### Automata and Formal Languages (9)

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
#### Using a compiler, how can you mount the perfect attack against a system?


#### What is a perfect attack?

- you can potentially completely take over a target system
- your attack is (nearly) undetectable
- It the victim has (almost) no chance to recover

clean compiler

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
#### my compiler (src)


## V0.01

#### Scala


host language

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host language



## **Hacking Compilers**



Ken Thompson Turing Award, 1983 Ken Thompson showed how to hide a Trojan Horse in a compiler without leaving any traces in the source code.

No amount of source level verification will protect you from such Thompson-hacks.

Therefore in safety-critical systems it is important to rely on only a very small TCB.

### **Hacking Compilers**





Ken Thompson Turing Award, 198

I) Assume you ship the compiler as binary and also with sources. 2) Make the compiler aware when it compiles itself. 3) Add the Trojan horse. 4) Compile. 5) Delete Trojan horse from the sources of the compiler. 6) Go on holiday for the rest of your life. ;o)

## **Hacking Compilers**




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### **Our Compiler**



lexer input: string

lexer output: sequence of tokens (white space and comments filtered out) parser output: abstract syntax tree code gen output: assembler byte code / assembler machine code

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**For-Loops** 

#### for Id := AExp upto AExp do Block

# for i := 2 upto 4 do { write i }

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## While-Language

Stmt		skip Id := AExp if BExp then Block else Block while BExp do Block write Id read Id
Stmts	$\rightarrow$	Stmt ; Stmts Stmt
Block	$\rightarrow$	{Stmts} Stmt
AExp BExp	$\rightarrow \rightarrow$	•••• AFL 09, King's College

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#### Interpreter

eval(n, E)eval(x, E) $eval(a_1 + a_2, E)$  $eval(a_1 - a_2, E)$  $eval(a_1 * a_2, E)$ 

def n

 $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$ 

 $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$ lookup **x** in **E**  $E(\mathbf{x})$  $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$  $eval(a_1, E) + eval(a_2, E)$  $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$  $eval(a_1, E) - eval(a_2, E)$ def  $eval(a_1, E) * eval(a_2, E)$ 

 $eval(a_1 = a_2, E)$  $eval(a_1!=a_2,E)$  $eval(a_1 < a_2, E)$ 

 $eval(a_1, E) = eval(a_2, E)$  $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$  $\neg(\operatorname{eval}(a_1, E) = \operatorname{eval}(a_2, E))$ def  $eval(a_1, E) < eval(a_2, E)$ 

## Interpreter (2)

 $eval(skip, E) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} E$  $\operatorname{eval}(x := a, E) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} E(x \mapsto \operatorname{eval}(a, E))$ eval(if b then  $cs_1$  else  $cs_2, E$ )  $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$ if eval(b, E) then  $eval(cs_1, E)$ else eval(cs, E)eval(while *b* do *cs*, *E*)  $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$ if eval(b, E)then eval(while b do cs, eval(cs, E)) else Eeval(write x, E)  $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=}$  { println(E(x)) ; E }

## **Compiling Writes**

#### write x

.method public static write(I)V (library function) .limit locals 5 .limit stack 5 iload 0 getstatic java/lang/System/out Ljava/io/PrintStream; swap invokevirtual java/io/PrintStream/println(I)V return .end method

iload E(x)invokestatic write(I)V .class public XXX.XXX .super java/lang/Object

.method public <init>0V aload\_0 invokenonvirtual java/lang/Object/<init>0V return .end method

.method public static main([Ljava/lang/String;)V .limit locals 200 .limit stack 200

(here comes the compiled code)

return .end method