 =>
                KLet(z, Kop(o, y1, y2), k(KVar(z))))
  } ...
                 . . .
                 let z = op \square_{v_1} \square_{v_2}
                 let tmp0 = add 1 a in
                 let tmp1 = mul Z 5 in
                 let tmp2 = add 3 tmp1 in
                 let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in
                   KReturn tmp3
```

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp =
    e match {
        case Sequence(e1, e2) =>
            CPS(e1)(_ => CPS(e2)(y2 => k(y2)))
        ...
    }
```

```
let tmp0 = add 1 a in
let tmp1 = mul 
    5 in
let tmp2 = add 3 tmp1 in
let tmp3 = add tmp0 tmp2 in
    KReturn tmp3
```

```
def CPS(e: Exp)(k: KVal => KExp) : KExp =
  e match {
    . . .
    case If(Bop(o, b1, b2), e1, e2) => {
      val z = Fresh("tmp")
      CPS(b1)(v1 = >
        CPS(b2)(y2 =)
          KLet(z, Kop(o, y1, y2))
                 KIf(z, CPS(e1)(k), CPS(e2)(k))))
     }
    . . .
```

The Basic Language, 1980+

```
5 \text{ LET } S = 0
```

```
10 INPUT V
```

```
20 PRINT "Input number"
```

```
30 IF N = 0 THEN GOTO 99
```

```
40 \text{ FOR } I = 1 \text{ TO } N
```

```
45 LET S = S + V(I)
```

```
50 NEXT I
```

```
60 PRINT S/N
```

```
70 GOTO 5
```

```
99 END
```

"Spaghetti Code"

Target Specific ASM

llc -march=x86-64 fact.ll
llc -march=arm fact.ll


Intel: xorl %eax, %eax ARM: mov pc, lr


Using a compiler, how can you mount the perfect attack against a system?

What is a **perfect** attack?

- 1. you can potentially completely take over a target system
- 2. your attack is (nearly) undetectable
- 3. the victim has (almost) no chance to recover

clean compiler







my compiler (src)


V0.01

Scala

host language







Hacking Compilers



Ken Thompson Turing Award, 1983

Ken Thompson showed how to hide a Trojan Horse in a compiler without leaving any traces in the source code. No amount of source level verification will protect you from such Thompson-hacks.

Hacking Compilers



Ken Thompson Turing Award, 19



- 1) Assume you ship the compiler as binary and also with sources.
- 2) Make the compiler aware when it compiles itself.
- 3) Add the Trojan horse.
- 4) Compile.

;0)

- 5) Delete Trojan horse from the sources of the compiler.
- 6) Go on holiday for the rest of your life.

ng any on will

acks.

a Tro-

Hacking Compilers



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Dijkstra on Testing

"Program testing can be a very effective way to show the presence of bugs, but it is hopelessly inadequate for showing their absence."

What is good about compilers: the either seem to work, or go horribly wrong (most of the time).

Proving Programs to be Correct

Theorem: There are infinitely many prime numbers.

Proof ...

similarly

Theorem: The program is doing what it is supposed to be doing.

Long, long proof ...

This can be a gigantic proof. The only hope is to have help from the computer. 'Program' is here to be understood to be quite general (compiler, OS, ...).

Can This Be Done?

- in 2008, verification of a small C-compiler
 - "if my input program has a certain behaviour, then the compiled machine code has the same behaviour"
 - is as good as gcc -01, but much, much less buggy



Fuzzy Testing C-Compilers

- tested GCC, LLVM and others by randomly generating C-programs
- found more than 300 bugs in GCC and also many in LLVM (some of them highest-level critical)
- about CompCert:

"The striking thing about our CompCert results is that the middle-end bugs we found in all other compilers are absent. As of early 2011, the under-development version of CompCert is the only compiler we have tested for which Csmith cannot find wrong-code errors. This is not for lack of trying: we have devoted about six CPU-years to the task."



- Revision Lecture
- How many strings are in $L(a^*)$?



- Revision Lecture
- How many strings are in $L(a^*)$?
- How many strings are in L((a + b)*)?
 Are there more than in L(a*)?